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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to stimulate a discussion toward developing an all- 
encompassing Inter-agency Information Operations organization. The authors define an 
environment and identify theories that point toward the necessity of integrating 
Information Operations (10) throughout the U.S. Government (USG). The authors 
explore the feasibility of establishing and empowering an inter-agency organization that 
will monitor, evaluate and enforce all aspects of 10. 
Early forms of 10 and its' deployment are depicted in the historical backdrop of 
World War II. Concepts of renown futurists identify the importance of the Information 
Age and the essential process to maximize its' full potential. A correlation between the 
current national security strategy and the 10 environment strongly suggests the need for 
innovation. 
An overview of the current 10 environment and USG organizations reveal a 
technological move toward inter-agency 10. Both the art and science sides of 10 are 
incorporated into a new organization. OrgCon 7.0 is used to analyze the proposed 10 
organizational structure, which provides specific recommendations and defines misfits 
that must be addressed. The authors conclude that further work is required in modeling 
the organization via alternate software and a more in depth look is required in the area of 
National Security 10. The authors provide the essential groundwork for further research. 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
A. THESIS STATEMENT 
In the wake of the Information Revolution, the numerous means of information 
exchange have exposed weaknesses that have been the source of much attention to 
include security, continuity, integrity and reliability. Although there are various methods 
and schools of thought to which information operations may be conducted, there must 
exist a cohesive policy and common structure from which those methods are employed. 
Policies, strategies and tactics all originate from an organization. Unfortunately, if an 
organization is stagnant, "old school" and unwavering in its' approaches to new 
problems, then it is fair to say that policies and therefore the methods in which we 
approach information operations will too be considered.. .obsolete. 
B. MOTIVATION 
. In looking back through history, there exists three major shifts or "waves" in 
civilization to date. The First Wave dates back 10,000 years and is described as the 
"agrarian" age. It was during these first few thousands of years that civilization was 
dominated by nomadic wandering and hunting that evolved into farming and villages. 
The Second Wave began at the closing of the 18th century and is described as the 
"industrial revolution." The Second Wave brought the beginnings of steam, mass 
production,   and  modern  machinery.   The  Third  Wave  involves  the  "information 
1 
revolution", which roughly began with the dawn of the space race in the 1950s. This 
period has experienced the birth of information technology plus social freedom and 
individuality. This brings us to where we stand today, in the middle of the information 
age. [Toffler, 1993] This is the model developed by Alvin and Heidi Toffler to depict 
where civilization has been, in hopes of predicting what the future may bring. 
If the Information Age began nearly 50 years ago, why is it referred to as the 
"Information Revolution" today? Thomas Czerwinski expounds upon the Tofflers' 
theory, taking a deeper look into the in mechanics of the Third Wave. Czerwinski states 
that, 'The Third Wave is not marked by a paradigm shift, but rather the lack of a 
paradigm." [Czerwinski, 1996] Czerwinski breaks down the composition of waves into 
three planes. The First Plane is inhabited by technology, artifacts and processes, which 
depict the economy, politics and social forms. The Second or "Intermediate" Plane 
describes the cultural aspects, such as art, literature, poetry, philosophy, and ideology. 
The Third Plane depicts the foundation, the fundamental ways of thinking. (See Table 1.) 
Layer 
-'iA«**iK.'* i- *-t*~ *■■*■■■   -"«^"TO.WW&S1'<:Soffit f r 
1st Wave 2nd Wave 3rd Wave 
Application Agrarian Industrial Information 
Interpretive Premodemism Modernism Postmodernism 
Foimdational Faith Reason Intuition 
Table 1. Wave Composition [After: Czerwinski, 1996] 
Historical studies support the concepts of Czerwinski and the Tofflers. First Wave 
wars were fought over land and natural resources. Second Wave wars while still fought 
over land, also targeted industrial centers and production plants. Warfare of the Third 
Wave still shows remnants of the First and Second Waves, but the focus is shifting 
toward the access and control of information. The United States, in its' brief history, 
depicts the transition through the waves. The economy of the United States, up until the 
late 18th century, was based upon land and natural resources. As the Second Wave 
approached, the economic wealth shifted toward industrial infrastructure. Today, in the 
thick of what is referred to as the "Information Revolution," the economy is once again 
shifting. The new wealth lies in knowledge, data and information along with the ability to 
store, transport and protect it. 
It is the synchronization of the three planes (application, interpretive and 
foundational) that marks a complete shift from one wave to another. The First 
(application) Plane is represented by the advances in technology and processes. The 
economy has seen significant changes as the focus shift to information based companies. 
Politics have been challenged with issues such as the importance of privacy and the 
security of information. The Second (Intermediate or Interpretive) Plane has been altered 
in the appearance of information-based cultures. Art in the form of short films, music and 
literature are finding audiences on the Internet, where as they may have never been seen 
heard, or read before. The Internet has induced a flurry of new phrases and words that 
may one day be seen as shift in our language. The Age of Postmodernist thought may 
indeed be upon us. 
The primary goal of Postmodernists is to challenge convictions about the 
objectivity of knowledge, and the stability of language. They challenge the 
neutrality of science and the modem state and assert that their cognitive 
methods are biases by their agendas that are gendered, ideological and 
politicized....They also argue against the possibility of any certain 
knowledge. 'Truth' derives from the construct.... that human beings do 
not discover a truth in accordance with nature; they invent it, so the truth is 
always changing. [Appleby, Jacob & Hunt, 1995] 
The Third (Foundational) Plane is still in progress and therefore, not entirely defined or 
understood. Czerwinski identifies the Age of Intuition as a concept based upon non-linear 
sciences. 
The hallmark of non-linear science is the startling idea that apparent chaos 
such as international relations, white water rapids, and battlefields, are 
unpredictable, but within bounds, self-organizing. [Czerwinski, 1996] 
The Information Age has provided the opportunity to explore the idea of self- 
organization. This presents problems that must be solved. It is the synchronization of the 
three planes that will produce a genuine and complete shift into the Third Wave. 
In 1996, the United States took another step toward the Third Wave. President 
Clinton signed The Clinger/Cohen Act, whose former title was the Information 
Technology Management Reform Act. This directs Federal agencies to establish a 
comprehensive approach toward managing the acquisition, use, and disposal of 
information technology. The act also ensures that Information Technology (IT) 
investments support strategic operational goals, and that delivery of services to the public 
are technologically up to date. The Clinger/Cohen Act established the position of Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) within each Executive Agency and tasked them with the 
responsibility of developing, maintaining, and facilitating the implementation of sound 
and integrated IT enterprise architectures (EA). This act establishes the CIO council, 
made up of CIOs from all of the executive agencies. This council establishes the 
framework needed to completely integrate 10 in the government. The focus is on the 
technology and science aspects of Information Operations. The CIO Council fails to 
integrate both the art and science sides of 10. This art side consists of soft perception 
techniques that range from public affairs to psychological operations. It is the fusion of 
art and science that is so essential in Information Operations. 
C. THESIS GOALS 
The overall goals of this thesis are to: 
• Research and evaluate the current structures and policies of Information 
Operations (10) at a Departmental/Agency level within the United States 
Government. 
• Depict the current methods of how individual departments and agencies co- 
operate with each other in the realm of Information Operations. 
• Identify inadequacies in the current Inter-Agency 10 environment and propose 
legitimate corrective measures. 
Develop an organizational structure that will support solutions and remedies 
for the problems identified in the current environment. 
• Analyze the proposed structure using Organization Consultant (OrgCon) 7.0 
design software. 
• Establish a solid foundation and provide recommendations from which future 
works may be endeavored. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION & SUMMARY 
This thesis is organized in to eight chapters. Each chapter is summarized as 
follows: 
• Chapter I: Introduction. Identifies the purpose and motivation of the thesis. 
Establishes the thesis goals and objectives. 
• Chapter II: Historical Reference: Depicts the importance of harnessing 
information operations via British and German intelligence agencies during 
World War EL 
• Chapter IK: Overview of Present Information Operations. Describes the 
current IO structures, down to the executive agency level and identifies 
deficiencies. 
• Chapter IV: Relationship Between National Security, IO and Innovation. 
Examines current National Security policy and threats while focusing on the 
importance of Information Operations and innovation. 
• Chapter V: Organizational Theory and Structure Methodology. Analyzes and 
describes key aspects and functional factors of organizational design. 
• Chapter VI: Structure for the Inter-agency IO Council. Defines the proposed 
organizational structure, identifying major players, important relationships and 
general tasks. 
• Chapter VII: Analysis of the Organization. Overview of Organizational 
Consultant (OrgCon 7.0) with the inputs, results and recommendations from 
the program. 
• Chapter VIII: Future Considerations and Conclusion. Purposes thoughts and 
ideas of future considerations (possible future research) and closes the thesis 
via a conclusion. 
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II.    A HISTORICAL REFERENCE - WWII INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
Information Operations (10) was a key factor in the Allied victory in Europe. 
Although Information Operations was not the "official" term of the day, many operations 
that would be considered 10 today, were conducted and conducted well. Communications 
were conducted via telegraph and radio. Radar, while used by both the Axis and the 
Allies, was still in its' infancy. Propaganda was widely used on both sides, both against 
the enemy and their own public. Deception, while not a new concept, had utilized the new 
technologies of the day. "All warfare is based on deception." [Sun Tzu, 1963, p.53] 
Communications, radar, propaganda, and deception all revolve around information. 
Between the Axis and the Allies, there was a battle for control of information and 
disinformation. These battles were fought between the intelligence agencies. The agency 
that could decode and manipulate the other's information while protecting their own 
would prevail. "It is often possible by adopting all kinds of measures of deception to 
drive the enemy in the plight of making erroneous judgments and taking erroneous 
actions, thus depriving him of his superiority and initiative." [Sun Tzu, 1963, p. 53] 
A. BRITISH INTELLIGENCE 
In the early parts of World War II, Winston Churchill recognized the importance 
of a solid intelligence network and the role that it would play in the defeat of the Axis 
countries. It is with this knowledge that he would establish and then call upon Special 
Operations Executive (SOE) and London Controlling Section (LCS). "It was Churchill 
who had all of the ideas. It was his drive, his brilliant imagination, and his technical 
knowledge that initiated all these ideas and plans." [Brown, 1975, p. 8] 
The SOE and LCS had special liaisons that worked effectively and efficiently 
with United States and their Office of Strategic Services (OSS). This sharing of 
information was key in the ramping up of U.S. intelligence operations, ensuring that their 
impact was quick, efficient and effective. 
During the War, London became the center of anti-German Intelligence activities. 
Allied intelligence networks made London their center of operations. All European 
campaigns were directed from the London headquarters, as important information was 
gathered, analyzed and disseminated throughout Europe and around the globe. 
1.   London Controlling Section 
London Controlling Section (LCS) was an organization established by Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill in 1941. LCS worked in cooperation with MI-5 (British 
security service responsible for domestic national security matters), MI-6 (British security 
service, otherwise known as the SIS, responsible for collecting foreign intelligence 
relating to national security), SOE and the OSS. The purpose of the LCS was to spread 
disinformation and coordinate all Allied deception efforts against the Axis. 
Prior to World War II, British deception had been the responsibility of the Inter- 
Services Security Board (ISSB). In late 1940, the British North Africa campaign 
developed a special section of intelligence assets whose responsibility was to deceive the 
opposing Italian forces. It was the success of this deception, on a small scale, that led to 
10 
the establishment of LCS. London Controlling Section proved its' value during the 
landings of Sicily and Italy in 1943. LCS coordinated all information regarding the 
operation, spreading disinformation and gathering accurate information on enemy forces. 
The end result was a success, with Axis forces sparsely deployed along coastlines 
between Greece and Sardinia, posing a minimal threat to Allied forces. 
In 1944 the Allies began preparations for invading Europe. Operation Bodyguard 
was commenced; a deception intended to conceal Allied intentions in northwest Europe. 
"[LCS] coordinated all British military, political, and civil agencies to make certain that 
they conformed to the multitude, of Bodyguard deception schemes." [Breuer, 1993] 
Coordination efforts were massive and detailed. The United States was a part of the 
deception with all efforts coordinated through the Joint Security Control (JSC). The JSC 
was the American version of the LCS with members from the Army, Navy and Air Corps. 
The LCS employed many "soft" perception techniques, but when physical action 
was required they called upon MI-5, MI-6, SOE and the OSS. MI-5 worked with the 
Twenty Committee, other wise known as XX or Double Cross, and developed the 
deception plans for Normandy and coordinated all operations through the LCS. MI-5 and 
Scotland Yard aided the Double Cross Committee in capturing German agents that had 
infiltrated Britain. The XX Committee then turned the captured into double agents as to 
manipulate information received by German High Command. "It is essential to seek out 
enemy agents who have come to conduct espionage against you and to bribe them to 
serve you." [Sun Tzu, 1963, p. 148] 
11 
The cornerstone of secure German messages was the "Enigma." A revolutionary 
device that the German's thought was unbreakable. The British, via Ultra, used a captured 
German "Enigma" device to decode and encode Nazi message traffic. The XX 
Committee and Ultra provided LCS with the ability to coordinate information that was 
being pumped in to the Nazi information network (via XX), verify that the information 
had been received (via Ultra) and then confirm any Nazi reactions (via Ultra). 
2.   Special Operations Executive 
Headquartered in London, Special Operations Executive (SOE) was established in 
July of 1940 by direction of Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The purpose of SOE was 
to coordinate all actions against the Axis by way of subversion and sabotage. In essence, 
SOE was a physical arm of London Controlling Section. 
British Espionage efforts were crippled during the initial stages of the war. MI-6's 
intelligence networks were nearly completely compromised or destroyed. The SOE then 
began the rebuilding of these networks drawing assets from all sections of the British 
government. The SOE was divided into three sections; SOI - Propaganda, S02 - Active 
Operations, and S03 - Planning. 
The SOE took on activities previously carried out by the War Department's 
Military Intelligence Research (MI(R)), Section D of the Secret Intelligence Service or 
MI-6, and the Department of Propaganda of the Foreign Office or Department Electra 
House. The SOE was then empowered with coordinating all "subversive" plans. The SOE 
ensured that all irregular operations were in sync with general strategic plans. 
12 
Since organized resistance groups already existed in the Nazi occupied countries, 
the SOE was tasked with financing, supplying, and directing the different guerilla 
operations. SOE agents were assigned to the resistance groups, parachuting behind enemy 
lines. These agents were experts in espionage, electronics, explosives, and 
communications. SOE efforts used state-of-the-art technology and irregular tactics to 
disrupt communications, transportation and supply lines. Instrumental in the success of 
the D-Day Allied landings, the SOE was a key factor in stimulating resistance movements 
throughout Europe allowing the Allied forces to gain a foothold on the continent. 
In 1946, after a nearly six-year battle against the Axis and their troops, the SOE 
was disbanded. It is impossible to list all of the SOE operations; many are still classified, 
even today. It is evident that the efforts of the SOE were vital to an Allied victory. 
B. GERMAN INTELLIGENCE 
In 1938 the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) or High Command of the 
Armed Forces was established. The OKW replaced the old Reich War Ministry. The 
OKW coordinated all efforts of the German military forces. 
Nazi Germany employed numerous intelligence agencies. The agencies included 
the Abwehr, the Sicherheitsdienst (Security Police), the Schutzstaffel (Protective 
Squadrons), the Reich Sicherheits Hauptamt (Main Security Office), and the Geheimes 
Staatspolizeiamt (Gestapo). The inherent problem of these agencies was that they not 
only conducted operations against the adversaries of Germany and the Nazi party, but 
against each other as well. The agencies became the personal troops of their respective 
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directors and were employed as political tools. None was more evident than the turmoil 
between The Abwehr's "old school" Wilhelm Canaris and the Sicherheitsdienst's "young 
devoted" Walther Schellenberg. 
The two heads of Germany's intelligence agencies were mortal enemies. Canaris 
was an old school German who did not like what Hitler and the Nazi party had done to 
his homeland. On the surface, Canaris was an outspoken true believer in the Nazi cause. 
Underneath, Canaris was a traitor to the Nazi party who divulged secrets to the Allies and 
plotted a coup to assassinate Hitler. Schellenberg was a "genuine" true believer and had 
suspected that Canaris was a traitor, which is why the Sicherheitsdienst spied on the 
Abwehr. 
1.   The Abwehr & Brandenbourg Commandos 
The Abwehr was Germany's foreign information and counterintelligence 
department. Established in 1866 as a Prussian agency, the Abwehr successfully conducted 
espionage against Austria in a conflict between the two Germanic nations. The Abwehr 
continued to prove itself in the Franco-Prussian War and World War I. After Germany's 
loss in WWI, the Abwehr was disbanded. Only to be reinstated in the early 1920's under 
the Weimar Republic. 
The Abwehr was the German War Ministry's intelligence and espionage agency 
that was established in the early 1920's under the Weimar Republic. The Abwehr 
employed saboteur tactics by operating behind enemy lines just ahead of German forces. 
Utilizing a battalion of agents, the Abwehr would capture roadways, bridges, and other 
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strategically valuable targets before retreating forces could destroy them. This battalion of 
operatives was known as the "Ebbinghaus" battalion and was later renamed the 
"Brandenburg Commandos." The operatives that made up this special battalion were 
fluent in a number of different languages to include, Russian, Polish, Czech, and etc., 
which allowed them to infiltrate the variety operational areas. 
2.   The Sicherheitsdienst 
The Sicherheitsdienst (SD), or "Security Police", was the political intelligence 
arm of the Schutzstaffel (SS) or "Protective Squadrons". The mission of the SD was to 
conduct intelligence operations for the German state and the Nazi party. The SD was 
tasked with obtaining secret information on current and potential enemies of the state or 
the party, so that those threats could be neutralized. Unfortunately, a few of the current 
and potential enemies of the Nazi party were internal high-ranking members. 
C. INFORMATION: THE DECISIVE FACTOR 
The continuity between agencies and their ability to share information, work 
together and combine assets made the difference, "...the SD and Abwehr were devoting 
more energy and time in trying to discredit one another than they were spending in 
seeking to unlock the secrets of the looming assault on Fortress Europe." [Breuer, 1993, 
p. 19] The arrogance of the Nazi's in declaring their "enigma" unbreakable left them 
complacent and vulnerable. The Allies were able to compromise the German information 
network, pump in disinformation and get feedback without them even knowing. 
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During the Battle of Britain, it was the ability of Ultra combined with the use of 
radar and human spotters that produced excellent information on the location of incoming 
German bombers. The Royal Air Force (RAF) was then waiting to prey upon the 
unsuspecting bombers. To protect their access to the German information, the British 
would first send a scout plane and/or fake a radio transmission spotting the incoming 
bombers. This was done so that the Germans would not suspect a leak in their 
information network. This represents the effective blending of technology and "soft" 
perception techniques to achieve a decisive advantage in Information Operations. 
D. BRINGING IO FORWARD 
The authors believe, that the abilities displayed by the British and the Allies in 
gaining "information superiority" are exactly what must be emulated. Although today's 
conflicts are not to the scale of World War II, there are still those who would do harm to 
the United States. The technology today allows the smallest of groups, not even a nation 
state, to inflict significant amounts of damage. Attacks may range from weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) to a distributed denial of service (DDOS) network attack. In all cases 
information is at the center. Aggressive IO may uncover a plot to detonate a nuclear 
weapon inside the continental U.S. and solid IO defense measures may defuse a harmful 
computer virus before it infects millions of computers. Information Operations must be 
attended to, from both a technology and a "soft" perspective. 
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III.   OVERVIEW OF PRESENT INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a common understanding through 
terminology and concepts. A description of the current 10 organization will depict who 
the main players are within each executive agency and how they interact. In today's 
environment the private sector has taken the lead in terms of technological innovation and 
organizational practice. The Chief Information Officer (CIO) of a large corporation today, 
is a key figure of the organization. The CIO works closely with the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) in developing strategy, policy, milestones and goals. The CIO oversees, all 
aspects of information, from information systems to public relations. The government has 
adopted many of the new technologies used in the private sector. The authors suggest that 
the government must now take a few pages from of the private sector's organizational 
playbook. 
B. ART VS. SCIENCE 
Information Operations (10) integrates areas such as electronic warfare (EW), 
psychological operations (PSYOPs), public affairs (PA), information security (IS), civil 
affairs (CA). In effect 10 has blended the two polarized sides of information management 
and information manipulation; art and science. 
17 
The art side incorporates diplomacy, public affairs (PA), civil affairs (CA), 
psychological operations (PSYOPs), deception and some aspects of operational security 
(OPSEC) into the larger picture of 10. These forms of 10 require the employment of 
"soft" perception techniques that attack, defend and exploit the inner workings of the 
human mind and cultures. These "soft" techniques are aimed at influencing a target 
audience, whether it is a small group or an entire population. 
The science side involves technology in the forms of computer network attacks 
(CNA), computer network defense (CND), cyber-terrorism, physical destruction, 
electronic warfare (EW) and such. The science side of 10 depicts an offensive advantage, 
in that anyone with the equipment and the savvy may conduct a CNA in the form of a 
distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack or computer virus. As quickly as defensive 
measures are taken, they are unable to keep up. [Gerblick, 2000, p. 3] 
C. THE CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER'S COUNCIL 
The Chief Information Officers (CIO) Council was established by Executive 
Order 13011, Federal Information Technology, on July 16, 1996 (APPENDIX E. 
EXECUTIVE ORDER 13011 OF JULY 16, 1996). This was later named the Clinger- 
Cohen Act. The CIO Council serves as the principal inter-agency forum for improving 
practices in the design, modernization, use, sharing, and performance of Federal 
Government agency information resources. The Council's role includes developing 
recommendations for information technology management (ITM) policies, procedures, 
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and standards; identifying opportunities to share information resources; and assessing and 
addressing the needs of the Federal Government's IT workforce, [cio.gov] 
The Chair of the CIO Council is the Deputy Director for Management for the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the CIO Council elects the Vice Chair 
from its membership. Membership on the Council is comprised of CIOs and Deputy CIOs 
from the Federal executive agencies: 
Department of State 
Department of Justice 
Department of Commerce 
Department of Housing and 
Urban Development 
Department of Education 
Federal Emergency Management 
Agency 
Social Security Administration 
Department of the Treasury 
Department of the Interior 
Department of Labor 
Department of Transportation 
Department of Defense 
Department of Agriculture 
Department of Health and Human 
Services 
Department of Energy 
Department of Veterans Affairs      Environmental Protection Agency 
Central Intelligence Agency Small Business Administration 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
Agency for International 
Development 
General Services Administration National Science Foundation Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
Office of Personnel Management 
Table 2. Members of the CIO Council 
CIO Council membership may also include representatives from the smaller Federal 
agencies, and liaisons to other executive councils, committees, and boards. 
The CIO Council serves as a focal point for coordinating inter-agency challenges. 
The CIO Council. committees are designated to meet these challenges. The Council's 
committees for the year 2000 included: Capital Planning and IT Management; Federal IT 
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Workforce; Security, Privacy and Critical Infrastructure; Enterprise Interoperability and 
Emerging IT; Outreach; and E-Gov. 
D. EXECUTIVE AGENCY ORGANIZATIONS 
1.   Department of Defense 
The mission of the Department of Defense is to provide the military forces needed 
to deter war and to protect the security of the country. 
The Department of Defense is divided into several groups: three military 
departments, fourteen defense agencies, nine field activities, nine Unified Combatant 
Commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Inspector General (IG) and the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense (OSD). 
The military departments include the Army, the Air Force and the Navy-Marne 
Corps. These departments are responsible for recruiting, training and equipping their 
forces, but operational control of those forces is assigned to one of the unified combatant 
commands, [defenselink.mil] 
The fourteen defense agencies include: 
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Ballistic Missile Defense 
Organization 
Defense Contract Audit Agency 
Defense Intelligence Agency 
Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency 
National Imagery And Mapping 
 Agency  
Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency 
Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service 
Defense Legal Services Agency 
Defense Security Service 
National Security Agency 
Defense Commissary Agency 
Defense Information Systems 
Agency 
Defense Logistics Agency 
Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency 
Table 3. Defense Agencies 
The nine Unified Combatant Commands are: 
U.S. European Command 
U.S. Southern Command 
U.S. Special Operations 
Command 
U.S. Pacific Command 
U.S. Central Command 
U.S. Transportation Command 
U.S. Joint Forces Command 
U.S. Space Command 
U.S. Strategic Command 
Table 4. Unified Combatant Commands 
The nine Field Activities are: 
American Forces Information        Defense Prisoner of War/Missing 
Service 




Defense Medical Programs 
Activity 
Office of Civilian Health & 
Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services 
DoD Human Resources Activity 
Office of Economic Adjustment 
Defense Technology Security 
Administration 
Table 5. Field Activities of the DOD 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is responsible for the development 
of policy, planning, resource management, finances, and program evaluation. OSD 
includes the immediate offices of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Under 
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Secretaries of Defense, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Assistant 
Secretaries of Defense, General Counsel, Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) - Command, Control, Communications, and 
Intelligence (C3I), Assistant Secretary of Defense Legislative Affairs, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense Public Affairs, and Director of Administration and Management. The entire 
DoD Organization is depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. DoD Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: defenselink.mil] 
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The Secretary's primary subordinate responsible for Information Operations (10) 
is the Chief Information Officer (CIO). The ASD-C3I performs the duties of CIO. The 
ASD-C3I has four Deputies: Deputy CIO; Intelligence; Security & Information. 
Operations; Command, Control. Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, 
Reconnaissance (C3ISR) & Space; Program & Evaluation. The CIO's Organization is 
represented in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. DoD CIO Organizational Chart (as of Jan 2001) [From: defenselink.mil] 
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2.   Department of State 
The State Department is the lead agency on matters regarding foreign affairs. The 
department advances U.S. objectives and interests abroad by formulating, representing. 
and implementing the President's foreign policies. Major agencies within the department 
include the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Office of International Information 
Programs, all of which are subordinate to the Secretary of State, [state.gov] 
The State Department is headed by the Secretary of State. The secretary is aided 
by a Deputy Secretary, five Under Secretaries (Political Affairs; Economic, Business and 
Agricultural Affairs; Arms Control and International Affairs; Management; and Global 
Affairs) and 19 Assistant Secretaries. The Assistant Secretaries are responsible for the 
numerous functions that make up the State Department. (See Figure 3.) Their 
responsibilities are broken up by region and/or areas of specialty. There are numerous 
additional assistants and specialists that are employed to maintain an effective grasp of 
the world's international relations. One of these assistants/specialists is the Chief 
Information Officer (CIO). 
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Figure 3. BOS Organizational Chart (as of Oct 1999) [From: state.gov] 
The CIO is the Department's lead official responsible for the information 
technology (IT) operations, policies and plans needed to achieve strategic Department 
missions. The CIO is the equivalent of an assistant secretary, and serves as the Under 
Secretary for Management's principal advisor on IT matters. The CIO also heads the 
Department's Bureau of Mormation Resource Management (IRM). The IRM Bureau's 
mission is to provide the Department of State the reliable, secure, and high quality IT 
infrastructure and services that are fundamental to foreign affairs operations and the 
conduct of U.S. diplomacy. The CIO is supported by four primary deputies: Operations; 
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Architecture, Planning and Regulations; Management and Customer Service and Foreign 
Affairs System integration. (See Figure 4.) 
Chief Information Officer 
Fernando Burbano 
Chief Knowledge Officer 
Joseph Chaddic 
Deputy CIO for Operations 
Robert Surprise 
Deputy CIO for Architecture 8 Planning 
Roy Standing 
Deputy CIO for Management Deputy CIO for Foreign Afairs 
Patricia Popovich "jos eph Chaddic 
Figure 4. DOS CIO Organizational Chart (as of Jan 2001) [From: state.gov] 
3.   Department of Justice 
The Department represents the citizens of the United States in enforcing the law 
in the public interest and plays a key role in protection against criminals; ensuring healthy 
competition of business; safeguarding the consumer; enforcing drug, immigration, and 
naturalization laws; and protecting citizens through effective law enforcement. The 
Department conducts all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States is 
concerned. It represents the Government in legal matters rendering legal advice and 
opinions, upon request, to the President and to the heads of the executive departments. 
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The affairs and activities of the Department are supervised and directed by the Attorney 
General (AG). [usdoj.gov] 
The AG directs and oversees the work of more than 30 separate component 
organizations of the Department. (See Figure 5.) These components include the 
Department's five major law enforcement bureaus: the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the United States Marshals Service 
(USMS); the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS); and the Bureau of Prisons 
(BOP). There are also six divisions that conduct litigation (Civil, Criminal, Antitrust, 
Civil Rights, Environment and Natural Resources, and Tax), the U.S. Attorneys, and a 
number of additional organizations (offices and boards) essential to the Department's 
fulfillment of its mission. 
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Figure 5. DOJ Organizational Chart (as of Feb 2001) [From: usdoj.gov] 
The Assistant Attorney General for Administration (AAG/A) heads -the Justice 
Management Division (JMD) and serves as the Department's Chief Information Officer 
(CIO). The JMD is the principal administrative arm of the Department. The JMD controls 
policy, oversight, and service delivery responsibilities in such diverse functional areas as 
budget finance, procurement, personnel, and the Information Resources Management 
(BRM) staff. The CIO or AAG/A is supported by four key deputies: ERM; Controller; 
Human Resources/Administration; and Law & Policy. (See Figure 6.) 
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Figure 6. DOJ CIO Organizational Chart (as of Jan 2001) [From: usdoj.gov] 
4.   Department of Commerce 
The Department of Commerce (DOC) promotes job creation, economic growth, 
sustainable development and improved living standards for all Americans by working in 
partnership with business, universities, communities and workers. The DOC promotes 
U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace by strengthening and safeguarding the 
nation's" economic infrastructure. U.S. Industry is kept competitive with cutting-edge 
science and technology and an unrivaled information base. The DOC manages the 
nation's resources and assets to ensure sustainable economic opportunities, [doc.gov] 
The Department is broken down into ten offices: 
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National Telecommunications & 
Information Administration 
(NTIA) 
Technology Administration (TA) 
Economics & Statistics 
Administration (ESA) 
National Oceanic & Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) 




Minority Business Development 
Agency (MBDA) 
Patent & Trademark Office 
(PTO) 
Table 6. Offices of the DOC 
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Figure 7. DOC Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: doc.gov] 
The DOC has taken the approach of creating an independent position of CIO. The 
role ofthe DOC CIO is to provide guidance to the CIOs of all the Bureaus and Operating 
Units within the DOC. In addition, the DOC CIO manages Programs such as Digital 
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Department, Y2K requirements compliance, Protection of the Critical Infrastructure, and 
Data Center consolidation, which are most effectively run on a centralized basis. The 
DOC CIO advises the Secretary on all matters regarding IT. 
The bureau CIOs manage the IT within their bureaus, coordinating with the DOC 
CIO. CIOs of the Operating Units within the bureau manage the IT within their Operating 
Units and coordinate with the bureau CIO on IT activities within their Units. All DOC 
bureau CIOs are to attend the DOC CIO Council Meetings. At these meetings, the bureau 
CIOs exchange ideas and provide the DOC CIO with inputs on Department policy and 
procedures. 
The DOC CIO has eight internal offices that support him/her: 
T-.- -.. 1 T^     _^_    x                    Office of Computer Services         Office of Information Collection 
Digital Department                                    rr\nv\                                      A A    I   •  /V^TOA-V (OCS)                                   and Analysis (OICA) 
Office of Information Planning       Office of Information Policy and        Office of Information Systems 
and Review (OIPR)                          Technology (OIPT)                                     (OIS) 
Office of Technical Support and        Office of Telecommunications 
Network Services (OTS&NS);                 Management (OTM) 
Table 7. Offices of the DOC CIO 
The Digital Department is responsible for planning and coordinating activities 
necessary for Commerce to perform most internal and external processes electronically. 
The Office of Computer Services (OCS) manages and operates a computer center 
to support the Office of the Secretary and designated operating units. The Office of 
Information Collection and Analysis administers the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA). 
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The Office develops Department-wide policy and guidance for the program and provides 
ongoing assistance to Commerce operating units in implementing the PRA. The Office 
reports to the Director for Digital Department. 
The OIPR administers the IT planning, IT investment review, computer security, 
and IT architecture and standards programs. OIPR develops Department-wide policy and 
guidance for all four programs and provides ongoing assistance to Commerce operating 
units in implementing these programs. 
The OIPT administers the CIO's information technology risk management 
program, the IT liaison program to the operating units and coordinates IT data calls from 
OMB and other Federal departments. OPT develops Departmental policy for 
management and use of IT resources, as well as the acquisition of these resources. OIPT 
also recommends approval or disapproval to the CIO for requirements initiative/business 
case justification, specifications and benefit/cost analyses for IT resources from the 
operating units. 
The OIS reports to the Digital Department Director. OIS provides systems 
analysis, design, development support, and oversight for Department automated systems 
for administrative and program management (excluding financial systems). OIS develops 
and manages numerous administrative and management systems in support of the 
Department's program offices. 
The OTS&NS provides a broad range of technical and systems management 
assistance for the Secretary and designated operating units. 
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The OTM reports to the Digital Department Director.  OTM develops and 
implements policies and  guidelines related to Commerce telecommunications and 
coordinate the management of all Departmental telecommunication systems 
5.   Department of the Treasury 
The Mission of the Department of the Treasury is to, promote prosperous and 
stable American and World economies, manage the Government's Finances, safeguard all 
Financial  Systems,  protect the nation's  leaders,  and  secure  a  safe and drug-free 
environment, [treasury.gov] 
The Department is made up of numerous offices, bureaus and services to include: 
Departmental Offices               Office of Inspector General (IG)        Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
TT„ _            o     •    /TTO^ON         Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &           TTO ,-,      i0     .    „.„„„v U.S. Customs Service (USCS)                     p.           f A.TF>                               Secret Service (USSS) 
Federal Law Enforcement             Financial Crimes Enforcement         „            _   r .       r    , ,—j™. ™   • ■     -,         ^r ^~™                      ,,        , ,-. „r-Ts                 Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF) Training Center (FLETC)                      Network (FinCEN)                             3                         v      ' 
Office of the Comptroller of the          Office of Thrift Supervision                           ,,„„. 
Currency (OCC)                                       (OTS)                                            u.^.Mmt 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing       Financial Management Service       Bureau rf ^ ^^ Debt (ßpD) 
(BEP)                                               (FMS) 
Community Development             „            T        ^    /-,        i *• 
_.       . ,, \.^ t.      /^TNCTN          Treasury Inspector General for Financial Institutions (CDFI)                  „     . f . . .   .. 
_    ,                                    Tax Administration Fund 
Table 8. Offices of the Treasury 
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Figure 8. Treasury Organizational Chart (as of Nov 2000) [From: treasury.gov] 
The Deputy Assistant Secretary Information Systems (DASIS) is the CIO of the 
Treasury Department. Treasury has approached the task of IO in a way congruent to that 
of the DOC. Although they have added a title to an existing position, the DASIS, the 
Treasury has established a CIO for each bureau, office and service. Each of those CIOs is 
subordinate to the DASIS on issues regarding IT. The office of the CIO is divided into 
seven sections: Senior Technical Officer (STO); Administrative Support; Security; IT 
Policy and Strategy; Infrastructure and Operations; Customer Service Consulting; and 
Chief Operating Officer (COO)/ Business Practices. (See Figure 9.) 
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Figure 9. Treasury CIO Organizational Chart (as of Jan 2001) [From: treasury.gov] 
6.   Department of Energy 
The Department of Energy's (DOE) mission is provide a secure and reliable 
energy system that is environmentally and economically sustainable, to oversee the 
Nation's nuclear programs, and to ensure the United States remains on the cutting edge of 
science and technology, [energy.gov] 
The DOE is comprised of over 31 offices broken up into 3 key groups: the Under 
Secretary of Nuclear Security; the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment, 
and the Departmental Staff and Support Offices. (See Figure 10.) 
35 






A^Mfofti* CtMtff nl 
NIUIMT Smvnty 
fc( Etuccry, Sdcivt kiwl 
Xmir *»*.*<* 
DtpufyAdntebtrtlci 
f«r 9 tf«UM Fr*rr*<v* 
Offic«*f Siiowt 
b iputy Adrainktrrt« 
f<r F**nt &uxjy 
<<s £n«rr/ EÄUievy 


















CJürf fcrf«m rtfcm Offi» <r 
Qf&t «f bhdrpend«ni ÖrenäxM 
tun* PvtftiniM t Atnr tut 
Difictf<r*&< Äff «fact 
Offk* «f MuufCMort 
und Adnintrtrrt«* 
O&.rfWwfcor m<l 
MEt« dt H*vin(* ml App«üi 
CHWrut Adsnti m4 
Mvctfi ttUn fx«i«tt Ott* * 
{«rotucy ««TEiuriy 
A4viitry3»ird 
ft «ft»« NWb *r F.dfcÄ.1 
Srfrfvltaar<lliii*« 
Figure 10. DOE Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: energy.gov] 
The Director of Security and Emergency Operations was designated the DOE's 
CIO. The CIO supports the Secretary on all departmental IT concerns. The CIO is 
supported by five offices: Records and Business Management; Architecture, Standards 
and Policy; Cyber Security; Operations; and Special Projects. (See Figure 11.) 
The Office of Records, & Business Management ensures that the Department's 
recorded information is managed in an economical, effective, and efficient manner 
throughout its life cycle in support of mission accomplishment and accountability. 
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The Office of Architecture, Standards, and Policy provides advice and other 
assistance to the CIO and other senior management personnel to ensure that information 
technology and resources are planned for, acquired and managed in a manner that 
implements the policies and procedures of legislation. 
The Office of Cyber Security manages the Department-wide communications 
security (COMSEC), Unclassified Computer Security programs, and provides assistance 
and guidance in these areas to all DOE entities. 
The Office of Operations provides advice and technical infrastructure support to 
the CIO and other senior Departmental officials to ensure delivery of vital Information 
Management (FM) and Information Technology (IT) services. 
The Special Projects Office identifies, directs, and manages high-priority 
corporate information management and information technology projects. This office also 
advises the CIO and Senior DOE Management on the implementation of information 
technology solutions to achieve management efficiencies in business processes. 
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Figure 11. DOE CIO Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: doe.gov] 
7.   Department of Transportation 
The mission of the Department of Transportation (DOT) is to ensure that the U.S. 
has a fast, safe, efficient, accessible and convenient transportation system that meets vital 
national interests and enhances quality of life, [dot.gov] 
The DOT is made up by a number of organizations. Key organizations include: 
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Office of the Secretary of 
Transportation (OST) 
Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (BTS) 
Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) 
Federal Highway Administration 
(FHWA) 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration (FMCSA) 
Federal Railroad Administration 
(ERA) 




National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) 
Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) 
Research and Special Programs 
Administration (RSPA) 
Saint Lawrence Seaway 
Development Corporation 
(SLSDC) 
Surface Transportation Board 
(STB); 
Transportation Administrative 
Services Center (TASC) 
United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) 
Table 9. Organizations of the DOT 
A full view of the DOT organization is depicted in Figure 12. 


















































Figure 12. DOT Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: dot.gov] 
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The DOT CIO is an independent entity that is responsible for all departmental 10. 
The DOT CIO chairs a Council that includes CIOs or senior IT officials from the thirteen 
operating entities within DOT. Additional members include representatives from the 
CFO, Inspector General and General Counsel's offices. The DOT CIO is supported by a 
structure consisting of Strategic Planning and Policy, IT Security, Enterprise Architecture 
(EA), Capital Planning and Investment Control (CPIC), Operations & Technology, E- 
government and Workforce Issues committees was established to bring focus on these 
priority Council areas. (See Figure 13.) 
Strategic Planning and Policy Division ensures that all IT programs support the 
strategic goals and objectives of the Department. The division provides leadership and 
establishes policy to address regulatory requirements. 
The Operations & Technology staff provides complete information technology 
support to all personnel within the Department. 
The Enterprise Architecture defines the strategic information asset base which 
defines: the information necessary to operate the business, the technologies necessary to 
support the business operations, and the transitional processes necessary for 
implementing new technologies in response to a dynamic environment. 
IT Security maintains the security of all IT systems vital to the mission of DOT. 
This office is responsible for the overall management and guidance of the Department's 
IT Security Program. 
The overall goal of the Capital Planning And Investment Control (CPIC) office is 
to establish and maintain a Department-wide process that will use long-range strategic 
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planning and a disciplined budget process as the basis for efficient management of a 
portfolio of capital assets. 
The E-Government Division is responsible for providing leadership throughout 
the DOT for the transition to digital government, including managing the departmental 
Internet and intranet web sites. 
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Figure 13. DOT CIO Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: dot.gov] 
8.   Department of Agriculture 
The mission of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is to 
enhance quality of life by supporting the production of agriculture; ensuring a safe, 
affordable, nutritious, and accessible food supply; caring for agricultural, forest, and 
range lands; supporting sound development of rural communities; providing economic 
opportunities for farm and rural residents; expanding global markets for agricultural and 
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forest products and services and working to reduce hunger in the States and throughout 
the world, [usda.gov] 
The Department is divided up into seven main agencies and offices headed by 
their respective Under Secretaries: Farm and Foreign Agriculture Services; Food, 
Nutrition and Consumer Sen-ices; Food Safety; Marketing and Regulatory Programs; 
Natural Resources and Environment; Research, Education, and Economics; and Rural 
Development. (See Figure 14.) 
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Figure 14. USDA Organizational Chart ( as of Jan 2001) [From: usda.gov] 
The USDA CIO is independent of any other office or agency of the Department. 
The CIO reports directly to the Secretary and has primary responsibility for supervision 
and coordination within the Department. The Office of the CIO supervises and 
coordinates the design, acquisition, maintenance, use, and disposition of IT by USDA 
agencies. 
The Office of the CIO is dived up into three key sections: National Information 
Technology      Center;      Information      Resources      Management      (IRM);      and 
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Telecommunications Services & Operations. The CIO is also supported by the Resource 
Management Staff that provides leadership, consultation and support services in the 
management of resources. (See Figure 15.) 
The National Information Technology Center participates with the CIO in the 
formulation, implementation, and evaluation of program development and delivery in the 
area of Technology Management (TM). 
IRM is the Strategic information arm of the CIO. The IRM advises the CIO in the 
development of government-wide policies and initiatives in the application of IT to 
programs. This office also analyzes the impact of government-wide information 
management trends and develops appropriate USDA principles, policies, and standards. 
The office of Telecommunications Services & Operations assists the CIO in the 
formulation, implementation, and evaluation of program development and delivery in the 
area of Telecommunications Services. 
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Figure 15. USD A CIO Organization Chart (as of Jan 2001) [From: usda.gov] 
9.  Department of Labor 
The Mission of the Department of Labor (DOL) is to prepare the American 
workforce for new and better jobs, while ensuring the adequacy of America's workplaces. 
The DOL is responsible for the administration and enforcement of over 180 federal 
statutes supporting the protection of workers' wages, health and safety, employment and 
pension rights; equal employment opportunity; job training, unemployment insurance and 
workers' compensation programs. 
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The Department is separated into 18 sections: 
Adjudicatory Agencies 
Employment & Training 
Administration (ETA) 
Veteran's Employment & 
Training Service (VETS) 
Women's Bureau (WB) 
Office of the Assistant Secretary 
for Administration and 
Management (OASAM) 
Office of the Solicitor (SOL) 
Office of Small Business 
Programs (OSBP) 




Bureau of International Labor 
Affairs (ILAB) 
Office of the Assistant Secretory 
for Policy (OASP) 
Office of the Inspector General 
 (IOG)  
Occupational Safety & Health 
Administration (OSHA) 
Pension & Welfare Benefits 
Admmistration (PWBA) 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
Office of Congressional and 
Intergovernmental Affairs 
Office of the Chief Financial 
Officer (OCFO) 
Office of Public Affairs (OPA) 
Table 10. Offices of the DOL 
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Figure 16. DOL Organizational Chart (as of Nov 2000) [From: dol.gov] 
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The Assistant Secretary of Administration and Management is the departmental 
CIO. The CIO is tasked with harnessing the power of modern IT to enable the efficient 
and effective delivery of Department of Labor services to external and internal customers. 
The CIO provides leadership, policy guidance and assistance to Departmental agencies in 
all aspects of using information technology to implement and manage those programs 
within the Department. 
Although the CIO has not yet established an organizational hierarchy the 
following boards and teams are in affect: The Capital Planning and Investment Board 
(CPIB); the Computer Security group; and the IT Architecture team. The OCIO has also 
established policies and set forth a strategic plan. 
The CPIB ensures that the departmental information system investments are based 
upon decision criteria which take into consideration risk- adjusted return and emphasize 
interoperability, improved delivery of services and reduced cost of system operation and 
system sharing, where appropriate. 
The Computer Security group oversees the protection of information processing 
resources to ensure that information and processing capabilities are reasonably protected 
from loss, misuse, unauthorized access, modification, unavailability, or undetected 
Activities. The goal of the group is to ensure that reliable data is available to the 
authorized user, when needed. The group is also responsible for all hardware with the 
means to store, manipulate, and deliver the data. 
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The IT Architecture team is a collection of Agency representatives with contractor 
facilitation. This team will be developing linked business, web and technology 
architectures, and a multi-year migration plan that support all aspect of the DOL. 
10. Department of the Interior 
The mission of the Department of the Interior (DOI) is to protect and provide 
access to the nation's natural and cultural heritage. The DOI ensures the U.S. honors 
trusted responsibilities to the Indian Tribes and upholds commitments to island 
communities. The DOI also protects the environment and preserves the country's natural 
and cultural resources. The department has four primary Assistant Secretaries: Policy, 
Management & Budget (PMB); Fish, Wildlife & Parks; Indian Affairs; Land & Minerals 
Management; and Water & Science. (See Figure 17.) 
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Figure 17. DOI Organizational Chart (as of Oct 2000) [From: doi.gov] 
The DOI CIO heads the Office of Information Resources Management (OIRM). 
The CIO is responsible for continuously enhancing the ability of the Department to 
perform its many missions by efficiently managing information, providing sound 
technology investment solutions, and obtaining and improving access to information 
through the application of IT. The CIO ensures the alignment of IRM goals, objectives, 
and programs with the goals, objectives, and programs of the DOI and its' bureaus. The 
CIO is also responsible for optimizing the collection, access, and sharing of 
information/knowledge throughout the department using cutting edge IT. 
The DOI CIO is responsible for numerous programs that fall within the realm of 
IRM. They include: 
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Radio Communications and 




Computer Training and 
Development 
Privacy Program 
Information Technology Budget 
and Capital Planning 
Government Information Locator 
System (GILS) 
Table 11. Programs of the DOI's CIO 
11. Department of Education 
The mission of the Department of Education (DOED) is to ensure equal access to 
education and to promote educational excellence for all Americans. A Deputy Secretary 
and an Under Secretary support the Secretary. The DOED structure consists of 8 program 
offices and 8 staff offices, [ed.gov] 
The program offices include: 
Office of Bilingual Education and Office for Civil Rights Office of Educational Research Minority Languages Affairs and Improvement 
Office of Elementary and Office of Postsecondary Office of Special Educational and 
Secondary Education Education Rehabilitation Services 
Office of Student Financial Office of Vocational and Adult 
Assistance Programs Education 
Table 12. Program Offices of the DOED 
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The staff offices include: 
Office of the Chief Financial 
Officer 
Office of Inspector General 
Office of Management 
Office of the Chief Information 
Officer 
Office of Intergovernmental and 
Inter-agency Affairs 
Office of Public Affairs 
Office of the General Counsel 
Office of Legislation and 
Congressional Affairs 
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Figure 18. DOED Organizational Chart (as of Jan 2001) [From: ed.org] 
The DOED CIO is an independent office that works for the Secretary of 
Education via the Deputy Secretary. The purpose of the Office of the Chief Information 
Officer (OCIO) is to provide world-class customer service to schools, students and their 
families through information technology. The DOED CIO is supported by three deputies 
in the areas of: Information Management (IM); Information Technology (IT); and 
Information Assurance (IA). (See Figure 19.) 
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The Deputy CIO of IM is responsible for planning, executing and evaluating all 
IM activities in the OCIO. 
The Deputy CIO of IT provides technical support on all matters related to the 
department's network information systems. This deputy oversees the information systems 
architecture, network and telecommunications design and operations, configuration 
management and IT/TM contract management. 
The Deputy CIO of IA is responsible for planning, developing, administering and 
evaluating all long and short-term IA activities in the department including the 














Figure 19. DOED CIO Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: ed.gov] 
12. Department of Veteran's Affairs 
The Department of Veteran's Affairs (VA) administers laws the provide benefits 
and other services to veterans, their dependents, and their beneficiaries. The VA's 
mission is to serve as the principal advocate of Veterans, ensuring that they receive 
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medical care, benefits, social support, and lasting memorials. The VA is made up of 
several offices including: the Veteran's Health Administration (VHA); the Veteran's 
Benefits Administration (VBA); the National Cemetery Administration; the Board of 
Contract Appeals; Board of Veteran's Appeals; the Center for Minority Veterans; the 
Center for Women Veterans; the Office of Acquisition & Material Management; the 
Office of Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) and Mediation; the Office of Budget; the 
Office of Congressional Affairs; the Office of Employment Discrimination Complaint 
Adjudication; the Office of Financial Management; the Office of the General Counsel; 
the Office of Information & Technology (OI&T); the Office of the Inspector General; the 
Office of the Occupational Safety & Health; the Office of Planning & Analysis; the 
Office of Public Intergovernmental Affairs; and the Office of Small & Disadvantaged 
Business Utilization. 
The Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology is the VA CIO. The VA 
CIO ensures that information and technology resources are maximized. The Office of 
Information and Technology is comprised of four organizational elements: the Office of 
Policy and Program Assistance, the Office of Telecommunications, the Austin 
Automation Center, and the Office of Information Technology and Administration. The 
VA CIO heads a council made up of the Deputy VA CIO, the VHA CIO, the VBA CIO, 
and representatives from the National Cemetery Administration, the Office of Planning 
and Analysis, the Office of Financial Management, and the Board of Veterans Appeals. 
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13. Department of Health and Human Services 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the principal agency for 
protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential human services. The HHS 
employs five Assistant Secretaries to include; Health, Management & Budget; Planning 
& Evaluation; Legislation; and Public Affairs. The HHS involves more than 300 
programs spread over a wide spectrum. The several Operating Divisions (OPDIVs) 
divided up into two sections, Public Health Services and Human Services. (See Figure 
20.) 
Public health service operations include: the National Institutes of Health; the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA); Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC); Indian Health Service; Health Resources and Services Administration; Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration; Agency for Healthcare Research and 
Quality. 
Human service operations include: the Health Care Financing Administration; the 
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Figure 20. HHS Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: hhs.gov] 
The Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget (ASMB) is the HHS CIO 
and reports directly to the Secretary. The ASMB delegates authority for managing the 
IRM program to the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Resources Management 
(DASIRM), who also acts as the Deputy CIO. 
The DASIRM provides leadership in the acquisition and use of computer 
technology and other information resources for the department. The DASIRM advises 
and supports the Secretary, the CIO and all of the OPDF/s concerning the planning and 
conduct IRM programs. The DASIRM provides IRM policy, guidance and strategic 
vision. In addition, the DASIRM oversees OPDIV projects and investments regarding IT. 
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14. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
The mission of the Department of Housing And Urban Development (HUD) is to 
ensure that everyone has a decent, safe, and sanitary home surrounded by a suitable living 
environment. HUD creates opportunities for homeownership, provides housing assistance 
for low-income persons, and enforces the nation's fair housing laws and helps the 
homeless. HUD Headquarters (HQ) has two sides, program offices and support offices. 
HQ Program Offices include: 
Office of Housing 
Office of Fair Housing and Equal 
Opportunity 
Office of Community Planning 
and Development 
Ginnie Mae Foundation 
Office of Public and Indian 
Housing 
Office of Multifamily Housing 
Assistance Restructuring 
Table 14. HQ Program Offices of HUD 
HQ Support Offices include: 
Board of Contract Appeals Chief Financial Officer (CFO)        Chief Information Officer (CIO) 
Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) Department Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement Center 
Field Policy and Management General Counsel Labor Relations 
Office of Administration 
Office of Intergovernmental 
Relations 
Policy Development and 
Research 
Office of Congressional and 
Intergovernmental Relations 
Office of International Affairs 
Real Estate Assessment Center 
Office of Healthy Homes and 
Lead Hazard Control 
Office of Small and 
Disadvantaged Business 
Utilization 
Table 15. HQ Support Offices of HUD 
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HUD's CIO reports directly to the Secretary, and advises the Secretary and other 
HUD senior managers on the strategic use of IT in support core business processes and 
mission critical goals. The Office of the CIO is supported by: an Administrative Staff; the 
Office of Central Information Management; the Office of Systems Integration and 
Efficiency; the Office of Investment Strategies, Policy and Management; the Office of IT 
Reform and the Office of IT. (See Figure 21.) 
The Administrative Staff advises and coordinates the internal management of 
resources available to the CIO. 
The Office of Central Information Management is principal advisor to the CIO on 
the management of HUD's IT resources; IT Architecture; data administration; and 
information strategy planning. 
The Office of Systems Integration and Efficiency is principal advisor to the CIO 
on configuration management, systems integration and design efficiency information 
systems. The office also manages the Business Process Improvement (BPI) Program and 
computer security. 
The Office of Investment Strategies, Policy, and Management advises the CIO on 
IT policy/management and supports the Technology Investment Board Executive 
Committee (TIBEC). The office also oversees of the department's Reports Management 
Program that includes the Information Collection Budget. 
The Office of IT Reform is responsible for all aspects of IT reform at the 
Department. This includes the IT investment strategy and capital planning program; the 
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TIBEC; IT capital planning and investment control; economic and risk analysis of 
proposed IT investments; and maintaining a information technology performance 
measurements program. 
The Office of IT's mission is to deliver technical assistance, guidance, and support for 
national initiatives. The office also implements CIO policies, standards and guidelines. 
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Figure 21. HUD CIO Organizational Chart (as of Oct 2000) [From: hud.gov] 
15. Environmental Protection Agency 
The mission of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is to protect human 
health and to safeguard the natural environment including the air, water, and land. 
[epa.gov] The EPA is headed by an Administrator. The Administrator is supported by 
nine Assistant Administrator, three staff offices, and ten regional offices. (See Figure 22.) 
The Administrators include: Resource Management; Air & Radiation; 
Enforcement   &   Compliance   Assurance;   International   Activities;   Environmental 
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Information; Prevention, Pesticides, and Toxic Substances; Research & Development; 
Solid Waste & Emergency Response; and Water. 
The Offices are that of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), General Counsel and 
Inspector General (IG). 
Regional Offices are based in various cities around the country and represent a set 
area. Each EPA Regional Office is responsible for the execution of the Agency's 
programs, considering regional needs and the implementation of federal environmental 
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Figure 22. EPA Organizational Chart (as of Nov 2000) [From: epa.gov] 
The Assistant Administrator for Environmental Information is the EPA's CIO. 
The Office of Environmental Information (OEI) has central responsibility over 
information management, policy and technology. The OEI supports the EPA's mission by 
integrating quality environmental information into the decision process. The OEI works 
with many different internal and external entities, to establish and oversee information- 
related policies and procedures. 
The OEI is supported by five key groups: the Quality Staff; the Office of 
Information Collection (OIC); the Office of Technology, Operations and Planning 
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(OTOP); the Office of Information Analysis and Access (OIAA); and the Office of 
Planning Resources and Outreach. (See Figure 23.) 
The Quality Staff develops agency-wide policy for QA, developing guidance and 
tools, providing training and outreach, and overseeing the implementation process. 
The OIC develops and implements data collection policies and services. The OIC 
promotes efficient and effective collection/use of data. 
The OTOP organizes strategic planning for IT and security. This office also sets 
hardware, software and telecommunications standards and operates the agency's internal 
technology infrastructure. 
The OIAA develops policies for data analyses, data interpretation and the 
responsible use/release of data. 
The Office of Planning, Resources and Outreach manages outreach and 
communication programs while ensuring the implementation of OEI policies, programs 
and procedures. The Office also assures sound strategic planning and resource 
management within OEI. 
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Figure 23. EPA OEI Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: epa.gov] 
16. Federal Emergency Management Agency 
. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is an independent agency 
of the federal government, reporting to the President. The purpose of FEMA is to reduce 
loss of life and property and protect critical infrastructure from all types of hazards via an 
emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery. 
[fema.gov] 
FEMA's organizational structure mirrors the functions that take place in the cycle 
of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, and response and recovery. FEMA 
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is supported by a robust structure to include nine support offices, five directorates, and 
ten regional offices. FEMA also contains the U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), which 
supports the nation's fire service, and the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA), which 
provides flood insurance nationwide. (See Figure 24.) 
The nine support offices include: Inspector General (IG); Congressional & 
Legislative Affairs; Human Resources Management; Equal Rights; Public Affairs; Policy 
& Regional Operations; Financial Management; National Security Affairs; and General 
Counsel. 
FEMA's directorates include: Mitigation; Recovery & Response; Information 
Technology Services; Preparedness; and Operations Support. 
FEMA's ten regional offices are organized similarly to that of the EPA and they 
work directly with their states to help plan for disasters, develop mitigation programs, and 
meet needs when major disasters occur. 
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Figure 24. FEMA Organizational Chart (as of Dec 2000) [From: fema.gov] 
The Information Technology Services Directorate provides agency-wide IT 
services and systems for routine operations and in emergency disaster situations, hi 
concert with other federal agencies, state and local governments, this Directorate provides 
direction for integrating IT resources, automated data processing, communications, and 
information services necessary to expedite all aspects of the emergency management 
cycle. 
The head of the directorate serves as FEMA's CIO and is responsible for IT policy 
& planning; agency-wide IM services and IT systems engineering. The directorate is 
supported by five programs including: IT Investments & Evaluations; IT Architecture; 
Management and Operations of Information Systems: FEMA Switched Network; and IT 
Security. 
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17. Central Intelligence Agency 
The CIA is an independent agency accountable to the American people through 
the intelligence oversight committees of Congress. The CIA's mission is to support the 
President, the National Security Council (NSC), and all officials who make and execute 
U.S. national security policy. The CIA engages in research, development, and deployment 
of high-leverage technology for intelligence purposes. As a separate agency, CIA serves 
as an independent source of analysis on topics of concern and works closely with the 
other organizations in the Intelligence Community to ensure that the intelligence 
consumer receives the best intelligence possible. 
The CIA is lead by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), who reports directly 
to the President. The DCI is supported by: the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
(DDCI); the Executive Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (EXDIR); the Deputy 
Director of Science & Technology; the Deputy Director of Operations; and the Deputy 
Director of Administration. 
The DDCI assists the Director in his duties as head of the CIA and the Intelligence 
Community and exercises the powers of the Director when the Director's position is 
vacant or in the Director's absence or disability. The EXDIR manages the CIA on a day- 
to-day basis. The Director of Intelligence is responsible for the production and 
dissemination of all-source intelligence analysis on key foreign issues. The Director of 
Science and Technology creates and applies innovative technology in support of the 
intelligence  collection mission. The Director of Operations is responsible  for the 
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clandestine collection of foreign intelligence. The Directorate of Administration provides 
administrative support to the CIA in such areas as Communications, security, human 
resources, and logistics. (See Figure 25.) 
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Figure 25. CIA Organizational Chart {as of Dec 1999) [From: cia.gov] 
Within the CIA, there exists a conglomeration of government intelligence assets. 
This group is called the Intelligence Community (IC). At the top of the community is the 
National  Intelligence  Council   (NIC).   The  community is  comprised  of National 
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Intelligence Officers, senior experts from both inside and outside government circles. The 
NIC concentrates on the substantive problems of particular geographic regions of the 
world and of particular functional areas such as economics and weapons proliferation. 
The Intelligence Community Chief Information Officer (IC CIO), who is 
appointed by the DCI, is the agencies lead CIO. The IC CIO works with Community 
CIO's and other Information Systems (IS) leaders to shape enabling information systems 
and technology in response to the DCFs Strategic Intent. As a member of the IC, the IC 
CIO has direct contact with other intelligence agencies (Figure 26.) and as a result may 
better coordinate inter-agency 10 concerns. 
Figure 26. IC Members [From: odci.gov] 
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E. EVALUATIONS 
Deficiencies of the current organization include: a lack of uniformity; a focus on 
the science side of 10; a lack of shared 10 assets that results in redundancy; and a lack of 
incorporating intelligence assets. 
1. Uniformity 
Although each department must define and employ the services of their CIO to the 
best of their needs and abilities, they must have a uniform level of responsibility. It is the 
opinion of the authors that each CIO must be an independent entity within their 
organization that works directly for and with their respective Secretary/Director. The 
equality of responsibility would ensure that each CIO had a balanced influence on the 
council. 
2. All Science, No Art 
The current CIO Council is made up of what is conventionally thought of as 
"chief information officers." They maintain information services, structures and 
technologies. This is a purely technology-based view of Information Operation. The 
departmental/agency CIOs must be brought into the art side of the fold. This added 
responsibility demands a higher level of authority, and a greater range of capabilities. The 
purpose of the thesis is not to advise individual organizations (e.g. DOD, CIA, DOC) how 
to reorganize within, but to properly empower the CIOs. The authors believe that the 
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responsibilities of the CIO's must include both the science and the art aspects of 10. The 
bottom line is that each CIO must be responsible for all "information" in all mediums (i.e. 
intelligence assets, public affairs, civil affairs, information systems, and so forth.). 
3. Redundant IO Assets 
The lack of shared 10 assets is a direct result of "All science, No Art". If CIOs 
were truly empowered to the degree that they were tied into everything from public affairs 
to intelligence assets, then they could effectively be able to share information. The 
sharing of information would result in common operating pictures, agencies would not 
have to deploy assets if another agency already had assets assigned. Information databases 
could be shared to whatever degree security would allow. How many DOJ assets, via the 
FBI, are committed abroad to counter terrorism and such, when quite possibly the CIA 
does much of the same? These are the kinds of questions individual organizations must 
ask and then explore through a common medium such as the CIO Council. 
4. IO Intelligence 
In continuing to integrate the "art" side into the scope of a CIO's responsibility, 
intelligence assets must be brought into the fold. The Intelligence Community (IC) looks 
like a microcosm of the CIO Council. Even though the two are currently unrelated, the IC 
has many of the same types of roles. Of course, the members of the IC only include those 
that pertain to national security (DOD, DOJ, DOS, CIA, etc.), but the authors believe that 
this community must be brought in to the realm of 10. This may be accomplished by 
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incorporating the IC in the form of a committee or a community within the CIO Council. 
In Chapter Six the authors discuss this very concept in terms of an Information 
Operations Security Council (IOSC). 
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IV.   RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY, INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS, AND INNOVATION 
A. PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL SECURITY 
1.   Introduction 
For most of the last 300 years, states have dominated the international 
system. This domination may be coming to an end, driven in part because 
of the advanced information and communication technologies. These 
technologies will enable other types of international actors to challenge 
state dominance as never before. [Papp and Alberts, 1997, p. 700] 
As the United States has entered the twenty first century, the global environment 
continues to be in flux. The fifty-year threat of global nuclear war with the Soviet Union 
is no longer present, but neither is the relative stability that accompanied that bipolar 
world. In fact, the world is certainly further away from this goal than it was before the 
fall of the Soviet Union. The Cold War has been over for nearly ten years and in that 
period the threats to national security have become diminished in potential, but increased 
in both number and uncertainty. The post-Cold War period has heightened the levels of 
uncertainty and in turn diminished confidence in United States national security. This is 
the global environment the United States will be facing in the foreseeable future. 
The National Defense Panel identified four key trends that are main causes of the 
new global environment in a 1997 report, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 
21st Century, to Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Theses four interrelated trends are 
listed below. 
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• The geopolitical revolution that prompted the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
that will see the emergence of China as a major regional and global actor. 
• Demographic and social pressures of potentially volatile social systems. 
• The emergence of a global, interdependent marketplace that affects the well-being 
of virtually every nation and society. 
• The technological revolution that is transforming advanced industry-based 
economies into information-based economies and that promises to affect a 
revolution in military affairs. 
These four trends have and will continue to have a profound affect on the global 
security environment, most notably in the information operations domain. It is certain that 
the future adversaries of the United States have learned from the Gulf War, in that they 
cannot confront the U.S. conventionally (Second Wave) with massed armies, or blue- 
water navies. The future adversary will try to find weaknesses or "chinks" in the armor 
and exploit them. They will focus on using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against 
forward deployed U.S. military forces and quite possibly the continental United States. 
Additional threats could include terrorist actions (e.g. U.S. Embassies and USS COLE 
bombing) and information systems/infrastructure attacks (e.g. Denial of Service or 
computer virus). 
2.   National Interests 
The national interests of the United States, although debated throughout history, 
have remained relatively constant.  Many scholars have different interpretations of what 
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the national interests should be, but for the most part there have always been four 
constant themes. Donald Nuechterlein states in his book United States National Interests 
in a Changing World that "throughout the nation's history four long-term, enduring 
national interests have conditioned the way the U.S. government viewed the external 
world and this countries place in it." [Nuechterlein, 1973] 
• Defense of the United States and its constitutional system. 
• Enhancement of the nation's economic well-being and promotion of U.S. products 
abroad. 
• Creation.of a favorable world order (international security environment). 
• Promotion abroad of U.S. democratic values and the free market system. 
B. INFORMATION OPERATION'S ENVIRONMENT 
1.   Introduction 
Information Operations are defined in Joint Publication 3-13 as "actions taken to 
affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own 
information and information systems." This definition is specifically directed towards 
information operations in the military, but is also applicable in regards to overall 10 and 
national security. One must take the view that information operations is not strictly a 
military concept, but a global concept that is also quite prevalent in the commercial 
business and government sectors. Only then, with this view of a global 10 concept, can 
the depth of information operations be explored, realized and utilized. 
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The importance of Information Operations in terms of protecting vital national 
interests cannot be overstated. The United States must maintain its lead in information 
systems and technology. The fact that commercial progress and growth in information 
technology is so extensive, coupled with the fact that these technologies are relatively 
cheap and easily accessible, will present adversaries with opportunities that they have not 
had in the past. Also, the more reliance the United States puts on these information 
systems and technologies economically, commercially, and militarily, the more 
vulnerable the nation will be to such an attack. 
The global information environment expands exponentially almost every day. 
The combination of different 10 elements (e.g. industry, global politics, information 
infrastructure) constantly changes the operating environment. Figure 27 illustrates the 
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Figure 27. Global Information Operations Environment [From: HQ USA FM 100-6,1996] 
2.  Activities in the Information Operations Environment 
There are several critical actions that can be taken by an individual or organization 
in the IO environment, as depicted in Figure 28. These actions can be taken 
simultaneously or in some type of chronological order, dependent upon the situation and 
goals of the individual or organization. They are not always mutually exclusive or strictly 
dependent upon each other. It will be helpful to briefly discuss each of these actions and 
their effects on the IO environment. 
cu  Acquire 
Information can be acquired through a variety of ways, including but not 
limited to: intelligence, personal experience and expertise, technical surveillance, and 
inter-organizational relations and communications.   Acquiring information has become 
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one of the easier tasks in the Information Operations environment. The difficulty that 
many face is in acquiring information that is relevant to the goals of the individual or 
organization and receiving the information at the right time. In many cases, organizations 
take the approach that "more is better" and accumulate masses of useless information 
(information overload) or spend so much time collecting information that they lose the 
opportunity to use it to their advantage. 
b.  Protect 
The protection of information is quickly becoming one of the focal points 
of all organizations (including commercial, government, and military). Information 
protection must be kept at three levels: human, physical, and technological/electronic. 
The human level is basically comprised of effective Information Assurance and 
Operational Security. The physical level is the corporal security of the organization's 
information centers and headquarters and its protection from intruders. The electronic 
level, similar to the physical, is designed to prevent intruders from accessing information 
in the electronic information center or databases. This type of security is certainly the 
most difficult to maintain in today's environment. 
Organizations are finding it harder and harder to protect internal 
information from their adversaries. Part of the reason for this problem is because of the 
fact that commercial progress and growth in information technology has been so 
extensive during this Information Revolution. A second contributing factor is that these 
technologies are relatively cheap and easily accessible which allows adversaries with 
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opportunities that they have not had in the past. Protection of information will continue 
to be one of the most difficult aspects of the 10 environment 
c. Exploit 
Exploitation is basically the use or manipulation of an adversary's data 
without their knowledge. Exploitation could be as simple as monitoring an adversary's 
information system or, on a more complex level, corrupting crucial data or databases. 
Exploitation of information is abundant in corporate and state espionage and even more 
so in the military where international laws become ambiguous. 
d. Deny 
Denial of information goes hand-in-hand with information exploitation. 
Once an adversaries information has been exploited, it opens the door for some types of 
information denial. Denying an adversary critical information degrades the overall 
efficiency and effectiveness of the system and forces the adversary to rely on other means 
of information for decision-making. A classical example of the exploitation-denial 
relationship is a Distributed Denial of Service for a computer server. This is where the 
attacker "cases" a network via traffic flow analysis to identify vulnerable nodes and then 
floods those nodes with an onslaught of pings and requests, thus relegating the network 
unusable. 
e. Use 
The use of information is synonymous with organizational decision- 
making. Once the information has been acquired, analyzed, disseminated and fully 
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understood it can then be utilized in making a decision for a particular situation or used in 
a future planning process. This process, known as the cognitive hierarchy, which will be 
further discussed in Chapter Five. 
/   Manage 
Management of information is the basis of an effective command, 
coordination, and control system. It entails getting the right information, in the right 
format, to the right people, at the right time. The keys to accomplishing these tasks are 
having a well-connected system that is resilient and maximizes information throughput. 
An effective information management system will promote information flow both 
horizontally and vertically within an organization. Information and knowledge 










Figure 28. Information Operations Activities [From: HQ USA FM 100-6, 1996] 
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C. INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
1.   Introduction 
The 1999 report, from the Executive Office of the President, A National Security 
Strategy for a New Century identifies six principle threats to the national security of the 
United States. These threats are: 
a. Regional or State-Centered Threats 
Numerous states have the capability to threaten the United States through 
aggression. These threats have increased their offensive capability and in most cases 
possess, or have access to WMD. These states include, but are not limited to Iraq, Iran, 
China, and North Korea. 
b. Transnational Threats 
Threats that have no boundaries or borders and can threaten both United 
States interests at home and abroad. These actors are most likely to be rogue states, 
terrorist organizations, or criminal syndicates. This threat is especially important in the 
10 environment because it involves the critical infrastructures of the United States. 
Cyber-attacks will be the weapons of choice in addition to traditional physical attacks and 
sabotage. 
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c. Failed States 
This threat is a direct product of the post-Cold War global instability. 
Many states are unable to provide the basic governance, safety, security and opportunities 
for their people and in turn are prime candidates for insurrection and instability. The 
result is often civil unrest, war, migration or mass famine. These states often request 
some type of assistance or aid (e.g. humanitarian). In some instances, the United States is 
compelled to intervene because the regional instability directly affects national interests. 
d. Spread of Dangerous Technologies 
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is the central 
factor associated with this threat. Rogue states and terrorist organizations pose the largest 
concern when it comes to this threat. Rogue states, knowing they cannot contend with the 
United States in conventional military actions will resort to the threat and possible use of 
WMD. Terrorist actions could also quite possibly shift from conventional bombings and 
hijackings to the use of WMD. A second type of technology that is not addressed by the 
previously mentioned report is Information Technology. Certain information 
technologies that have the capability to shut down or seriously degrade the nation's 
critical infrastructures can have just as damaging an effect as WMD. 
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e.   Foreign Intelligence Collection 
With the infusion of information technology into the global environment 
the capability of foreign intelligence agencies has increased tenfold. The fact that the 
United States is so dependent on networks and information systems is actually a 
detriment to national security. The nature of the global information infrastructure leaves 
many information systems vulnerable to anonymous penetration and attack. This gives 
both traditional and unknown adversaries the ability to collect intelligence on United 
States military and government policies and operations. 
/   Environment and Health Threats 
This threat is often overlooked, but it has serious ramifications to the 
national security of the United States. History shows that epidemics (e.g. polio, 
tuberculosis, AIDS) have almost annihilated populations. Adversaries could quite 
conceivably introduce a life-threatening disease into the United States without any 
detection. For instance, what would be the ramifications if an adversary introduced a 
strain of the recent "Mad Cow Disease" from Europe into the United States cattle 
population? The results would catastrophic. 
Each of these six threats, have a direct relationship with Information 
Operations. The confronting of these threats will become even more dependent upon 
effective Information Operations in the future global security environment. One must 
take the point of view that the correlation between the previously mentioned threats and 
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information operations lays at the intersection of technology and "soft" perception 
techniques. 
D. DOCTRINAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL INNOVATION 
1.   Introduction 
Webster's dictionary defines innovation as " 1. something new or different, such 
as a change in customs or ways of doing things; 2. an introducing or bringing in 
something new." 
Contrary to common belief, innovation is not necessarily only related to 
technological advances and inventions. In fact, technological advances are more often 
than not the precursors to innovation. True innovation should be viewed as the 
culmination of changes in organizational thinking and strategy, doctrine, and technology. 
Barry Posen states in his book, The Sources of Military Doctrine, "The benefits of 
innovation can be judged, in part, in terms of its effect on integration. Do the means and 
ends retain a working relationship to each other? In part, innovation must be judged in 
terms of the general [organization] and technological environment." [Posen, 1984, p.29] 
Effective innovation requires visionary thinkers who look beyond the scope of the 
present situation and environment. These individuals are often more than willing to voice 
their views will little regard to the "status quos." History has shown that these "out of 
the box" thinkers are often dismissed because their ideas/visions seem impossible to 
facilitate to the traditional old school thinkers.   One visionary that comes to mind is Sir 
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Hugh Dowding,  Commander of Great Britain's RAF Fighter Command and his 
endeavors in the Battle of Great Britain during World War II. The successful defense of 
Great Britain was a direct result of Fighter Command's highly effective and efficient 
information and intelligence systems, as previously discussed in Chapter Two.    The 
effective use of these systems was a direct result of Sir Dowding's doctrinal and strategic 
innovations within Fighter Command. A second, modem day innovator/visionary is Vice 
Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, founder of U.S. Navy's Network Centric Warfare.  VADM 
Cebrowski continues his efforts to innovate in the Unites Sates Navy through the 
incorporation technology, doctrine and the global environment. 
Organizational innovation is just as important as technical or doctrinal innovation. 
Changes and advancement in technology and doctrine quite often require than some type 
of organizational innovation, or at least an organizational review take place.   These 
organizational changes  are starting to take place at the governmental levels, but 
unfortunately, they are being met with a substantial amount of resistance from those who 
are comfortable with the "old school" (or Second Wave) thinking that what worked 
yesterday will work tomorrow.   The Executive Office of the President stated the need for 
organizational innovation within the U.S. government in 1998 via A National Security 
Strategy for a New Century: 
We must continue aggressive efforts to construct appropriate twenty-first 
century national security programs and structures. The Defense 
Department, State Department and other international affairs agencies are 
similarly reorganizing to confront the pressing challenges of tomorrow as 
well as those we face today. Federal, state, and local law enforcement and 
emergency response agencies are enhancing their ability to deal with 
terrorist threats.   Government and industry are exploring ways to protect 
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critical national infrastructures.    We will continue looking across our 
government to see if during this time of transition we are adequately 
preparing to meet the national security challenges of the next century. 
[The White House, 1998] 
E. CONCLUSION 
Thomas Friedman says it best when it comes to the lack of innovation and 
unwillingness to change in his book The Lexus and the Olive Tree.   In comparing the 
Cold War system to the present system of globalism he states that adaptation and change 
have been slow to take place because the "old system" is what individuals know and are 
comfortable with.  In the Cold War system they adversary was known, the environment 
was defined, and the strategy to deal with the adversary in this environment was planned 
out. The system of the past ten years, globalization, is much more complex. The threats 
are much more ambiguous and the traditional boundaries are no longer there.  Friedman 
explains some of the possible reasons for this resistance to change in the following 
excerpt from his book. 
The foreign policy community has been slow to adjust to this system for a 
variety of reasons. In part because it is still too new and our experience 
with it still too limited. In part it is because people who are life-long 
experts in one thing - the Cold War- don't want to be told that their 
expertise is not going to take them very far in analyzing geopolitics in this 
new system, and so they try to dismiss it. In part it may be due to the 
rather unheroic nature of many of the foreign policy issues that arise in this 
system.... Finally, the adjustment in seeing today's system has been slow 
in part because there is a certain allergy within parts of the foreign policy 
establishment to bringing markets and finance into the analysis. It is like 
talking about money and markets is unseemly or unmanly when analyzing 
geopolitics. [Friedman, 1999, p.211] 
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Steps must be taken within the government, in both structure and thinking, to 
ensure that when matters of National Security and interests are discussed, Information 
Operations are synonymous with those discussions. These steps will only occur if 
individuals are able to accept the changes in a dynamic global environment and then be 
willing to adapt innovative measures. 10 cannot be considered a separate issue. 10 must 
have a place in all matters of national security. 
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V.    ORGANIZATIONAL SCIENCE METHODOLOGY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The basic definition of any organization is that it is " a consciously coordinated 
social entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, which functions on a relatively 
continuously basis to achieve a common goal or a set of goals." [Robbins, 1990, p.4] 
Organizations vary in structure, size, environment, and purpose, but the underlying fact 
that makes all organizations similar is that they are together to achieve a relatively 
common goal or end state. Of course the individuals within any organization will have 
their own personal motivations and goals, but the culmination of the achievement of 
those personal goals will inevitably lead to overall organizational prosperity. Charles 
Perrow accurately describes the issue of organizational goals in his book Complex 
Organizations: A Critical Essay. Perrow states "....goals are set by the leaders and then 
broken down into sub goals at each level of the organization. Each lower-order goal 
becomes a means to a high-order goal. People do not accept these goals because they 
necessarily share them or believe in them, but because the organization has mechanisms 
to insure that working toward them meets the individuals own personal values." [Perrow, 
1972, p. 150] Therefore, organizational success is fairly dependent upon the success of 
the individuals within that organization. 
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1.   Organizational Design 
An organizational design has often been perceived simply as the structure of an 
organization, but it is more accurate to define an organizational design as a system that 
includes the organization's structural alignment, management processes, information 
systems, reward systems, and people within the prescribed strategy. [Galbraith, 1987] 
Organizational design is focused on how an organization should be structured 
according to its goals. Organizational structure is basically the "nuts and bolts" of the 
organization; it directs how tasks are allocated, who is responsible for the completion of 
those tasks, and how the formal coordination between individuals actually takes place. 
Organizational design looks at an organization's structure and tries to determine how 
constructing, altering, and innovating the organization's structure can improve overall 
operations to fulfill the preset goals more efficiently and effectively. Design "is 
concerned with how things ought to be, with devising structures to attain goals." [Simon, 
1981, p.133] Its prescribed goals and missions determine an organization's boundaries 
and how they relate to the environment. There must be a direct and definitive 
relationship between an organization's design, environment, and goals; if there isn't then 
the organization will incur some type of misfit. This relationship (See Figure 29.) will 
therefore play an integral part in the overall development of the organization's strategy 
and design. 
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Figure 29. Organizational Design [From: Erickson, 2000] 
2.   Efficiency, Effectiveness and Viability 
There are three fundamental criteria that are required for any organization to be 
successful. They are independent of size, environment or purpose. These three criteria are 
effectiveness, efficiency, and viability. Effectiveness, meaning that the organization's 
purpose is realized and the goal is accomplished. Efficiency, meaning that the 
organization uses the least amount of resources to achieve the goal. And lastly, viability, 
meaning that the organization can withstand changes in the environment and persevere 
for a long period of time. [Burton and Obel, 1998, p.4] 
In some instances efficiency and effectiveness contradict one another. 
Organizations can be highly effective and at the same time be extremely inefficient or an 
organization can be exceptionally efficient while not accomplishing any of the goals that 
it has set forth.   For example an organization may use every available resource at its 
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disposal to achieve its goals, but if the operations were planned better the organization 
may have come to the realization that the use of all their resources was not required. This 
is the case of an effective-inefficient organization. The efficiency versus effectiveness 
argument has always been somewhat of a "give and take" relationship with organizational 
structure. The ideal organization would of course be both efficient and effective. 
Coordination among the separate groups or individuals within an organization is 
essential for the overall organizational success. "The fundamental issues in designing an 
organization are to group the small activities together so that the goals are realized or 
conversely, is to take a large task and break it into smaller tasks." [Burton and Obel, 
1998, p.3] In either case the smaller tasks will eventually be brought together in order to 
fulfill the larger organizational goals. This process requires meticulous coordination, 
because without coordinating the smaller tasks and groups all the organization is left with 
is a collection of separate activities. In order for any organization to effectively 
coordinate they must utilize some type of information/communication system. To best 
accomplish this goal of effective coordination, the organization should to integrate the 
concepts of information processing and knowledge management at all levels. These 
concepts will be further analyzed in this chapter. 
B. STRUCTURAL DETERMINANTS 
An organization's structure is determined by countless factors. Some of these 
factors include, but are not limited to, size, operating environment, product/service 
provided, and overall competitiveness.   In an analysis of an organization's structure the 
90 
organization's horizontal and vertical differentiation, its command and control, and the 
centralization/decentralization of decision making within the organization must be 
examined. Also essential is how the organization will "fit" with its external environment 
and overall goals. 
A common organizational theory is the "rational system." In this system 
"theorists emphasize organizational goals, roles, and technology, and they look for ways 
to develop structures that best fit organizational purposes and environmental demands." 
[Bolman and Deal, 1991, p.9] A second theory is the "human resource" theory. This 
theory focuses on the relationship between the individual's needs and skills and their 
prescribed function within the organization. A third theory is the "political theorists," 
which is focused on the managerial understanding and use of power to achieve 
organizational success. [Bolman and Deal, 1991, p.9] Each of these theories offers a 
different point-of-view on how an organization should be structured in order to achieve 
success, but in actuality there is no "right" theory or structural system. A successful 
organization will have attributes of many different theories dependent upon the existing 
environment and organizational mission. 
In essence, an organization must find the most effective and efficient combination 
of strategy, structure, individuals, rewards, processes, and the environment in order to 
achieve its goals in a given environment. All of these factors are interrelated and hold a 
strong bearing on one another. If there were a change in one of these factors it would 
inevitably require some type of change or adjustment in the others. Figure 30 displays 
how the concepts are interrelated. 
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Figure 30. Star Model   [From: Berger, 1998] 
C. INFORMATION PROCESSING AND TECHNOLOGY 
1.   Introduction 
Information in its' simplest form is defined as data that is collected from the 
environment and processed into a usable form. Any given piece of data is basically 
useless in its raw form. Only when it is processed does gain some type of use and 
meaning. 
Information management is the cycle of processes that support an organization's 
activities and operations, it identifies and stores that information, and eventually develops 
and uses that information to achieves its goals.   Information is not only needed about 
specific instances, but also for the development of new theories and frameworks that may 
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dispute currents organizational beliefs and standards. Information processing is used by 
organization to coordinate the different activities among its groups or individuals. "By 
processing information it (the organization) observes what is happening, analyzes and 
makes choices about what to do, and communicates the above to its members." [Burton 
and Obel, 1998, p.4] 
Information is recognized as a strategic resource that must be effectively managed 
in order to maintain a competitive advantage in an organization's ever-changing 
environment. It plays a critical role in reducing uncertainty, and structural complexity. It 
also provides greater situational awareness for the entire organization. 
2.   Technology 
Technology plays a key role not only in information processing, but also in the 
overall evolution of an organization's structure and design. Routineness of technology 
can often determine the level of complexity; this is illustrated in Figure 31, and 
centralization within an organization. Often routine technology is associated with 
organizations of low complexity. The reasoning for this association is that the more 
routine the technology is the less training is required for the individuals who use that 
technology. The same tends to hold true holds for an organizations level of 
centralization. 
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Figure 31. Evolution of Organizational Applications of Information Technology [From: Nixon, 2000] 
The introduction of new technology will more often than not stimulate some 
amount of organizational learning. New technologies (e.g. information processing, 
telecommunication, decision support systems) open the door to new ways of 
accomplishing tasks, allow organizations to modify or even dismiss the previous 
procedures, and often require organizational reconfiguration to some degree. If done 
correctly the organization capitalizes on the benefits of the new technology and in turn 
often increases organizational effectiveness. 
Gareth Morgan states that the organizations that do not incorporate these new and 
revolutionary changes in technologies into their organizational structures will eventually 
suffer severe consequences. Morgan view on this situation is stated below. 
Information Technology - in the form of micro computing, electronic 
communication, and robotics - has the capacity to transform the nature 
and structure of many organizations and the nature and lifestyles of their 
products and services.   Organizations that fail to get "on board" and to 
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reap the potential benefits will find the competition passing them by. The 
technology is leading us into a new age in which completely new styles of 
organization and new managerial competencies will come into their own. 
[Morgan, 1988, p.9] 
3.   Information Processing 
There are some who believe that the problem of organizational design is actually 
an information-processing problem. Galbraith writes "the greater the uncertainty of the 
task, the greater the amount of information that has to be processed between decision- 
makers." [Galbraith, 1974, p.28] If information processing creates uncertainties in task 
performance then the information processing is referred or passed up the organization's 
chain of command (hierarchy) so that it can be reviewed. If an organization ignores the 
problems that are created from uncertainty, then organizational performance will be 
reduced. The downside to this hierarchal process is that the uncertainties often exceed 
the capacities of the decision makers. This, in turn, produces the unwanted scenario of 
"information overflow" and impairs the organizational performance. Organizations can 
either reduce their need for information processing or increase their capacity to process 
the information. [Galbraith, 1974, p.30] The disadvantage to reducing the need for 
information processing is the organization, to some degree, will lack the proper 
coordination and possibly incur high opportunity costs. Increasing the organization's 
processing capabilities is often the better alternative, but this will require an increase in 
resources. "In a hierarchical organization, the hierarchical processing of information can 
be increased in an investment in a vertical information system.    The demand for 
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information processing capacity that arises from uncertainty frees the organization to be 
able to react to unforeseen events." [Burton and Obel, 1998, p.6] Although the demand 
for information processing and capacity continues to grow within organizations, the 
relative cost of processing that information has decreased, thus making increasing 
information capacity a viable option for many organizations. Lastly, according to 
Galbraith, "the task information requirements and the capacity of the organization to 
process information are always matched. If the organization does not consciously match 
them, reduced performance through budget overruns, schedule overruns, act. will occur in 
order to bring about equality." [Galbraith, 1977, p.55] 
Figure 32 illustrates the "data to understanding" hierarchy within a given 
organization. The raw data that is collected is analyzed and filtered to produce pertinent 
information for the organization. This information is then further processed and 
distributed throughout the organization to generate a general knowledge base by means of 
cognition. This knowledge base is then transformed, through individual judgment, into 
understanding. Once this understanding is achieved by the organization's decision- 
makers the decisions can be made that support the organizational goals and mission. 
Although understanding gives decision-makers the ability to act, it does not necessarily 
mean they must take action. This knowledge must be further managed and constantly 
updated. 
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Figure 32. Cognitive Hierarchy [From: HQ USAFM 100-6, 1996] 
D. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT 
More than other structures, the power derived from the knowledge 
structure comes less from coercive power and more from consent, 
authority being conferred voluntarily on the basis of shared belief systems 
and the acknowledgment of the importance to the individual and to society 
of the particular form taken by the knowledge—and therefore of the 
importance of the person having the knowledge and access or control over 
the means by which it is stored and communicated. [Strange, 1988, p.l 18] 
1.  Introduction 
Knowledge is basically information that has been tested and is accepted by an 
individual or organization. Knowledge is validated either through human cognition 
(Figure 32), or through some type situational analysis. 
Knowledge management is centered on getting the right information to the right 
individual or group, in the right form, at the right time for the right purpose. Information 
provides the "what is happening" aspect to the organization, but that is not enough. The 
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organization needs to know "if and "how" that information is relevant, and "who" needs 
the information, this is the knowledge management process. Knowledge management 
involves the identification and analysis of the information that could be pertinent to one 
individual in an organization and useless to another, or it may only be pertinent if coupled 
with other information. It is dependent upon the view of a single individual. Knowledge 
management involves the identification and analysis of available and required knowledge 
assets and knowledge asset related processes. These processes include developing the 
knowledge; preserving the knowledge; using the knowledge; and sharing that knowledge 
throughout the organization. 
Figure 33. Knowledge Management Supporting Technologies [From: Garigue, 1995] 
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2.   Knowledge Management Framework 
The knowledge management framework is a step-by-step process that determines 
the most efficient and beneficial use of information/knowledge within an organization. 
There are four fundamental steps to the process and within each step there are operational 
questions about the knowledge that should be addressed. The basic framework is 




Identify what knowledge assets an organization possesses, 
o   Where is the knowledge asset? 
o   What does it contain? 
o   What is its use? 
o   What form is it in? 
o   How accessible is it? 
Analyzing how the knowledge can add value. 
o   What are the opportunities for using the knowledge asset? 
o   What would be the effect of its use? 
o   What are the current obstacles to its use? 
o   What would be its increased value to the company? 
Specifying what actions are necessary to achieve better usability and added 
value. 
o   How to plan the actions to use the knowledge asset? 
o   How to enact actions? 
o   How to monitor actions? 
Reviewing the use of the knowledge to ensure added value, 
o   Did the use of it produce the desired added value? 
o   How can the knowledge asset be maintained for this use? 
o   Did the use create new opportunities? 
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3.   Knowledge Types 
There are three classes of knowledge: tacit knowledge, rule-based knowledge, and 
background knowledge. An organization must adopt a holistic approach to knowledge 
management that combines all three knowledge types at all levels of the organization. 
Tacit knowledge is the hands-on experience and specialty skills that individuals 
attain through their every day working activities. The following example explains tacit 
knowledge: "The skilled carpenter knows just how a given variety of wood must be 
handled, or what type of joint will best serve his purpose at a particular edge. To say that 
he 'knows' these things is not to say that he could put his knowledge into words. That is 
never entirely possible...the practitioner's knowledge of the medium is tacit. It is 
essential to skilled practice: the carpenter uses what he knows with every stroke of his 
tool." [Zuboff, 1988, pi87] In this example the carpenter has gained his knowledge of 
woodwork through hands-on experience and on-the-job training. Tacit knowledge, see 
Table 1, promulgates task effectiveness within an organization. 
The flipside to tacit knowledge is explicit knowledge. Explicit knowledge can be 
defined as the knowledge available to individuals through some type of information 
storage system. Unlike tacit knowledge, where an individual knows something due to his 
or her experience, explicit knowledge is based on the storing of the experiences of others. 
Explicit knowledge links the individual to the reusable codified knowledge through 
databases and electronic libraries. These two approaches to knowledge are further 
described in Figure 34. 
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These two types of knowledge, explicit and tacit, are described in depth by the 
knowledge  theorists  Ikujiro  Nonaka  and  Hirotaka  Takeuchi   in  their  book  The 
Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of 
Innovation. An excerpt from their book is provided below. 
Although Western managers have been accustomed to dealing with 
explicit knowledge, the recognition of tacit knowledge and its importance 
has a number of crucially relevant implications. First, it gives rise to a 
whole different view of the organization-not as a machine for processing 
information but as a living organism. Within this context, sharing an 
understanding of what the company stands for, where it is going, what 
kind of a world it wants to live in, and how to make that world a reality 
becomes much more crucial than processing objective information. 
Highly subjective insights, intuitions, and hunches are an integral part of 
knowledge. Knowledge also embraces ideals, values, and emotion as well 
as images and symbols. These soft and qualitative elements are crucial to 
an understanding of the Japanese view of knowledge. [Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1995, p.9] 
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Figure 34. Approaches to Knowledge Management [From: Nixon, 2000] 
Rule-based knowledge is knowledge that involves matching certain preformatted 
rules to various situations. Rule-based knowledge guides an individual's actions by 
answering three questions: What kind of situation is this? What kind of organization is 
this? And what does this particular organization do in this situation? This type of 
knowledge is very common in design standard operating procedures and organizational 
routines, and enables an organization to maintain a certain level of efficiency and control. 
[Choo, 1998] 
Background knowledge supplies the mindset or worldview by which people in the 
organization understand particular events, actions, or situations in distinctive ways. 
[Morgan   1986]   Background   knowledge,   see   Table   16,   promotes   organizational 
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commitment from its individuals by uniting them under common views and beliefs. An 
example of this would be the certain views that one sports team would hold for its 
competitors. If a player were newly acquired he would assume the same views of his 
teammates in a relatively short time about their competitors. 
Type '^'.^Fcrm''■-:■■■'] Example Use 
Tacit -Procedural -Know how -Ensures task 
Knowledge -Embedded in -Heuristics effectiveness 
action -Intuitions 
Rule-Based -Declarative -Routines -Promotes operational 
Knowledge -Encoded in -Standard Operating efficiency and control 
programs procedures 
Background -Contextual -Stories/metaphors -Instills commitment 
Knowledge -Expressed in -Mindsets/world views through shared meanings 
texts Visions/scenarios 
Table 16. Knowledge Management Table [After: Choo, 1998] 
Organizations are quickly coming to view knowledge as one of. it not the most 
important strategic resource for success. Along those same lines, organizations must 
understand the most productive way that knowledge can be utilized in problem solving 
and decision-making. An organization must continuously review, expand, and revise its 
knowledge base in all three of these categories in order to maintain its overall efficiency 
and effectiveness. Technical and organizational initiatives, if integrated correctly, will 
provide a comprehensive infrastructure to support the knowledge management process 
and in turn support organizational success. [Zack, 1999, p. 125] 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Organizations are tools that are designed to accomplish prescribed goals and 
milestones. [Perrow, 1972, p. 180] The organizational design characteristics and factors 
described in this chapter play an integral part in the success of any organization, no matter 
the size, strategy or environment. A second point brought out in this chapter is the 
importance of the organization's process flow of information and the 
development/usability of knowledge and understanding. This is illustrated in Figure 32, 
the Cognitive Hierarchy of information processing. What is successful for an 
organization today may not be successful tomorrow. Therefore, organizations must come 
to the realization that they must adapt to the existing environment, and in order to 
accomplish this adaptation they must be willing to innovate, both strategically and 
organizationally. 
The basic definition of any organization is that it is " a consciously coordinated 
social entity, with a relatively identifiable boundary, which functions on a relatively 
continuously basis to achieve a common goal or a set of goals." [Robbins, 1990, p.4] 
Organizations vary in structure, size, environment, and purpose, but the underlying fact 
that makes all organizations similar is that they are together to achieve a relatively 
common goal or end state. Of course the individuals within any organization will have 
their own personal motivations and goals, but the culmination of the achievement of 
those personal goals will inevitably lead to overall organizational prosperity. Charles 
Perrow accurately describes the issue of organizational goals in his book Complex 
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Organizations: A Critical Essay. Perrow states "....goals are set by the leaders and then 
broken down into sub-goals at each level of the organization. Each lower-order goal 
becomes a means to a high-order goal. People do not accept these goals because they 
necessarily share them or believe in them, but because the organization has mechanisms 
to insure that working toward them meets the individuals own personal values." [Perrow, 
1972, p. 150] Therefore, organizational success is relatively dependent upon the success 
of the individuals within that organization. 
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VI.   STRUCTURE FOR THE INFORMATION OPERATIONS COUNCIL (IOC) 
For U.S. policy, an early implication of our work is that counter-netwar 
will require very effective interagency operations, which by their very 
nature involve networked structures. It should not be necessary, or 
desirable, to replace all hierarchies with networks. Rather, the challenge 
will be to blend these two forms skillfully, while retaining enough central 
authority to encourage and enforce adherence to truly networked 
processes. In this manner, states may come to be better prepared to 
confront the multitude of new threats emerging in this information age. 
[Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p.291] 
A. STRUCTURAL OVERVIEW 
1.   Introduction 
The proposed organization would be titled the Information Operations Council 
(IOC) and its primary goal is to ensure that all relevant departments and agencies play 
their appropriate role in the formulation and implementation of both foreign and domestic 
Information Operations policy. This council would be headed by a National Chief 
Information Officer (NGO), who would be directly appointed by the President and retain 
a position on the National Security Council. 
The reason for appointing an official at this high level is because of the need for a 
fully integrated inter-agency Information Operations Council that possesses the ability to 
incorporate 10 policy and doctrine into National Security. The current 10 picture does 
not delineate a specific entity who; (1) has the sufficient authority and (2) can directly 
oversee this task.    The current 10 organizational structure is insufficient.    It is a 
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culmination of "individuals" from twenty-eight executive agencies that meet to develop 
recommendations for information technology management issues, procedures, and 
standards. The majority of these individuals have taken on the position of departmental 
Information Officers not as their primary job, but as a collateral tasking as was delineated 
in Chapter Three. This is extremely insufficient in this complex 10 environment and is 
the equivalent of using a band-aid to stop the bleeding from a major wound. In essence, 
the short term problem may receive a temporary fix, but sooner than later the problems 
will have compounded tenfold. In today's uncertain world where, more often than not, 
identifying the enemy/adversary is becoming more and more difficult, Information 
Operations can no longer be thought of as a "part-time" job. 
The empowering of the NCIO would ensure that not only recommendations were 
made, but that 10 policy is implemented across agency boundaries and that potential 
problems are addressed in an efficient and effective manner. 
2.   Information Operations Council Configuration 
The authors have proposed a hybrid configuration for the Information Operations 
Council. This hybrid configuration would be a combination of the divisional 
configuration and the matrix configuration. 
The divisional configuration, a hierarchy, is characterized by subunits (e.g. 
Departmental CIO) within the organization that manage the tactical and operational 
activities. This enables the top management (e.g. NCIO) to focus on strategic planning 
and operations.   The divisional configuration also facilitates improved coordination of 
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functional activities and allows for a fast adaptation to environmental and market 
changes. 
The matrix configuration, a duel hierarchy, promotes interdepartmental cohesion 
and effective information distribution in the organization. This is an essential factor in 
developing a successful Information Operations Council. A second motive for choosing 
this configuration is because the matrix configuration "...assigns specialists from 
functional departments to work on one or more interdisciplinary teams." [Burton and 
Obel, 1998, p.45] 
The integration of these two configurations will promote a high degree of 
departmental responsibility through the divisional configuration and at the same time 
drastically improve inter-departmental coordination and information distribution. 
The proposed Information Operations Council will be comprised of one National 
Chief Information Officer (NCIO), one Deputy NCIO for Foreign Affair, one Deputy 
NCIO for Domestic Affairs, and seventeen Chief Information Officers representing the 
departments/agencies identified and described in Chapter Three. (See Figure 35.) 
Although these members are representatives of their perspective departments, they must 
be place the needs and requirements of the IOC on the same level, if not on a higher level 
than those of their departments.. This is a situation that will undoubtedly be met with 
enormous resistance, -which is another reason why the position of the NCIO must be an 
Executive appointee who is given enough authority and control to carry out agenda and 
accomplish the goals of the IOC. 
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Figure 35. Organizational Structure of IOC 
B. DEFINING MAJOR PLAYERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
1.   National Chief Information Officer 
The National Chief Information Officer is designated by the Executive Branch of 
government, and is responsible for establishing and maintaining a national Information 
Operations doctrine and strategic plan. The NCIO's duties will include enforcing inter- 
agency 10 structure, the development and implementation of doctrine and policy with the 
intent of maintaining a comprehensive operating picture of the 10 environment. This 
position will be required to play an innovative role in informational aspects of National 
110 
Security policy and planning, and to not only focus on the "now/' but to look beyond and 
define a larger 10 environment. 
The NCIO will be required to maintain a bold leadership style while possessing 
the attributes of a visionary, who is willing and able to set a new course for the way 
business is done in the 10 environment. He must have the ability to see 10 situations for 
what they are and to report frankly, and without hesitation, to the President on matters 
regarding Information Operations. Without his strong leadership and the support from 
the President, this organization will never accomplish its demanding goals and will falter 
in the realm of Mormation Operations and National Security. 
2.   Deputy NCIO for Foreign Affairs 
The Deputy NCIO for Foreign Affairs is the primary assistant to the NCIO on 10 
matters that originate from outside the United States, or that effect foreign relations. This 
deputy would have a close working relationship with NCIO and the departmental/agency 
CIOs as to coordinate a common 10 picture in the area of foreign relations. The 
relationship between the Deputy NCIO for Foreign Affairs and the Department of State 
will play a significant role in the development of, and constant adjustment of foreign 
policy. A second integral relationship will be that of the Deputy NCIO for Foreign 
Affairs and the CIO for the Central Intelligence Agency. These two actors must be 
forthright with their information in order to maintain a common informational operating 
picture in the global environment. 
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3. Deputy NCIO for Domestic Affairs 
The Deputy NCIO for Domestic Affairs is the primary assistant to the NCIO on 
matters that originate from inside the U.S. or that effect the domestic infrastructure. This 
deputy would have a close working relationship with NCIO and the departmental/agency 
CIOs as to coordinate a common 10 picture in the area of domestic Information 
Operations. 
4. Departmental / Agency CIOs 
Their respective Secretaries designate an executive agency's CIO. As their 
agency's CIO, they would be responsible the oversight of all Information Operations 
within their department. Although their respective Secretary/Director appoints them, they 
also will be directly responsible to the National Chief Information Officer for the 
implementation and promulgation of all Information Operations policy and doctrine. 
5. Support Staff 
The individual members of the council would assemble their respective support 
staffs. These staffers would work closely with their respective CIO to ensure that they are 
current on issues directly and indirectly related to their area of responsibility. Again, 
these positions cannot be filled as "collateral" jobs. The individuals employed by the IOC 
must work for the IOC and their CIO only. The days of "part-time" 10 must come to an 
end.   An added advantage to this approach is that the support staff is getting direct 
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exposure to the 10 environment, thus receiving "indirect on-the-job training" (tacit 
knowledge). 
C DELINEATING ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
1. NCIOandCIOs 
The NCIO would work weekly and as required with the CIOs. The purpose of 
these frequent meetings is to further advance the role and effectiveness of the IOC. The 
weekly meetings would entail discussions of new policies, current and future threats, and 
any other aspects of 10. 
2. NCIO to Deputy NCIOs 
The NCIO would work day to day with the deputies to ensure that there is a 
coherent operating picture in 10. This relationship is important to ensure that the blending 
of domestic and foreign IO is seamless where required. 
3. Deputy NCIOs to CIOs 
The deputy NCIOs would meet weekly and as required with the CIOs to ensure 
that each executive agency is in tune with the entire 10 orchestra, both foreign and 
domestic. 
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4. CIO to CIO 
The CIOs should operate independently except when meeting weekly with the 
council or as necessary. The CIOs will interact with the NCIO, the deputies and each 
other to share ideas ensuring that all 10 assets are being effectively allocated. 
5. CIO to Support Staff 
The staff would be tasked according to the priorities of their CIO. Staff members 
would include experts, technicians and analysts in the Information Operations field 
relating to their respective executive agency. 
D. THE INFORMATION OPERATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (IOSC) 
The Information Operations Security Council (which could quite possibly merit a 
separate research topic of its own) will become an integral entity in defining the National 
Security Strategy of the United States in the very near future. This topic, U.S. National 
Security, has been previously discussed in Chapter Four. The IOSC, illustrated in Figure 
35, would be comprised of "mandatory" members from the following 
department/agencies : 
• Department of State 
• Department of Defense 
• Department of Justice 
• Department of Energy 
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• Department of Treasury 
• Department of Transportation 
• Federal Emergency Management 
• Central Intelligence Agency 
At times the NGO may be inclined to bring in other members of the Information 
Operations Council as "advisory" members. This would be done in a similar fashion to 
the way the President brings in advisory members for the National Security Council. 
The IOSC would be similar to, if not the actual, CIA Intelligence- Community 
(IC). The purpose of this sub-council within the IOC would be to ensure that those 10 
issues effecting national security are given special attention. The executive agencies that 
contribute to the national security of the United States would be permanent members of 
the IOSC. These agencies include: Defense, State, Treasury, Justice, Energy, CIA and 
FEMA. Other members of the IOC may be called upon to meet with the IOSC, as the 
situation arises, to discuss national security threats or issues that pertain to that IOC 
member's realm. An example of this is discussed in Chapter Four. 
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VII. ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS COUNCIL 
A. OVERVIEW OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT 
1.   Introduction 
Organizational Consultant is a decision support tool that makes educated 
recommendations on organizational structure. These recommendations are dependent 
upon the user's inputs. Some of the inputs will be based on observations and others will 
be based on judgment. The output from Organizational Consultant is composed of the 
recommended improvements and the organization's situational misfits. The 
recommended improvements are self-explanatory. The misfits are basically combinations 
of certain situations or attributes within the organization, which can lead to lower 
organizational performance. Situational misfits are detractors in organizational design 
and structure that prevent the organization from reaching its full potential. 
The Input categories in Organizational Consultant are made up of the following: 
current configuration, current complexity, current formalization, current centralization, 
size, age/ownership, diversity, technology, environment, management profile, strategy 
factors, and climate factors. Theses categories are comprised of between one to ten 
questions that inquire specifics about the organization. If one of the questions is not 
applicable to the organization the user has the option to choose the "no answer" choice. 
Also, with each question there is a "certainty factor." This certainty factor allows the user 
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to indicate the degree of certainty for that specific input. This allows the Organizational 
Consultant to evaluate each question appropriately and with the accurate level of 
importance. The range for the certainty factor is between -100 and 100. Through the 
user's answers to these questions the organization is then defined. 
2.   Fit Criteria 
Fit is an organizing concept that is used to develop a knowledge base. "Fit 
suggests a synthesis and integration of concepts to create definitions. The challenge is to 
create a knowledge base system that utilizes known theory for a given situation to suggest 
appropriate organizational design recommendations. To meet these goals the knowledge 
base must fit together across a number of dimensions." [Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 15] 
There are four fundamental criteria that are needed for a functional organization. 
These criteria are: 
• Contingency Fit: The Contingency fit is dependent upon there being a good 
fit between the contingency factors of the organizational structure (e.g. 
Management style, Climate, Size, Environment, Technology, Strategy) and the 
design parameters of the organization (e.g. Complexity, Formalization, Rules, 
Reports, Communications). This relationship can be seen in Figure 36. "The 
contingency fit criteria can largely be achieved through careful attention to the 
contingency theory literature and translation of that knowledge into 
appropriate if-then statements." [Burton and Obel, 1998, p. 17] 
• Situational Fit: Situational fit is determined by whether or not the 
organization's "situational facts" make sense. For example, the organization's 
management style must fit the environment; if one were to change then the 
other must also change in order to maintain a situation fit.   It is basically a 
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matter of consistency within the organizational structure. "The control of 
situational fits and misfits is a key to organizational success." [Burton and 
Obel, 1998, p. 17] 
Design Parameter Fit: Design fit is characterized as a fit between the 
properties of an organization's design parameters (e.g. Centralization, 
Complexity, Formalization), seen on the right side of Figure 36, and the 
organization's contingency factors (e.g. Management Style, Size, 
Technology), seen on the left side of Figure 36. The difficulty in attaining a 
design parameter fit is in balancing the recommendations. "For example, a 
design recommendation that the organization should be decentralized can be 
driven by a number of contingencies. Management style, climate, size, 
environment, technology, and strategy all may suggest decentralization. 
However, the more likely situation is that there are design propositions that 
suggest decentralization and others that suggest centralization." [Burton and 
Obel, 1998, p.17] 
Total Design Fit: The Total fit is the culmination of the above-mentioned fits 
(Contingency, Situational, and Design). Obviously, this is the most difficult 
fit to attain because it requires that not only must the design recommendations 
fit internally to the organization, but they must also fit the actual situation. If 
serious situational misfits are present, and not corrected then the total design 
fit will be impossible to obtain. 
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Figure 36. Contingency Theory - Organizational Design Fit [From: Burton and Obel, 1998] 
In this scenario the organization is a new proposal, so some of the answers to the 
Organizational Consultant questions will be conceptual in nature. 
B. INPUTS TO ORGCON 
1.   Current Configuration 
An organization's configuration is basically its chain of command.   It specifies 
who is responsible for what tasks within the organization.    There are seven basic 
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stereotypical organizational configurations: simple, functional, divisional, matrix, 
machine bureaucracy, professional bureaucracy, and ad hoc. An organization is not 
always one of the above-mentioned stereotypical configurations. Many times an 
organization can possess attributes of one or more of these and in many situations those 
"hybrid" configurations are very adaptive and in turn very successful. 
The Inter-agency Information Operations organization proposed in this research 
will possess attributes of three of the above-mentioned configurations. la order for the 
organization to flourish it should possess attributes from the following configurations: 
• The Information Operations Council will be predominately comprised of a 
divisional configuration. This configuration will best fit this organization 
because it will allow the each individual Departmental Chief Information 
Officer to handle the day-to-day operations and tactical issues and at the same 
time allowing the National Chief Information Officer to focus his efforts on 
the strategic issues. However, the draw back to this configuration is that it 
sometimes tends to promote autonomy and minimizes interdependency 
between the individual units. This could cause redundancy and "stove-piping" 
within the organization. 
• The Information Operations Council should also possess attributes of a matrix 
configuration in order to promote interdepartmental cohesion and effective 
information distribution. The matrix configuration ".. .assigns specialists from 
functional departments to work on one or more interdisciplinary teams." 
[Burton and Obel, 1998, p.45] The matrix configuration focuses on making 
required adjustments in the organization and managing uncertainty. The goal 
of the matrix configuration is to "capture the effectiveness of the division as 
well as the efficiency of the functional configuration under uncertainty." 
[Burton and Obel, 1998, p.64] This is an important concept that the 
Information Operations Council must fully comprehend. 
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• Lastly, there will be elements of the machine bureaucracy configuration 
present in the Information Operations Council. These elements are inevitable, 
any governmental organization will possess a proper chain of command and 
will be highly formalized with rules and regulations. And lastly government 
organizations tend to have a well-defined hierarchy. Although some of these 
attributes will be somewhat inevitable the authors contest the belief that 
because the organization is within the government that it is obliged to follow a 
configuration of a machine bureaucracy. A strict machine bureaucracy will 
only defeat the purpose of the Information Operations Council, which is to 
break down the common barriers/walls that currently exist between 
departments in the information operations environment. 
Although there are elements of each of these configurations in the Information 
Operations Council, a mixture or "hybrid" configuration that combines the divisional and 
matrix configurations, while minimizing the effects of the inevitable machine 
bureaucracy, will be best suited to accomplish organizational goals. Unfortunately, the 
authors have been limited to only one choice for the current configuration question in 
Organizational Consult. The authors have chosen the divisional configuration because 
this configuration is the best fit. 
2.   Current Complexity 
The amount of horizontal, vertical and spatial differentiation within an 
organization defines its degree of complexity. The horizontal differentiation is defined as 
the varying amounts of specialization within the organization. The depth of the 
organization's hierarchy or chain of command determines an organization's vertical 
differentiation.    Spatial differentiation can simply be described as the extent that an 
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organization is geographically spread out. [Burton and Obel, 1998, p.68] For instance, is 
the organization global, international, national, or regional? The proposed Inter-Agency 
10 organization is moderately complex, in that there are numerous departments/agencies 
that are involved. There will be a high need for detailed coordination between these 
separate departments, which is why each departments will be required to have their own 
departmental Chief Information Officer. Geographic complexity will not be overly 
important because each of the departmental CIOs will be located within the 
organization's main center. Vertical levels will number between three and five, and all of 
the roles will require advanced degrees. 
3.   Current Formalization 
Formalization can be explained as the basic rule and regulations of an 
organization. These rules could range from working hours and attire to standards and 
procedures for executing a deal or orders. "We measure formalization as the degree to 
which there exists formally stated rules, in writing." [Burton and Obel, 1998, p.73] The 
degree of formalization could vary at different levels of any organizations. In many 
instances an organization will be extremely formalized at its lower levels where direction 
and supervision are needed, but at upper levels formalization is replaced by experience 
and knowledge. The Inter-agency 10 organization should have a level of medium 
formalization, but will most likely be highly formalized, if for no other reason than 
because it is a governmental organization. The majority of the rules and procedures will 
be in writing.  The difficulty this organization will face will be trying to adhere to this 
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level of formalization while continuously dealing with a very uncertain environment and 
trying to adapt to these uncertainties. Senior leadership must be able to have some 
latitude in their decision making process. 
4. Current Centralization 
Centralization, in its simplest form can be explained as to what extent upper 
management is involved in the overall operations of an organization. A few questions 
that should be asked in order to determine an organizations level of centralization: Are 
the decision makers involved in the day-to-day intricacies of the organization? To what 
extent is the decision making process delegated? Is authority delegated or does it rest at 
the top? We measure centralization by how much direct involvement top managers have 
in gathering and interpreting the information they use in decision-making and the degree 
to which top management directly controls the execution of a decision [Burton and Obel, 
1998, p.75]. The proposed 10 organization will be highly centralized at the upper levels 
(e.g. National Chief Information Officer, National Security Council), but somewhat 
decentralized at the separate department levels. Upper leadership will have direct control 
over the implementation of policy and the execution of decisions. 
5. Size 
The size of an organization is defined by the obvious: the number of individuals 
within an organization. The greater the number of people the larger the organization. The 
skill levels of individuals determine the number of people required. An organization with 
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highly trained and skilled individuals tends to behave larger than an organization with the 
same number of unskilled individuals. Thus, the employee number is factored up to 
reflect this difference. Size is used here as a measure of the information processing 
capacity. A larger organization requires greater information processing capacity. The 
education and skill level of the employees is important in this respect. [ORGCON, 1998] 
In the case of the 10 organization, although the overall organizational size will be 
greater than 2,000 individuals, the authors will only be examining the organization from 
the upper-middle management levels and higher. 
6. Age/Ownership 
Age in an organization varies throughout the different organizational levels, there 
are certain organizations where age is limited within a certain age group.  In the Inter- 
agency 10 organization the authors will be focusing on the middle to upper management, 
therefore the age will not vary as much. The ownership is obviously going to be 
government. 
7. Diversity 
Organizational diversity pertains to the different types to diversity of products and 
services that an organization provides. "A greater number of products indicates a greater 
variety in the organization's activities and is a measure of differentiation. The exact 
number is less important than the perception of the variety or differences among the 
products."  [ORGCON,   1998]     Although the  Inter-agency Information Operations 
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organization's prime service/product is information, the types of information will greatly 
fluctuate. Because of this fluctuation, the organization is considered highly diversified. 
8. Technology 
Technology is considered to be the equipment, and methods used by an 
organization to achieve its goals. Technology often is considered to be the key to an 
organization's success. Unfortunately, this is a misconception. Technology is only a part 
of what is required for an organization's success and could even be detrimental to an 
organization if it is not utilized correctly. The Information Operations Council will have 
to us advanced information systems for proper command and control. 
9. Environment 
An organization's environment is defined as the arena in which the organization 
operates. "The environment consists of many different parts. The industry, including its 
size and competitions, is a major part of the organization's environment." [Burton and 
Obel, 1998, p.201] The environment also includes, but is not limited to, suppliers, 
politics, customer bases, finances, and social attitudes. The level of uncertainty in the 
information operations environment is very high, which in turn produces a very complex 
and competitive environment. 
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10. Management Profile 
An organization's management profile is basically the leadership style of the 
upper management/decision makers. The management profile must be a good fit with the 
organizational structure. If it is not a good fit then the organization will not achieve its 
goals. Senior leadership will make the majority of policy and general decisions for both 
the long and short term, while operating decisions will be made at the separate 
departmental levels. The top management in the Information Operations Council has to 
be extremely proactive in its' thinking in order to stave off potential 10 threats. 
11. Strategy Factors 
An organization's strategy is one of the essential determinants of organizational 
design. It determines what the organization's long term goals and milestones will be. 
An organization's strategy and structure must fit together in order for the organization to 
achieve those goals and milestones. This organization will possess a high capital 
requirement and be highly innovative in doctrine/policy matters. The organization's 
concern for quality will be exceedingly high. 
12. Climate Factors 
The organizational climate refers to the beliefs and attitudes held by individuals 
about their organization. The climate is a relatively enduring quality of an organization 
that (1) is experienced by employees, and (2) influences their behavior. [ORGCON, 
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1998] The Information Operations Council must have a high level of trust if the council 
is to succeed. This also will be difficult to achieve because of the departmental 
walls/barriers that are presently in existence. Information assurance and security must be 
a chief concern for all members in the council, as this is becoming more and more 
difficult to control. 
C. RESULTS FROM ORGCON 
As discussed previously in this chapter, Organizational Consultant is a decision 
support tool that diagnoses organizational problems and makes educated 
recommendations on organizational structure. As described by Burton and Obel in 
Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design, "....Organizational Consultant is an 
expert/knowledge base system, which incorporate knowledge derived from experts into 
an information processing framework for organizational design. This knowledge base 
has been transformed into a system of decision rules." [Burton and Obel, 1998, p.347] 
Organizational Consultant will analyze the organization based on the inputs of the user, 
and upon the completion ofthat analysis the program will produce a detailed report. The 
explanations provided in the report summary relate the specific recommendations and 
conclusions to the organizational design theory. It is important to understand that the 
answers provided through the report summary are not the "all and end all" for the most 
successful organizational design. These conclusions and recommendations are only 
biased because they are generated in the decision support system and based on the inputs 
of the individual and their understanding/interpretation of the organization. [Burton and 
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Obel, 1998, p.348]    Additionally, the decision support system rules are empirically 
validated only for business scenarios. 
The individual input questions and answers can be found in Appendix A and the 
detailed results from Organizational Consultant can be found in Appendix B. 
1.   Size 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number 
of employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills. [ORGCON, 1998] 
The size of the Information Operations Council has been deemed medium by the 
authors. It is also more than likely that all members of this council, since they will also 
be upper-management officials within their perspective departments/agencies, will 
possess some type of higher education. 
Based on the answers...provided, it is most likely that your organization's 
size is medium (cf 80). More than 75 % of the people employed by IOC 
have a high level of education. Adjustments are made to this effect. The 
adjusted number of employees is lower than 1,000 but greater than 500 
and IOC is categorized as having a medium size. [ORGCON, 1998] 
2.   Climate 
The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior. 
[ORGCON, 1998] The beliefs, attitudes, and perspectives of the individuals within the 
organization determine the organization's climate. The organizational climate can be 
further defined as "the relatively endearing quality of the internal environment of an 
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organization that a) is experienced by its members, b) influences their behavior, and c) 
can be described in terms of the values of a particular set of characteristics (attitudes) of 
the organization." [Taguiri and Litwin, 1968, p.27] 
Based on the answers...provided, it is most likely that the organizational 
climate is a developmental climate (cf 64). The developmental climate is 
characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative place to work. 
People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered to 
be innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations together is 
commitment to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being 
on the leading edge. Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are 
important. The organization's long-term emphasis is on growth and 
acquiring new resources. Success means having unique and new products 
or services and being a product or service leader is important. The 
organization encourages individual initiative and freedom. 
Medium to high leader credibility characterizes an organization with a 
developmental climate. When the organization has a high to medium level 
of trust it is likely that the organization has a developmental climate. 
Employees with a high morale is frequently one element of a 
developmental climate. An organization with a medium level of 
scapegoating may have a developmental climate. [ORGCON, 1998] 
3.   Management Style 
An organization's management style can have a vast effect on how the 
organizational structure is formed and if/how it will evolve. At the same time it is quite 
possible for management to adapt to the existing structure. The key to a successful 
management - structure relationship is to ensure that there is a good fit between the two. 
The level of management's micro involvement in decision-making is the summary 
measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for micro involvement; 
managers   have   a   high   preference   for   micro-involvement.    [ORGCON,    1998] 
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Organizational   Consultant  made  the  following  observations  in  reference  to   the 
Information Operations Council's climate: 
Based on the answers...provided, it is most likely that your management 
profile has a medium preference for micro involvement (cf 73). 
Management has both a short-term and long-term horizon when making 
decisions, which characterizes a preference for a medium micro 
involvement. Management is risk neutral. This is one of the characteristics 
of a manager with a medium preference for micro involvement. Since the 
management has a preference for medium detailed information when 
making decisions a medium preference for micro involvement 
characterization is appropriate. Management has a preference for using 
both motivation and control to coordinate the activities, which leads 
toward a medium preference for micro involvement. [ORGCON, 1998] 
4.   Strategy 
"Structure follows strategy or strategy follows structure," this debate has been 
going on for quite some time. Amburgey and Dacin [1994] argue that strategy is more 
important in determining structure than structure is in determining strategy. Whichever is 
the case, in the end the most important factor will be whether or not there is a sufficient 
fit between the two, "The fit between strategy and organizational structure has crucial 
implications for the performance of the organization." [Miller, 1987b] 
The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer 
with innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories 
follow Miles and Snow's typology. Based on the authors' inputs, the organization has 
been assigned to a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not 
an analysis of what is the best or preferred strategy for the organization. [ORGCON, 
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1998]   The preferred strategy will be discussed in the recommendations section later in 
this chapter. 
Organizational   Consultant   found   that   it   is   most   likely   that   the   IOC's 
organizational strategy is that of an analyzer with innovation strategy, with a certainty 
factor of 68%.   It also states the strategy could also be that of a prospector, with a 
certainty factor of 65%. An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an 
organization that combines the strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into 
the production of a new product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. 
But in contrast to an analyzer without innovation, it has innovations that run concurrently 
with the regular production and it has a dual technology core.  [ORGCON, 1998] 
Organizational Consultant states the following: 
With a concern for high quality an analyzer with innovation strategy is a 
likely strategy for IOC. With top management preferring a medium level 
of micro involvement top management wants some influence. This can be 
obtained via control over current operations. Product innovation should be 
less controlled. The strategy is therefore likely to be analyzer with 
innovation. For a medium routine technology, IOC has some flexibility. It 
is consistent with an analyzer with innovation strategy. [ORGCON, 1998] 
A prospector is constantly seeking new product opportunities to serve the existing 
and potentially new customers. With a concern for high quality a prospector strategy is a 
likely strategy for IOC.     For a prospector strategy to be aggressive  in product 
development or market opportunities exploitation, it requires a high capital investment. 
An organization with a prospector strategy is an organization that continually searches for 
market opportunities and regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging 
environmental trends.    Thus, the organization is often the creator of change and 
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uncertainty to which its competitors must respond. However, because of its strong 
concern for product and market innovation, a prospector usually is not completely 
efficient. 
The Information Operations Council must possess traits of both the analyzer with 
innovation, and the prospector strategies. So in essence the organization will possess a 
hybrid strategy that combines the two in order to meet the challenges of the uncertain 
environment. 
5.   Current Organizational Characteristics 
Based on the authors' inputs, the organization's complexity, formalization, and 
centralization have been calculated. The current organization has been categorized with 
respect to formalization, centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on 
the input given and does not take missing information into account. This is the current 
organization. Later in this chapter, there will be recommendations for the organization. 
Below are the current organizational characteristics: 
• The current organizational complexity is medium (cf 75). 
• The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 80). 
• The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 70). 
• The current spatial differentiation is low (cf 70). 
• The current centralization is medium (cf 86). 
• The current formalization is high (cf 70). 
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D. MISFITS 
Organizational Consultant provides two types of misfits in its report summary. 
These misfits are called situational misfits and organizational (design parameter) misfits. 
The situational misfit occurs when there are internal inconsistencies within the 
organization's design situation. "Situation misfits may appear due to changes in the 
environment and thus be exogenous to the organization. Misfits may also appear because 
of management decisions." [Burton and Obel, 1998, p.17] If Organizational Consultant 
finds that an organization does not have any situational misfits then it is assumed that 
there is a high level of internal consistency within the organizational structure. 
Situational misfits must be controlled if the organization is going to be successful. 
Organizational misfits, also called design parameter misfits, exist when the 
existing level of the organization's design parameters differ from those recommended by 
Organizational Consultant. [Burton and Obel, 1998, p.392] Organizational misfits will 
be evident when the "if-then" propositions, used in the determination of the 
organization's design, are not met and hence are unbalanced. 
1.   Situational Misfits 
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of 
management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy. [ORGCON, 
1998] Organizational Consultant has found that the following situational misfits are 
present, with a certainty factor of 100%: 
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IOC has a high capital requirement but is not a large organization. The 
organization can be vulnerable. An organization with a high capital 
requirement and a few employees usually makes a few standardized 
products. Further, the technology is likely to be very limited in 
adaptiveness. The organization is then vulnerable to changes in the 
environment, market and products changes. Smaller organizations with 
small capital requirements are frequently more adaptive. To reduce this 
vulnerability, the organization should consider creating a greater capability 
for adaptation, which will usually require more employees of higher skill, 
education and training. [ORGCON, 1998] 
The above-mentioned situational misfits are mostly due to the manner in which 
the authors have "bound" the proposed organization. The authors specifically bound the 
problem by concentrating on the upper management level of the Information Operations 
Council. This ultimately affects the size and complexity of the organization, which in turn 
causes a situational misfit between organizational size and capital requirement. Also, 
Organizational Consultant correlates small organizations that have high capital 
requirements with the production of few standardized products. The authors consider the 
products of the IOC to be countless. Although information can be considered one 
product, the realm of information operations is practically infinite and knows no bounds. 
2.   Organizational Misfits 
Organizational (Design Parameter) misfits compare the recommended 
organization with the current organization. [ORGCON, 1998] The current organization is 
the direct result of the user's input to, or in other words how the user interprets the 
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organization. The prescribed organization is defined as the best recommended fit for the 
organization, through Organizational Consultant's decision support system rules. 
Organizational Consultant has found that only one organizational misfit is present, with a 
certainty factor of 100%: 
•    Current and prescribed formalization do not match. 
This is somewhat of a positive outcome for the basic design/structure of the 
proposed Information Operations ■ Council. The authors specifically answered the 
majority of the formalization questions in Organizational Consultant to the "highly 
formalized" side. Formalization is a fact of life in government organizations and is 
something that needs to be addressed in the future. 
The basic reasoning behind this misfit is that the excessive formalization will 
stifle innovation and the proverbial "out of the box" thinking, which are essential to 
success in the 10 realm. Some even go to the extent of deeming this environment as the 
"Information Revolution", but these are the same people that try to formalize or "do 
business like they always have in the past." How can one formalize something so new? 
This is where much of the problem lies today in governmental organizations. Excessive 
formalization tends to lead one to assume that "what worked today will work tomorrow 
and the next day," but this is certainly not always the case. This is not to say that there is 
no need for any formalization in organizational structure, just that future success in this 
environment will more dependent on innovation and forward thinking, and much less 
dependent upon formalization. 
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E. ORGCON RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the authors' inputs about the organization, its situation, and the 
conclusions with the greatest certainty factor from the analyses above Organizational 
Consultant has derived recommendations for the organization's configuration, 
complexity, formalization, and centralization. There are also recommendations for 
coordination and control, the appropriate media richness for communications, and 
incentives. More detailed recommendations for possible changes in the current 
organization are also provided. [ORGCON, 1998] 
1.   Organizational Configurations 
Organizational Consultant has determined that the configuration that best fits the 
situation has been estimated to be a divisional configuration, with a certainty factor of 
69%. The following is the reasoning for Organizational Consultant's recommendation: 
A divisional organization is an organization with self-contained unit 
grouping into relatively autonomous units coordinated by a headquarters, 
(product, customer, or geographical grouping). When the organization is 
of medium size, the configuration can be a divisional configuration. 
Because the organization has many products, the configuration should be 
divisional. The configuration should be divisional when the equivocality 
of IOC's environment is not high and the complexity is not low. The 
divisionalization of IOC may be based on products or product groups. The 
divisionalization of IOC may be based on markets. The divisional 
configuration may be a multi-domestic structure. Because the technology 
is not fully divisible, care should be taken in recommending a divisional 
configuration. [ORGCON, 1998] 
Organizational Consultant further added that the machine bureaucracy would most 
likely be the worst fit for the IOC. The basis for Organizational Consultant's observation 
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that a machine bureaucracy would be an ill suited configuration for the Information 
Operations Council is that the environment is highly hostile and uncertain. And that in 
this type of environment a machine bureaucracy would prevent the organization from 
acting appropriately when unexpected events occur. 
Although the recommendation stated above coincides with the recommendation of 
the authors, there is still no definite configuration. While not a viable option in 
Organizational Consultant, the authors believe that the ideal configuration would be one 
that combines the key elements of the divisional and matrix configurations, while 
minimizing the effects of the inevitable machine bureaucracy. This configuration has 
been previously described as a "hybrid" configuration. 
2.   Organizational Characteristics 
a.   Complexity 
Organizational complexity is the combination of vertical, horizontal and 
spatial differentiation. Horizontal differentiation is usually high when there are many 
small tasks to be accomplished that require individual specialization. The number of 
hierarchical levels within the organization determines vertical differentiation. Spatial 
differentiation is determined by the amount of different geographic locations the 
organization possesses. Lastly, complexity is also a by-product of the organization's 
preference for micro-involvement, size, environment, technology, and strategy.   As the 
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organizational complexity becomes higher the demand for efficient information 
processing becomes higher and command and control becomes increasingly more 
difficult. 
The IOC's horizontal differentiation is considered to be medium because 
of the fact that there are only a moderate number of different job titles. This is due to the 
fact that the authors "bounded" the organization to include only the separate 
Departmental Information Officers, the two Deputy Chief Information Officers, and the 
National Chief Information Officer. The vertical differentiation was also determined to 
be medium, again because of the way the organization has been bounded. There are only 
three to five levels that will separate the National Chief Information Officer (top) and the 
Departmental Information Officers (bottom). The spatial differentiation was deemed low 
due to the fact that the number of geographic locations separating the individuals is 
limited to the Washington D.C. area (less than 10 miles). 
Organizational Consultant recommends that the degree of organizational 
complexity is medium for the Information Operations Council. The certainty factor 
associated with this recommendation was 62%. Organizational Consultant states that, for 
the most part, medium sized organizations should have medium complexity and that top 
management of IOC has a preference for a medium level of micro involvement, which 
drives the organizational complexity towards medium. This recommendation is 
explained in further detail below. 
IOC has a technology that is somewhat routine, which implies that the 
organizational   complexity   should   be   medium.   The   environmental 
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uncertainty of IOC is high, and the equivocality of IOC's environment is 
medium. For this situation the organizational complexity should be 
medium. There is no need for an elaborate hierarchy or work 
specialization. Because IOC has an advanced information system, 
organizational complexity can be greater than it could otherwise. A 
developmental climate in the organization requires a medium level of 
complexity. The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is 
medium (cf 27). The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is 
medium (cf 48). It, too, could be: low (cf 44). [ORGCON, 1998] 
b.   Formalization 
Formalization is defined as the rules, regulations, and standard operating 
procedures for an organization. "We measure formalization as the degree to which there 
exists formally stated rules, in writing." [Burton and Obel, 1998, p.73] It has also been 
stated that formalization can increase information processing capacity or decrease the 
demand for information processing. Formalization and configuration have direct effects 
upon one another, as seen previously in this chapter. For example, machine bureaucracy 
configurations will tend to be highly formalized, while matrix configurations will tend to 
be less bound by written rules and regulations. 
As previously discussed, the authors answered the formalization questions 
from Organizational Consultant toward the highly formalized side. This in turn is what 
causes the only organizational/design parameter misfit. Organizational Consultant has 
recommended that degree of formalization be medium for the Information Operations 
Council. The certainty factor for this answer is 53%. Below is the explanation for this 
recommendation. 
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There should be some formalization between the organizational units but 
less formalization within the units due to the high professionalization. 
Medium size organizations should have medium formalization. 
Organizations with medium-routine technology should have a medium 
formalization. Medium formalization is consistent with the leadership 
style when top management's preference for micro involvement is neither 
very great nor very low. [ORGCON, 1998] 
c.   Centralization 
Centralization is measured by the amount of direct involvement top 
managers have in gathering and interpreting the information they use in decision-making 
and to what degree is the execution of a decision controlled by top management. 
Centralization has a direct relationship with the demand for information processing. As 
the demand for information processing rises, more individuals have to get involved in the 
decision-making process. This will lead to an increase in decentralizing the decision- 
making process within the organization. 
Organizational    Consultant    has    recommended   that    the    level    of 
centralization in the IOC be medium, but the detailed recommendation states reasons for 
the possibility of low, medium, and high centralization.  It is evident to the authors that 
Organizational Consultant selected the "middle ground" for this category.  The detailed 
recommendation is stated below. 
The recommended degree of centralization is medium (cf 59). IOC has an 
analyzer with innovation strategy. Centralization should be medium. 
There should be tight control over current activities and looser control 
over new ventures. When there is a high capital requirement and the 
product innovation is high, as is the case for IOC, centralization should be 
medium. IOC is of medium size. Such organizations should have medium 
to high centralization. Medium centralization is recommended when top 
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management has neither a great desire nor very little desire for micro 
involvement. Because IOC has an advanced information system, 
centralization can be greater than it could otherwise. A developmental 
climate in the organization requires a medium to low level of 
centralization. [ORGCON, 1998] 
d.   Span of Control 
Span of control is determined by how routine the technology is within an 
organization, and how important that technology is to the organization in their overall 
information a system. The Information Operations Council will be required to have 
dominant technologies and advanced information systems in order to effectively and 
efficiently accomplish their goals. This brings up the point made earlier about innovation 
and forward thinking. In order for the IOC to be effective, individuals must be 
continuously innovating, both doctrinally and technologically. The status quos will not 
work, information needs to be gotten to the right people at the right time and the only way 
to continuously accomplish this in the future is to increase the span of control through 
technological innovation. 
Organizational Consultant has recommended that the IOC's span of 
control that is medium and the media required for use have a medium richness.  Lastly, 
the IOC should an information media for a large amount of information. 
IOC's span of control should be moderate (cf 49). Since IOC has some 
technology routineness, it should have a moderate span of control. IOC 
should use media with medium media richness (cf 70). The information 
media that IOC uses should provide a large amount of information (cf 85). 
Incentives should be based on results (cf 85). [ORGCON, 1998] 
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e.   Coordination and Control 
"Coordination and control have two sides.    One is to make sure that 
enough relevant information is available at the right time to be able to make the right 
decisions.   The second is to make sure that the right decisions are made." [Burton and 
Obel, 1998, p.76] Command and control will play in integral role in the success of the 
proposed   Information   Operations   Council.      Coordination   between   the   separate 
Departmental Chief Information Officers and the National Chief Information Officer will 
be imperative, for if the right information is not being properly and effectively distributed 
then it is not doing anyone any good.    Organizational Consultant recommends that 
because the IOC's environment has medium equivocality, high uncertainty, and high 
complexity the  command  and  control  process  promulgated  through  departmental 
meetings. A detailed explanation regarding Organizational Consultant's recommendation 
for the IOC's command and control process is given below. 
IOC should use meetings as means for coordination and control (cf 79). 
When IOC's environment has medium equivocality, high uncertainty, and 
high complexity, coordination and control should be obtained through 
integrators and group meetings. The richness of the media used should be 
medium with a large amount of information to cope with the 
environmental complexity and uncertainty. Incentives must be results 
based. Coordination within each division is very important. Coordination 
between (among) divisions is usually relegated to top management, which 
is also concerned about strategic direction and allocation of funds between 
(among) the divisions. Technology efficiencies can be obtained by sharing 
technology, information and new developments across divisions. Liaison 
managers and technology committees are possible coordination 
mechanisms. Conferences among technical professionals can be very 
effective. When the organization has a developmental climate, 
coordination should be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings. 
Incentives could be results based with an individual orientation. An 
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organization with a developmental climate will likely have to process a 
large amount of information and will need information media with high 
richness. [ORGCON, 1998] 
3.   More Detailed Recommendations 
Organizational Consultant gave four detailed recommendations to further increase 
organizational effectiveness. These recommendations are all related to the level of 
formalization within the proposed Information Operations Council. The culmination of 
all of these recommendations leads the authors to conclude that by reducing the level of 
formalization within the IOC then there will be "good" organizational/design parameter 
fit. The four recommendations are listed below. 
• Consider fewer written job descriptions. 
• Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written 
instructions and procedures. 
• Consider having fewer rules and procedures put in writing. 
• Consider decreasing the number of positions for which job descriptions are 
available. 
F.  CONCLUSION 
The proposed Information Operations Council, after being analyzed through 
Organizational Consultant, will require further structural changes in order achieve a 
situation in which there are no misfits and all factors are consistent with one another. The 
situational misfits occur when there are inconsistencies between the organization's 
contingency factors (e.g. management style, size, environment, strategy).   Although the 
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ideal organizational situation would be zero misfits, organizations can still be quite 
successful in meeting goals while certain misfits are present. 
The situational misfits could be attributed to the fact that the proposed IOC is not 
a very typical organization. The IOC is an attempt to bring together a number of vastly 
diverse organizations with many different strategies and goals. The organization shows 
promise and can work with a few minor adjustments that will address the situational 
misfits. 
The authors are satisfied with the results of the organization/design parameter 
misfits. There were only four misfits in this classification and all were related to there 
being too much formalization in the IOC. As stated previously, this type of misfit would 
be expected in most governmental organizations. This is not to say that because it is 
common it is acceptable, especially if a high degree of organizational formalization 
hinders performance. Excessive formalization frequently will suffocate the organization 
and promote complacency throughout. This point has been thoroughly discussed in 
previous sections of this chapter. 
Lastly, the authors believe that two of the keys to successful implementation and 
operation of the Information Operations Council will be effective and efficient 
coordination, communication, and cohesion throughout the council; and the appropriate 
organizational configuration. 
Efficient and effective coordination and communication will lead to cohesion 
between council members. What must be avoided, at all costs, is the thinking that each 
Departmental CIO works strictly for his or her specific department.   There must be a 
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realization that the Departmental CIO's also work for the National CIO and within the 
council. 
The authors have determined that the best organizational configuration would be 
the previously discussed "hybrid" configuration, which would combine aspects from both 
the divisional and matrix configurations. The Information Operations environment is one 
of great uncertainty and ambiguity. The traditional ways of organizing and strategizing 
may not be sufficient to handle this type of environment. Robert V. Hatcher, the 
chairman and CEO of Johnson and Higgins, states it best in an advertisement in the Wall 
Street Journal: "Either you take charge of change or change takes charge of you!" 
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VIII.  FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
The more epistemological the challenge, the more it may be confounding 
from an organizational standpoint. Whose responsibility is it to respond? 
Whose roles and missions are at stake? Is it a military, police, intelligence, 
or political matter? The roles and missions of defenders are not easy to 
define, and this may make both deterrence and defense quite problematic. 
[Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 1997, p.284] 
A. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
In completing the circle that surrounds this thesis, it is important to note that in 
order to address the problem set forth, it had to be bounded. The area of focus was placed 
upon the organization at an executive inter-agency level. Many more deficiencies exist at 
different levels; it depends upon what boundaries are assigned and what type of 
environment is chosen. 
The authors decided to analyze the proposed organization from a macro view and 
focused on only the upper management of the Information Operations Council. 
Additional value may be added by conceptually analyzing the IOC "from top to bottom" 
using Organizational Consultant. It may also be useful to analyze the organization using a 
program such as VITE, which focuses more on the individual actors, their inter-relations, 
and their tasks. 
Law enforcement is based upon jurisdiction, whether their coverage is federal as 
in the FBI or local as in the State Police. Information knows no boundaries and therefore 
jurisdiction becomes a valid issue. Research into an 10 Law Enforcement Agency would 
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be an important endeavor especially in the field of Intelligent Agents. A well-developed 
10 law enforcement agency would be a legitimate addition to the IOC, as it would need to 
address "information" type laws that are currently in the debate stages of government. 
B. CONCLUSION 
In the wake of the Information Revolution, the numerous means of information 
exchange have exposed weaknesses that have been the source of much attention; security, 
continuity, integrity and reliability. Although there are various methods and schools of 
thought to which information operations may be conducted, there must exist a cohesive 
policy and common structure from which those methods are employed. Policies, 
strategies and tactics all originate from an organization. Unfortunately if an organization 
is stagnant, "old school" and unwavering in its' approaches to new problems, then it is 
fair to say that policies and therefore the methods in which we approach information 
operations will too be considered., .obsolete. 
Global security has taken on a whole new meaning in the past ten years. Situations 
that seemed quite stable in the past have now become some of the focal points of 
instability. The lines between domestic and foreign policy, intelligence and information, 
political and economic agendas, as well as military and law enforcement activities are 
becoming increasingly blurred. The challenges of the future will be ambiguous and 
adversaries will have no respect for the traditional boundaries of the past. These vague 
lines must be constantly and thoroughly analyzed, evaluated, and updated to promote 
inter-agency coordination and efficiency. [NDP, 1997]   It is important to state that the 
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changes suggested in this thesis are not a "one-time deal," these changes and suggestions 
must be constantly evaluated, and adjustments will have to be made in order to meet the 
requirements of a dynamic environment. 
The purpose of this thesis has been to analyze the current Inter-Agency 
Information Operations organization, or lack there of. The authors have observed the 
deficiencies and inadequacies that are inherent within the current "system." The authors 
then developed and recommended a proposed Information Operations organization that 
would meet future United States National Security requirements; or more appropriately 
named the United States "National Information Operations Security." 
The proposed solution is the establishment an inter-agency organization that 
would be titled the Information Operations Council (IOC). Its' primary goal would be to 
ensure that all relevant departments and agencies play their appropriate role in the 
formulation and implementation of both foreign and domestic Information Operations 
policy. The basis for this proposal is the current lack of integration between the various 
departments and agencies. The authors view the present Chief Information Officer 
Council, although having potential, as a victim of politics, bureaucracy, and "old school" 
thinking. The CIOC lacks the power and responsibility to address the problems that the 
USG faces today and in the future. Additionally the CIOC lacks any organizational, 
doctrinal, or strategic innovation, which inhibits the organization from adapting to meet 
new 10 threats. 
The current 10 organizational structure is insufficient. It is a culmination of 
"individuals"    from    twenty-eight    executive    agencies    that    meet    to    develop 
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recommendations for information technology management issues, procedures, and 
standards; purely technologically driven. The majority of these individuals have taken on 
the position of departmental Information Officers not as their primary job, but as a 
collateral tasking. Unfortunately, in today's uncertain world, identifying the 
adversary/threat is becoming more and more difficult. Information Operations can no 
longer be thought of as a "part-time" job. 
A National Chief Information Officer (NCIO) would head the proposed council. 
The NCIO would be directly appointed by the President and retain a seat on the National 
Security Council. This individual must be a fully qualified expert in the 10 field. It is of 
the utmost importance that this position is not filled with a "figurehead," who is given the 
job through some type of political favor. The reason for appointing an official at this 
high level is because the USG needs a fully integrated inter-agency Information 
Operations Council that possesses the ability to incorporate 10 policy and doctrine into 
National Security. The empowering of the NCIO would ensure that not only 
recommendations are made; but that 10 policy is implemented across agency boundaries 
and that potential problems are addressed in an efficient and effective manner. 
The government of the United States cannot assume that the simple infusion of 
new technologies and information systems into the previously successful doctrines, 
strategies, and organizational structures will guarantee dominance in the future 
information operations environment. Change and adaptation in "the way business is 
done" must be coupled with these innovations in technology. The United States may then 
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reach its' full 10 potential and maintain informational dominance in the environment that 
will undoubtedly shape the future. 
Gareth Morgan, "hits the nail on the head" in his book Riding the Waves of 
Change, by stating that organizations will either have to adapt to change or basically be 
overcome by change. Morgan states: 
Managers and their organizations are confronting wave upon wave of 
change in the form of new technologies, markets, forms of competition, 
social relations, forms of organization and management, ideas, beliefs, and 
so on. Wherever one looks, one sees a new wave coming. And it is vitally 
important that managers accept this as a fundamental aspect of their 
reality, rise to the challenge, and learn to ride or moderate these waves 
with accomplishment. This will require an approach to management and 
managerial competence that are proactive and future-oriented, so that 
future challenges will be talked with foresight and flexibility, and 
managers and their organizations will be able to deal with the 
opportunities created by the change, rather than allowing the waves to 
sweep them over. [Morgan, 1988, p.xii] 
This statement holds true for any type of organization, whether it be commercial, 
military, or governmental. Change is a fundamental aspect of growth and expansion that 
must constantly be planned for and analyzed.  This is the challenge that the Information 
Operations Council and all institutions within the United States government must answer 
to in the future. 
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APPENDIX A. INPUTS TO ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT 
(ORGCON inputs are in bold.) 
Current Configuration 










Certainty Factor: 75 
The matrix configuration best suits this organization because it promotes 
interdepartmental cohesion and effective information distribution, which is the goal of the 
Information Operations Council. The organization will also possess some attributes from 
the divisional and machine bureaucracy configurations. 
Current Complexity 







Certainty Factor: 80 
The analysis of this organization is from upper-middle management and higher so the 
number of different job titles will be moderate. If the organization was be analyzed from 
top to bottom, to include supporting staff then there would be a large number of different 
job titles. 









Certainty Factor: 85 
All Departmental Chief Information officers will hold some type of relevant, advanced 
degree. 
3. How many vertical levels separate the chief executive from those employees 
working at the bottom of the organization? 
No answer 
lor 2 
3 to 5 
6 to 8 
9 to 12 
more than 12 
Certainty Factor: 70 
In this organizational structure the Chief Information Officer will have a CIO within each 
department/agency. Those departmental CIOs will each have their own IO support staff. 
4. What is the average number of vertical levels for the organization? 
No answer 
lor 2 
3 to 5 
6 to 8 
9 to 12 
more than 12 
Certainty Factor: 70 
See previous question. 
5.        Including the main center, how many geographic locations are there where 
organization members are employed? 
No answer 
lor 2 
3 to 5 
6 to 15 
16 to 30 
more than 30 
Certainty Factor: 70 
All members of the council will be located in the main center—Washington, D.C. 
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6.        What is the average distance of these outlying units from the organization's 
main center? 
No answer 
Less than 10 miles 
11 to 100 miles 
101 to 500 miles 
501 to 3500 miles 
more than 3500 miles 
one site 
Certainty Factor: 70 
See previous question. 
7.        What proportion of the organization's total work force are located at these 
separate units? 
No answer 
Less than 10% 
11 to 25% 
26 to 60% 
61 to 90% . 
more than 90% 
one site 
Certainty Factor: 75 
Although support staffs will be widely dispersed, the main actors will be located in the 
main center. 
Current Formalization 
1. Written job descriptions available for? 
No answer 
none 
operating employees or top management 
operating employees and first line supervisors 
operating employees, lower and middle management 
all employees, excluding senior management 
all employees, including senior management 
Certainty Factor: 40 
All members of the IO Council will have written job descriptions. 
2. Where written job descriptions exist, how closely are employees supervised to 








Certainty Factor: 80 
Any type of governmental organization will ensure compliance with standards, but as 
stated earlier, the senior leadership must be given some latitude in decision making so as 
to allow them to "think outside of the box." 
3.        How much latitude are employees allowed from standards? 
No answer 
a great deal 
large amount 
a moderate amount 
very little 
none 
Certainty Factor: 60 
See previous question. 
4. What percentage of non-managerial employees are given written operating 
instructions or procedures for their job? 
No answer 
0 to 20% 
21 to 40% 
41 to 60% 
61 to 80% 
more than 80% 
Certainty Factor: 80 
Standard Operating Procedures and written instruction are the norm in any governmental 
organization. 
5. Of those managerial employees given written instructions or procedures, to 






very great deal 
no written instructions 
Certainty Factor: 80 
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Orders should always be followed. 
6.        To what extent are supervisors and middle managers free from rules, 
procedures, and policies when they make decisions? 
No answer 





Certainty Factor: 70 
Again, for the majority of the time the operational activities will be dictated by standard 
operating procedures. But if the organization is going to be successful, it must give its 
managers the leeway to deviate from SOPs when the situation merits. 
7. What percentage of all the rules and procedures that exist within the 
organization is in writing? 
No answer 
0 to 20% 
21 to 40% 
41 to 60% 
61 to 80% 
more than 80% 
Certainty Factor: 80 
The majority of all existing rules and procedures will be in writing. 
Current Centralization 
1.        How much direct involvement does top management have in gathering the 






very great deal 
Certainty Factor: 70 
Top management will be involved in the information gathering process to the extent of 
advising their subordinates what information they will need to assist in their decision 
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making process. The overall collection of information will be accomplished at the lower 
levels. 
2.        To what degree does top management participate in the interpretation of the 
information input? 
No answer 
0 to 20% 
21 to 40% 
41 to 60% 
61 to 80% 
more than 80% 
Certainty Factor: 70 
See previous question. 
3. To what degree does top management directly control execution of a 
decision? 
No answer 
0 to 20% 
21 to 40% . 
41 to 60% 
61 to 80% 
more than 80% 
Certainty Factor: 80 
Top management will be heavily involved in decision making process and in enforcing 
the execution of those decisions. 
4. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing 







Certainty Factor: 80 
Budget is determined outside of the organization. 
5. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over 








Certainty Factor: 80 
Not applicable. 








Certainty Factor: 80 
Not applicable. 
7. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over personnel 







Certainty Factor: 80 
Not applicable. 
8. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over purchasing 







Certainty Factor: 80 
Not applicable. 
9. How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over establishing 








Certainty Factor: 70 
The "out of the box" thinking will promote innovation, which in turn will encourage 
middle managers to voice their opinions and ideas. 
10.      How much discretion does the typical middle manager have over how work 







Certainty Factor: 70 
There will be some management of work exceptions, but for the most part work 
exceptions will be few and far between since most of the rules and procedures are in 
writing. 
Size 
1.        How many employees does this organization have? 
Input any number: 200 
Certainty Factor: 50 
Although the total organization will have well over 2,000 employees, the authors are only 
analyzing the organization from middle management and higher. 
Age/Ownership 





Certainty Factor: 90 
This organization is still in the conceptual/development phase. 
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Certainty Factor: 100 
Diversity 





Certainty Factor: 80 
There are many different informational products that will be produced by the IOC. 





Certainty Factor: 80 
The IOC will operate throughout the world. 
3.        Does the organization operate in more than one country?   If yes, is the 
activity level abroad greater than 25%? 
No answer 
Yes - activity level greater than 25% 
Yes - activity level lower than 25% no 
Certainty Factor: 60 
There is basically 50% of the  organization's  assets  devoted to the international 
environment and 50% to the domestic environment. 







Certainty Factor: 70 
Technology 






Certainty Factor: 60 
The IOC safeguards the informational infrastructure of the U.S. 
2. What kind of technology does the organization have? 
No answer 
standard high volume retail 
high automated retail 
specialized customer oriented retail 
Certainty Factor: 80 
The organization is not involved in any type of retail. 





Certainty Factor: 60 





Certainty Factor: 70 
Some of the everyday jobs can be further broken down in to smaller tasks, while others 
cannot be broken down. 
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Certainty Factor: 80 
The organization will be very reliant upon strong information processing systems, 
communication systems, and decision support systems. 




Certainty Factor: 100 
Advanced information systems will play a key role in successful information operations. 
Environment 





Certainty Factor: 100 
The information operations environment is purely complex. 





Certainty Factor: 90 
The IO environment is in constant flu and uncertainty. 






Certainty Factor: 80 
The environment is somewhat ambiguous. 






Certainty Factor: 80 
The organization's competition/threats are highly competitive very hostile. 
Management Profile 
1. Top management may prefer to make most of the decisions themselves; or 
they may prefer to delegate numerous decisions to other managers i.e.;, greater 
preference for decentralization. What kind of decisions does top management 
prefer to make? 
No answer 
policy and general decisions 
both general and some operating decisions 
both general and operating decisions 
Certainty Factor: 70 
The National Chief Information Officer will make the majority of the policy and general 
decisions through the inputs he receives from the departmental Information Officers. 
2.        Top management may prefer to make long-term decision or short-time 
decision. What kind of decisions does top management prefer to make? 
No answer 
long term 
long term and short time 
short time 
Certainty Factor: 80 
The National Chief Information Officer will have a large influence on both long and 
short-term decisions and policy. 
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3. Top management may prefer to use very detailed or very aggregate 
information when making decisions. What level of detail of information does top 
management prefer to use when making decisions? 
No answer 
very detailed information 
medium detailed information 
very aggregate information 
Certainty Factor: 70 
Top management will require some detailed information in order to make educated 
decisions. 
4. Top management may prefer to be proactive in its thinking, anticipate future 
events and take pre-emptive action. It may be reactive; wait and see and then act. 
What is management's preference on taking action? 
No answer 
proactive anticipating future events 
some proactive and some reactive 
reactive to events as they occur 
Certainty Factor: 90 
Being proactive and anticipating future events will be an essential factor in organizational 
success. 
5. Top management may be risk averse in its decision-making or it may have a 





Certainty Factor: 75 
There will be certain situations where top management will need to be risk adverse and 
other situations where a certain level of risk will be expected. 
6. Top management may prefer to manage through an ex ante motivation or ex 
post control techniques. What kind of motivation and control does top management 
prefer? 
No answer 
motivation through inspiration 
a combination of motivation and control using control techniques 
Certainty Factor: 60 
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Strategy Factors 





Certainty Factor: 60 
Almost all Information Operations have a large capital requirement. 





Certainty Factor: 70 
Innovation is another key factor in organizational success. 





Certainty Factor: 70 
Process innovation is required in order for the organization to adapt to the constant 
changes in the operational environment. 





Certainty Factor: 80 
Quality of information is another key to organizational success. 






Certainty Factor: 100 
Not applicable. 
Climate Factors 





Certainty Factor: 80 
Trust within the organization will be high, but outside the organization the trust level will 
be significantly lower. 





Certainty Factor: 80 





Certainty Factor: 70 





Certainty factor: 80 
Not applicable. 






Certainty Factor: 75 
Although most government organizations are highly resistant to change and are extremely 
bureaucratic in nature, the Information Operations Council must be open to change and 
adaptation. 





Certainty Factor: 90 
As with any organization, the acceptance and credibility of its leaders must be high if the 
organization will be successful. 





Certainty Factor: 70 
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APPENDIX B. ORGCON RESULTS 
REPORT SUMMARY - IOC 
Time: 2:13:19 PM, 3/13/2001 
Scenario: Basic 
INPUT DATA SUMMARY 
The description below summarizes and interprets your answers to the questions about 
your organization and its situation. It states your answers concerning the organization's 
current configuration, complexity, formalization, and centralization. Your responses to 
the various questions on the contingencies of age, size, technology, environment, 
management style, cultural climate and strategy factors are also given. The write-up 
below summarizes the input data for the analysis. 
- IOC has a divisional configuration (cf 75). 
- IOC has a moderate number of different jobs (cf 80). 
- Of the employees at IOC 76 to 100 % have an advanced degree or many years of special 
training (cf 85). 
- IOC has 3 to 5 vertical levels separating top management from the bottom level of the 
organization (cf 70). 
- The mean number of vertical levels is 3 to 5 (cf 70). 
- IOC has 1 or 2 separate geographic locations (cf 80). 
- IOC's average distance of these separate units from the organization's headquarters is 
less than 10 miles (cf 70). 
-11 to 25 % of IOC's total workforce is located at these separate units (cf 75). 
- Job descriptions are available for all employees, including senior management (cf 40). 
- Where written job descriptions exist, the employees are supervised moderately closely 
to ensure compliance with standards set in the job description (cf 80). 
- The employees are allowed to deviate a moderate amount from the standards (cf 60). 
- 61 to 80 % non-managerial employees are given written operating instructions or 
procedures for their job (cf 80). 
- The written instructions or procedures given are followed to a great extent (cf 80). 
- Supervisors and middle managers are to some extent free from rules, procedures, and 
policies when they make decisions (cf 70). 
- 61 to 80 % of all the rules and procedures that exist within the organization are in 
writing (cf 80). 
- Top Management is only a little involved in gathering the information they will use in 
making decisions (cf 70). 
- Top management participates in the interpretation of 21 to 40 % of the information 
input (cf 70). 
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- Top management directly controls 61 to 80 % of the decisions executed (cf 80). 
- The typical middle manager has an undetermined amount of discretion over establishing 
his or her budget (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has an undetermined discretion over how his/her unit will 
be evaluated (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has an undetermined amount of discretion over the hiring 
and firing of personnel (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has an undetermined discretion over personnel rewards - 
(i.e., salary increases and promotions) (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has an undetermined discretion over purchasing equipment 
and supplies (cf 100). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over establishing a new project or 
program (cf 70). 
- The typical middle manager has some discretion over how work exceptions are to be 
handled (cf 70). 
- IOC has 200 employees (cf 80). 
- IOC's age is young (cf 90). 
- IOC's ownership status is public (cf 100). 
- IOC has many different products (cf 80). 
- IOC has many different markets (cf 80). 
- IOC operates at a high-activity level in more countries (cf 60). 
- IOC has many different products in the foreign markets (cf 70). 
- IOC's major activity is categorized as service (cf 60). 
- IOC has an undetermined service technology (cf 100). 
- IOC has a medium routine technology (cf 60). 
- IOC's technology is somewhat divisible (cf 70). 
- IOC's technology dominance is strong (cf 80). 
- IOC has either planned or already has an advanced information system (cf 100). 
- IOC's environment is complex (cf 100). 
- The uncertainty of IOC's environment is high (cf 90). 
- The equivocality of the organization's environment is medium (cf 80). 
- IOC's environment has a high hostility (cf 80). 
- Top management prefers to make policy and general resource allocation decisions (cf 
70). 
- Top management primarily prefers to make both long-term and short-time decisions (cf 
80). 
- Top management has a preference for medium detailed information when making 
decisions (cf 70). 
- Top management has a preference for proactive actions (cf 90). 
- Top management is risk neutral (cf 75). 
- Top management has a preference for a combination of motivation and control (cf 60). 
- IOC operates in an industry with a high capital requirement (cf 60). 
- IOC has a high product innovation (cf 70). 
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- IOC has a high process innovation (cf 70). 
- IOC has a high concern for quality (cf 80). 
- IOC's price level is undetermined relative to its competitors (cf 100). 
- The level of trust is medium (cf 80). 
- The level of conflict is medium (cf 80). 
- The employee morale is high (cf 70). 
- Rewards are given in a not known fashion (cf 100). 
- The resistance to change is medium (cf 75). 
- The leader credibility is high (cf 90). 
- The level of scapegoating is medium (cf 70). 
THE SIZE 
The size of the organization - large, medium, or small - is based upon the number of 
employees, adjusted for their level of education or technical skills. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's size is 
medium (cf 80). 
More than 75 % of the people employed by IOC have a high level of education. 
Adjustments are made to this effect. The adjusted number of employees is lower than 
1,000 but greater than 500 and IOC is categorized as having a medium size. 
THE CLIMATE 
The organizational climate effect is the summary measure of people and behavior. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that the organizational climate is a 
developmental climate (cf 64). 
The developmental climate is characterized as a dynamic, entrepreneurial and creative 
place to work. People stick their necks out and take risks. The leaders are considered to 
be innovators and risk takers. The glue that holds organizations together is commitment 
to experimentation and innovation. The emphasis is on being on the leading edge. 
Readiness for change and meeting new challenges are important. The organization's long- 
term emphasis is on growth and acquiring new resources. Success means having unique 
and new products or services and being a product or service leader is important. The 
organization encourages individual initiative and freedom. 
Medium to high leader credibility characterizes an organization with a developmental 
climate. When the organization has a high to medium level of trust it is likely that the 
organization has a developmental climate. Employees with a high morale is frequently 
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one element of a developmental climate. An organization with a medium level of 
scapegoating may have a developmental climate. 
THE MANAGEMENT STYLE 
The level of management's micro-involvement in decision-making is the summary 
measure of management style. Leaders have a low preference for micro-involvement; 
managers have a high preference for micro-involvement. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your management profile has a 
medium preference for micro-involvement (cf 73). 
Management has both a short-time and long-term horizon when making decisions, which 
characterizes a preference for a medium micro-involvement. Management is risk neutral. 
This is one of the characteristics of a manager with a medium preference for micro- 
involvement. Since the management has a preference for medium detailed information 
when making decisions a medium preference for micro-involvement characterization is 
appropriate. Management has a preference for using both motivation and control to 
coordinate the activities, which leads toward a medium preference for micro- 
involvement. 
THE STRATEGY 
The organization's strategy is categorized as one of either prospector, analyzer with 
innovation, analyzer without innovation, defender, or reactor. These categories follow 
Miles and Snow's typology. Based on your answers, the organization has been assigned to 
a strategy category. This is a statement of the current strategy; it is not an analysis of what 
is the best or preferred strategy for the organization. 
Based on the answers you provided, it is most likely that your organization's strategy is an 
analyzer with innovation strategy (cf 68). 
It could also be: a prospector (cf 65). 
An organization with an analyzer with innovation strategy is an organization that 
combines the strategy of the defender and the prospector. It moves into the production of 
a new product or enters a new market after viability has been shown. But in contrast to an 
analyzer without innovation, it has innovations that run concurrently with the regular 
production. It has a dual technology core. 
With a concern for high quality an analyzer with innovation strategy is a likely strategy 
for IOC. With top management preferring a medium level of micro-involvement top 
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management wants some influence. This can be obtained via control over current 
operations. Product innovation should be less controlled. The strategy is therefore likely 
to be analyzer with innovation. For a medium routine technology, IOC has some 
flexibility. It is consistent with an analyzer with innovation strategy. 
An organization with a prospector strategy is an organization that continually searches for 
market opportunities and regularly experiments with potential responses to emerging 
environmental trends. Thus, the organization is often the creator of change and 
uncertainty to which its competitors must respond. However, because of its strong 
concern for product and market innovation, a prospector usually is not completely 
efficient. 
IOC has numerous products. A prospector is constantly seeking new product 
opportunities to serve the existing and potentially new customers. With a concern for high 
quality a prospector strategy is a likely strategy for IOC. For a prospector strategy to be 
aggressive in product development or market opportunities exploitation, it requires a high 
capital investment. 
THE CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Based on your answers, the organization's complexity, formalization, and centralization 
have been calculated. This is the current organization. Later in this report, there will be 
recommendations for the organization. 
The current organizational complexity is medium (cf 75). 
The current horizontal differentiation is high (cf 80). 
The current vertical differentiation is low (cf 70). 
The current spatial differentiation is low (cf 70). 
The current centralization is medium (cf 86). 
The current formalization is high (cf 70). 
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The current organization has been categorized with respect to formalization, 
centralization, and complexity. The categorization is based on the input you gave and 
does not take missing information into account. 
SITUATION MISFITS 
A situation misfit is an unbalanced situation among the contingency factors of 
management style, size, environment, technology, climate, and strategy. 
The following misfits are present: (cf 100). 
IOC has a high capital requirement but is not a large organization. The organization can 
be vulnerable. An organization with a high capital requirement and a few employees 
usually makes a few standardized products. Further, the technology is likely to be very 
limited in adaptiveness. The organization is then vulnerable to changes in the 
environment, market and products changes. Smaller organizations with small capital 
requirements are frequently more adaptive. To reduce this vulnerability, the organization 
should consider creating a greater capability for adaptation, which will usually require 
more employees of higher skill, education and training. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONSULTANT RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on your answers about the organization, its situation, and the conclusions with the 
greatest certainty factor from the analyses above Organizational Consultant has derived 
recommendations for the organization's configuration, complexity, formalization, and 
centralization. There are also recommendations for coordination and control, the 
appropriate media richness for communications, and incentives. More detailed 
recommendations for possible changes in the current organization are also provided. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATIONS 
The most likely configuration that best fits the situation has been estimated to be a 
divisional configuration (cf 69). 
It is certainly not: a machine bureaucracy (cf-80). 
A divisional organization is an organization with self-contained unit grouping into 
relatively autonomous units coordinated by a headquarters, (product, customer, or 
geographical grouping). 
When the organization is of medium size, the configuration can be a divisional 
configuration. Because the organization has many products, the configuration should be 
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divisional. The configuration should be divisional when the equivocality of IOC's 
environment is not high and the complexity is not low. The divisionalization of IOC may 
be based on products or product groups. The divisionalization of IOC may be based on 
markets. The divisional configuration may be a multi-domestic structure. 
Because the technology is not fully divisible, care should be taken in recommending a 
divisional configuration. 
When the organization has high hostility, it is unlikely to be a machine bureaucracy. A 
machine bureaucracy will prevent it from acting appropriately when unexpected events 
occur. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
The recommended degree of organizational complexity is medium (cf 62). 
Medium size organizations should have medium organizational complexity. IOC has a 
technology that is somewhat routine, which implies that the organizational complexity 
should be medium. The environmental uncertainty of IOC is high, and the equivocality of 
IOC's environment is medium. For this situation the organizational complexity should be 
medium. There is no need for an elaborate hierarchy or work specialization. Top 
management of IOC has a preference for a medium level of micro-involvement, which 
drives the organizational complexity towards medium. Because IOC has an advanced 
information system, organizational complexity can be greater than it could otherwise. A 
developmental climate in the organization requires a medium level of complexity. 
The recommended degree of horizontal differentiation is medium (cf 27). 
The recommended degree of vertical differentiation is medium (cf 48). 
It, too, could be: low (cf 44). 
The recommended degree of formalization is medium (cf 53). 
There should be some formalization between the organizational units but less 
formalization within the units due to the high professionalization. Medium size 
organizations should have medium formalization. Organizations with medium-routine 
technology should have a medium formalization. Medium formalization is consistent 
with the leadership style when top management's preference for micro-involvement is 
neither very great nor very low. 
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The recommended degree of centralization is medium (cf 59). 
IOC has an analyzer with innovation strategy. Centralization should be medium. There 
should be tight control over current activities and looser control over new ventures. When 
there is a high capital requirement and the product innovation is high, as is the case for 
IOC, centralization should be medium. IOC is of medium size. Such organizations should 
have medium to high centralization. Medium centralization is recommended when top 
management has neither a great desire nor very little desire for micro-involvement. 
Because IOC has an advanced information system, centralization can be greater than it 
could otherwise. A developmental climate in the organization requires a medium to low 
level of centralization. 
IOC's span of control should be moderate (cf 49). 
Since IOC has some technology routineness, it should have a moderate span of control. 
IOC should use media with medium media richness (cf 70). 
The information media that IOC uses should provide a large amount of information (cf 
85). 
Incentives should be based on results (cf 85). 
IOC should use meetings as means for coordination and control (cf 79). 
When IOC's environment has medium equivocality, high uncertainty, and high 
complexity, coordination and control should be obtained through integrators and group 
meetings. The richness of the media used should be medium with a large amount of 
information to cope with the environmental complexity and uncertainty. Incentives must 
be results based. Coordination within each division is very important. Coordination 
between (among) divisions is usually relegated to top management, which is also 
concerned about strategic direction and allocation of funds between (among) the 
divisions. Technology efficiencies can be obtained by sharing technology, information 
and new developments across divisions. Liaison managers and technology committees are 
possible coordination mechanisms. Conferences among technical professionals can be 
very effective. When the organization has a developmental climate, coordination should 
be obtained using planning, integrators and meetings. Incentives could be results based 
with an individual orientation. An organization with a developmental climate will likely 




Organizational misfits compares the recommended organization with the current 
organization. 
The following organizational misfits are present: (cf 100). 
Current and prescribed formalization do not match. 
MORE DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are a number of more detailed recommendations (cf 100). 
You may consider fewer written job descriptions. 
Managerial employees may be asked to pay less attention to written instructions and 
procedures. 
You may consider having fewer rules and procedures put in writing. 
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Assistant Attorney General for Administration 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
Altemate Dispute Resolution 
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Assistant Secretary of Defense 








Bureau of Engraving and Printing 
Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Bureau of Prisons 
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C3I, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
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Computer Network Attack 
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Deputy Assistant Secretary of Information Resources Management 
Director of Central Intelligence 
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence 
Distributed Denial of Service 
Drug Enforcement Administration 
Departmental Information Officer 
Department of Commerce 
Department of Defense 
Department of Energy 
Department of Education 
Department of.Housing and Urban Development 
Department of the Interior 
Department of the Interior Network 
Department of Justice 
Department of Labor 
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Economic Development Administration 
Environmental Protection Agency 
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Federal Law Enforcement Training Center 
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Federal Railroad Administration 
Federal Transit Administration 
Federal Trade Commission 
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Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration 
GILS Government Information Locator System 
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HUD 
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Bureau of International Labor Affairs 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Information Operations 
Information Resource Management 
Internal Revenue Service 
Information Systems 
Inter-Services Security Board 
Information Technology 
International Trade Administration 





Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Security Control 
Justice Management Division 
LAN Local Area Network 
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Management 
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy 
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Office of Computer Services 
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Office of Information Analysis and Access 
Office of Information Collection 
Office of Information Collection and Analysis 
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Office of Information Planning and Review 
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Office of Information Systems 
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or High Command of the Armed Forces 
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Office of Small Business Programs 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 
Occupational Safety & Health Administration 
Office of Strategic Services 
Office of the Secretary of Transportation 
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Office of Thrift Supervision 






Policy, Management & Budget 
Patent and Trademark Office 
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Sicherheitsdienst or Security Police 
Securities and Exchange Commission 
Secret Intelligence Service 
Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation 
Special Operations Executive 
Office of the Solicitor 
Schutzstaffel or Protective Squadrons 
Social Security Administration 
Surface Transportation Board 
TA Technology Administration 
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TASC - Transportation Administrative Services Center 
TFF - Treasury Forfeiture Fund 
TEBEC - Technology Investment Board Executive Committee 
TM - Technology Management 
U.S. - Untied States 
USA - United States Army 
USAF - United States Air Force 
USAID - United States Agency for International Development 
USCG - United States Coast Guard 
USDA - United States Department of Agriculture 
USN - United States Navy 
USMC - United States Marine Corps 
USMS - United States Marshal Service 
USSS - United States Customs Service 
VA - Department of Veteran's Affairs 
VBA - Veteran's Benefits Administration 
VHA - Veteran's Health Administration 
VETS - Veteran's Employment & Training Service 
WB - Women's Bureau 
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction 
XX - Double Cross Committee 
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APPENDIX D. IO TERMINOLOGY & DEFINITIONS 
Computer Network Attack - operations conducted to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 
information resident in computers and computer networks or the computers and networks 
themselves. 
Computer Network Defense - operations and precautions conducted to disrupt, deny or 
destroy an adversary's ability to attack information resident in your computers and 
computer networks or your computers and networks themselves. 
Deception - measures designed to mislead an adversary by manipulation, distortion, or 
falsification of evidence to induce a reaction prejudicial to that adversary's interest. 
Information - facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. It is the meaning that a 
human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. 
The same information may hold different levels of importance to different users. 
Information Operations - actions taken to affect adversary information and information 
systems, while defending one's own information and infrastructure. IO may include, but 
is not limited to: Operational Security (OPSEC), Psychological Operations (PSYOP), 
Military Deception, Electronic Warfare (EW), attack/destruction via physical and/or 
computer means, Public Affairs (PA), and Civil Affairs (CA). 
Information Assurance - information operations that protect and defend information 
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non- 
repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. 
Information Superiority - the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an 
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do 
the same. 
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Information System - the entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and 
components, that collect, process, store, transmit, display, disseminate, and act on 
information as well as the information-based processes. 
Information Warfare - information operations conducted during time of crisis or 
conflict in order to promote specific objectives over a specific adversary. 
National Information Infrastructure - the nation-wide interconnection of 
communication networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make vast 
amounts of information available to users. The infrastructure encompasses a wide range 
of equipment including cameras, scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines, computers, 
switches, routers, information storage devices, satellites, transmission lines, monitors, 
printers and much more. 
Perception Management - actions taken to convey and/or deny selected information and 
indicators to a targeted audience in order to influence their emotions, motives, and 
objective reasoning; and to intelligence systems and leaders at all levels to influence 
official estimates, ultimately resulting in behaviors and official actions that are desirable. 
Psychological Operations - operations planned to convey selected information and 
indicators to a targeted audience by influencing their emotions, motives, objective 
reasoning and ultimately their behavior. The purpose of these types of operations is to 
induce or reinforce attitudes and behavior that support an overall plan. 
Public Affairs - those public information, organizational information, and community 
relations' activities directed toward both the external and internal publics. 
Special Information Operations - information operations that by their sensitive nature, 
due to their potential effect or impact, security requirements, or risk to the national 
security of the U.S., require a special review and overall process. 
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APPENDIX E. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13011 OF JULY 16,1996 
FEDERAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
A Government that works better and costs less requires efficient and effective 
information systems. The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 and the Information 
Technology Management Reform Act of 1996 provide the opportunity to improve 
significantly the way the Federal Government acquires and manages information 
technology. Agencies now have the clear authority and responsibility to make measurable 
improvements in mission performance and service delivery to the public through the 
strategic application of information technology. A coordinated approach that builds on 
existing structures and successful practices is needed to provide maximum benefit across 
the Federal Government from this technology. 
Accordingly, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws 
of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section 1. Policy. It shall be the policy of the United States Government that executive 
agencies shall: 
(a) significantly improve the management of their information systems, including the 
acquisition of information technology, by implementing the relevant provisions of the 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (Public Law 104-13), the Information Technology 
Management Reform Act of 1996 (Division E of Public Law 104-106) ("Information 
Technology Act"), and the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (Public 
Law 103-62); 
(b) refocus information technology management to support directly their strategic 
missions, implement an investment review process that drives budget formulation and 
execution for information systems, and rethink and restructure the way they perform their 
functions before investing in information technology to support that work; 
(c) establish clear accountability for information resources management activities by 
creating agency Chief Information Officers (ClOs) with the visibility and management 
responsibilities necessary to advise the agency head on the design, development, and 
implementation of those information systems. These responsibilities include: (1) 
participating in the investment review process for information systems; (2) monitoring 
and evaluating the performance of those information systems on the basis of applicable 
performance measures; and, (3) as necessary, advising the agency head to modify or 
terminate those systems; 
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(d) cooperate in the use of information technology to improve the productivity of Federal 
programs and to promote a coordinated, interoperable, secure, and shared Government- 
wide infrastructure that is provided and supported by a diversity of private sector 
suppliers and a well-trained corps of information technology professionals; and 
(e) establish an interagency support structure that builds on existing successful 
interagency efforts and shall provide expertise and advice to agencies; expand the skill 
and career development opportunities of information technology professionals; improve 
the management and use of information technology within and among agencies by 
developing information technology procedures and standards and by identifying and 
sharing experiences, ideas, and promising practices; and provide innovative, multi- 
disciplinary, project-specific support to agencies to enhance interoperability, minimize 
unnecessary duplication of effort, and capitalize on agency successes. 
Sec. 2. Responsibilities of Agency Heads. The head of each executive agency shall: 
(a) effectively use information technology to improve mission performance and service to 
the public; 
(b) strengthen the quality of decisions about the employment of information resources to 
meet mission needs through integrated analysis, planning, budgeting, and evaluation 
processes, including: 
(1) determining, before making investments in new information systems, whether the 
Government should be performing the function, if the private sector or another agency 
should support the function, and if the function needs to be or has been appropriately 
redesigned to improve its efficiency; 
(2) establishing mission-based performance measures for information systems 
investments, aligned with agency performance plans prepared pursuant to the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (Public Law 103-62); 
(3) establishing agency-wide and project-level management structures and processes 
responsible and accountable for managing, selecting, controlling, and evaluating 
investments in information systems, with authority for terminating information systems 
when appropriate; 
(4) supporting appropriate training of personnel; and 
(5) seeking the advice of, participating in, and supporting the interagency support 
structure set forth in this order; 
(c) select CIOs with the experience and skills necessary to accomplish the duties set out 
in law and policy, including this order, and involve the CIO at the highest level of the 
agency in the processes and decisions set out in this section; 
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(d) ensure that the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the 
executive agency are adequate; 
(e) where appropriate, and in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation and 
guidance to be issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), structure major 
information systems investments into manageable projects as narrow in scope and brief in 
duration as practicable, consistent with the Information Technology Act, to reduce risk, 
promote flexibility and interoperability, increase accountability, and better correlate 
mission need with current technology and market conditions; and 
(f) to the extent permitted by law, enter into a contract that provides for multi-agency 
acquisitions of information technology as an executive agent for the Government, if and 
in the manner that the Director of OMB considers it advantageous to do so. 
Sec. 3. Chief Information Officers Council, (a) Purpose and Functions. A Chief 
Information Officers Council ("CIO Council") is established as the principal interagency 
forum to improve agency practices on such matters as the design, modernization, use, 
sharing, and performance of agency information resources. The Council shall: 
(1) develop recommendations for overall Federal information technology management 
policy, procedures, and standards; 
(2) share experiences, ideas, and promising practices, including work process redesign 
and the development of performance measures, to improve the management of 
information resources; 
(3) identify opportunities, make recommendations for, and sponsor cooperation in using 
information resources; 
(4) assess and address the hiring, training, classification, and professional development 
needs of the Federal Government with respect to information resources management; 
(5) make recommendations and provided advice to appropriate executive agencies and 
organizations, including advice to OMB on the Government-wide strategic plan required 
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995; and 
(6) seek the views of the Chief Financial Officers Council, Government Information 
Technology Services Board, Information Technology Resources Board, Federal 
Procurement Council, industry, academia, and State and local governments on matters of 
concern to the Council as appropriate. 
(b) Membership. The CIO Council shall be composed of the CIOs and Deputy CIOs of 
the following executive agencies plus two representatives from other agencies: 
1.   Department of State; 
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2. Department of the Treasury; 
3. Department of Defense; 
4. Department of Justice; 
5. Department of the Interior; 
6. Department of Agriculture; 
7. Department of Commerce; 
8. Department of Labor; 
9. Department of Health and Human Services; 
10. Department of Housing and Urban Development; 
11. Department of Transportation; 
12. Department of Energy; 
13. Department of Education; 
14. Department of Veterans Affairs; 
15. Environmental Protection Agency; 
16. Federal Emergency Management Agency; 
17. Central Intelligence Agency; 
18. Small Business Administration; 
19. Social Security Administration; 
20. Department of the Army; 
21. Department of the Navy; 
22. Department of the Air Force; 
23. National Aeronautics and Space Administration; 
24. Agency for International Development; 
25. General Services Administration; 
26. National Science Foundation; 
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27. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; and 
28. Office of Personnel Management. 
The Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB, the 
Controller of the Office of Federal Financial Management of OMB, the Administrator of 
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy of OMB, a Senior Representative of the Office 
of Science and Technology Policy, the Chair of the Government Information Technology 
Services Board, and the Chair of the Information Technology Resources Board shall also 
be members. The CIO Council shall be chaired by the Deputy Director for Management 
of OMB. The Vice Chair, elected by the CIO Council on a rotating basis, shall be an 
agency CIO. 
Sec. 4. Government Information Technology Services Board. 
(a) Purpose and Functions. A Government Information Technology Services Board 
("Services Board") is established to ensure continued implementation of the information 
technology recommendations of the National Performance Review and to identify and 
promote the development of innovative technologies, standards, and practices among 
agencies and State and local governments and the private sector. It shall seek the views of 
experts from industry, academia, and State and local governments on matters of concern 
to the Services Board as appropriate. The Services Board shall also make 
recommendations to the agencies, the CIO Council, OMB, and others as appropriate, and 
assist in the following: 
(1) creating opportunities for cross-agency cooperation and intergovernmental approaches 
in using information resources to support common operational areas and to develop and 
provide shared Government-wide infrastructure services; 
(2) developing shared Government-wide information infrastructure services to be used for 
innovative, multi-agency information technology projects; 
(3) creating and utilizing affinity groups for particular business or technology areas; and 
(4) developing with the National Institute of Standards and Technology and with 
established standards bodies, standards and guidelines pertaining to Federal information 
systems, consistent with the limitations contained in the Computer Security Act of 1987 
(40 U.S.C. 759 note), as amended by the Information Technology Act. 
(b) Membership. The Services Board shall be composed of individuals from agencies 
based on their proven expertise or accomplishments in fields necessary to achieve its 
goals. Major government mission areas such as electronic benefits, electronic commerce, 
law enforcement, environmental protection, national defense, and health care may be 
represented on the Services Board to provide a program operations perspective. Initial 
selection of members will be made by OMB in consultation with other agencies as 
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appropriate. The CIO Council may nominate two members. The Services Board shall 
recommend new members to OMB for consideration. The Chair will be elected by the 
Services Board. 
Sec. 5. Information Technology Resources Board. 
(a) Purpose and Functions. An Information Technology Resources Board ("Resource 
Board") is established to provide independent assessments to assist in the development, 
acquisition, and management of selected major information systems and to provide 
recommendations to agency heads and OMB as appropriated. The Resources Board shall: 
(1) review, at the request of an agency and OMB, specific information systems proposed 
or under development and make recommendations to the agency and OMB regarding the 
status of systems or next steps; 
(2) publicize lessons learned and promising practices based on information systems 
reviewed by the Board; and 
(3) seek the views of experts from industry, academia, and State and local governments 
on matters of concern to the Resources Board, as appropriate. 
(b) Membership. The Resources Board shall be composed of individuals from executive 
branch agencies based on their knowledge of information technology, program, or 
acquisition management within Federal agencies. Selection of members shall be made by 
OMB in consultation with other agencies as appropriate. The Chair will be elected by the 
Resources Board. The Resources Board may call upon the department or agency whose 
project is being reviewed, or any other department or agency to provide knowledgeable 
representative(s) to the Board whose guidance and expertise will assist in focusing on the 
primary issue(s) presented by a specific system. 
Sec. 6. Office of Management and Budget. The Director of OMB shall: 
(1) evaluate agency information resources management practice and, as part of the budget 
process, analyze, track and evaluate the risks and results of all major capital investments 
for information systems; 
(2) notify an agency if it believes that a major information system requires outside 
assistance; 
(3) provide guidance on the implementation of this order and on the management of 
information resources to the executive agencies and to the Boards established by this 
order; and 
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(4) evaluate the effectiveness of the management structure set out in this order after 3 
years and make recommendations for any appropriate changes. 
Sec. 7. General Services Administration. Under the direction of OMB, the 
Administrator of General Services shall: 
(1) continue to manage the FTS2000 program and coordinate the follow-on to that 
program, on behalf of and with the advice of customer agencies; 
(2) develop, maintain, and disseminate for the use of the Federal community, as requested 
by OMB or the agencies, recommended methods and strategies for the development and 
acquisition of information technology; 
(3) conduct and manage outreach programs in cooperation with agency managers; 
(4) be a focal point for liaison on information resources management, including Federal 
information technology, with State and local governments, and with nongovernmental 
international organizations subject to prior consultation with the Secretary of State to 
ensure such liaison would be consistent with and support overall United States foreign 
policy objectives; 
(5) support the activities of the Secretary of State for liaison, consultation, and negotiation 
with intergovernmental organizations in information resources management matters; 
(6) assist OMB, as requested, in evaluating agencies' performance-based management 
tracking systems and agencies' achievement of cost, schedule, and performance goals; and 
(7) provide support and assistance to the interagency groups established in this order. 
Sec. 8. Department of Commerce. The Secretary of Commerce shall carry out the 
standards responsibilities under the Computer Security Act of 1987, as amended by the 
Information Technology Act, taking into consideration the recommendations of the 
agencies, the CIO Council, and the Services Board. 
Sec. 9. Department of State, (a) The Secretary of State shall be responsible for liaison, 
consultation, and negotiation with foreign governments and intergovernmental 
organizations on all matters related to information resources management, including 
Federal information technology. The Secretary shall further ensure, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Commerce, that the United States is represented in the development of 
international standards and recommendations affecting information technology. In the 
exercise of these responsibilities, the Secretary shall consult, as appropriate, with affected 
domestic agencies, organizations, and other members of the public. 
(b) The Secretary of State shall advise the Director on the development of United States 
positions and policies on international information policy and technology issues affecting 
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Federal Government activities and the development of international information 
technology standards. 
Sec. 10. Definitions (a) "Executive agency" has the meaning given to that term in section 
4 (1) of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. 403 (1)). 
(b) "Information Technology" has the meaning given that term in section 5002 of the 
Information Technology Act. 
(c) "Information resources" has the meaning given that term in section 3502(6) of title 44, 
United States Code. 
(d) "Information resources management" has the meaning given that term in section 
3502(7) of title 44, Untied States Code. 
(e) "Information system" has the meaning given that term in section 3502(8) of title 44, 
United States Code. 
(f) "Affinity group" means any interagency group focused on a business or technology 
area with common information technology or customer requirements. The functions of an 
affinity group can include identifying common program goals and requirements; 
identifying opportunities for sharing information to improve quality and effectiveness; 
reducing costs and burden on the public; and recommending protocols and other 
standards, including security standards, to the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology for Government-wide applicability, for action in accordance with the 
Computer Security Act of 1987, as amended by the Information Technology Act. 
(g) "National security system" means any telecommunications or information system 
operated by the United States Government, the function, operation, or use of which (1) 
involves intelligence activities; (2) involves crypto logic activities related to national 
security; (3) involves command and control of military forces; (4) involves equipment 
that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or (5) is critical to the direct 
fulfillment of military or intelligence missions, but excluding any system that is to be 
used for routine administrative and business applications (including payroll, finance, 
logistics, and personnel management applications). 
Sec. 11. Applicability to National Security Systems. 
The heads of executive agencies shall apply the policies and procedures established in 
this order to national security systems in a manner consistent with the applicability and 
related limitations regarding such systems set out in the Information Technology Act. 
Sec. 12. Judicial Review. Nothing in this Executive order shall affect any otherwise 
available judicial review of agency action. This Executive order is intended only to 
improve the internal management of the executive branch and does not create any right or 
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benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by a party against the 
United States, its agencies or instrumentalities, its officers or employees, or any other 
person. 
William J. Clinton 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
July 16,1996 
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APPENDIX F. PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 63 
WHITE PAPER 
The Clinton Administration's Policy on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection: 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 
May 22,1998 
This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration's policy on critical 
infrastructure protection. It is intended for dissemination to all interested parties in both 
the private and public sectors. It will also be used in U.S. Government professional 
education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National Foreign 
Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on interagency practices and 
procedures. Wide dissemination of this unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all 
agencies of the U.S. Government. 
I. A Growing Potential Vulnerability 
The United States possesses both the world's strongest military and its largest national 
economy. Those two aspects of our power are mutually reinforcing and dependent. They 
are also increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based 
information systems. 
Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the 
minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited 
to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and 
emergency services, both governmental and private. Many of the nation's critical 
infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separate systems that had 
little interdependence. As a result of advances in information technology and the 
necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become 
increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new 
vulnerabilities to equipment failures, human error, weather and other natural causes, and 
physical and cyber attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require 
flexible, evolutionary approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and 
protect both domestic and international security. 
Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations, groups or individuals, 
may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways including attacks within the United States. 
Our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported 
infrastructures and non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems 
may be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy. 
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II. President's Intent 
It has long been the policy of the United States to assure the continuity and viability of 
critical infrastructures. President Clinton intends that the United States will take all 
necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and 
cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems. 
III. A National Goal 
No later than the year 2000, the United States shall have achieved an initial operating 
capability and no later than five years from the day the President signed Presidential 
Decision Directive 63 the United States shall have achieved and shall maintain the ability 
to protect our nation's critical infrastructures from intentional acts that would 
significantly diminish the abilities of: 
• the Federal Government to perform essential national security missions and to 
ensure the general public health and safety; 
• state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential 
public services; 
• the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the 
delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial and transportation 
services. 
Any interruptions or manipulations of these critical functions must be brief, infrequent, 
manageable, geographically isolated and minimally detrimental to the welfare of the 
United States. 
IV. A Public-Private Partnership to Reduce Vulnerability 
Since the targets of attacks on our critical infrastructure would likely include both 
facilities in the economy and those in the government, the elimination of our potential 
vulnerability requires a closely coordinated effort of both the public and the private 
sector. To succeed, this partnership must be genuine, mutual and cooperative. In seeking 
to meet our national goal to eliminate the vulnerabilities of our critical infrastructure, 
therefore, the U.S. government should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid outcomes that 
increase government regulation or expand unfunded government mandates to the private 
sector. 
For each of the major sectors of our economy that are vulnerable to infrastructure attack, 
the Federal Government will appoint from a designated Lead Agency a senior officer of 
that agency as the Sector Liaison Official to work with the private sector. Sector Liaison 
Officials, after discussions and coordination with private sector entities of their 
infrastructure sector, will identify a private sector counterpart (Sector Coordinator) to 
represent  their  sector.   Together  these  two  individuals   and  the  departments  and 
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corporations they represent shall contribute to a sectoral National Infrastructure 
Assurance Plan by: 
• assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or physical attacks; 
• recommending a plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities; 
• proposing a system for identifying and preventing attempted major attacks; 
• developing a plan for alerting, containing and rebuffing an attack in progress and 
then, in coordination with FEMA as appropriate, rapidly reconstituting minimum 
essential capabilities in the aftermath of an attack. 
During the preparation of the sectoral plans, the National Coordinator (see section VI), in 
conjunction with the Lead Agency Sector Liaison Officials and a representative from the 
National Economic Council, shall ensure their overall coordination and the integration of 
the various sectoral plans, with a particular focus on interdependencies. 
V. Guidelines 
In addressing this potential vulnerability and the means of eliminating it, President 
Clinton wants those involved to be mindful of the following general principles and 
concerns. 
• We shall consult with, and seek input from, the Congress on approaches and 
programs to meet the objectives set forth in this directive. 
• The protection of our critical infrastructures is necessarily a shared responsibility 
and partnership between owners, operators and the government. Furthermore, the 
Federal Government shall encourage international cooperation to help manage this 
increasingly global problem. 
• Frequent assessments shall be made of our critical infrastructures' existing 
reliability, vulnerability and threat environment because, as technology and the 
nature of the threats to our critical infrastructures will continue to change rapidly, 
so must our protective measures and responses be robustly adaptive. 
• The incentives that the market provides are the first choice for addressing the 
problem of critical infrastructure protection; regulation will be used only in the 
face of a material failure of the market to protect the health, safety or well-being 
of the American people. In such cases, agencies shall identify and assess available 
alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to 
encourage the desired behavior, or providing information upon which choices can 
be made by the private sector. These incentives, along with other actions, shall be 
designed to help harness the latest technologies, bring about global solutions to 
international problems, and enable private sector owners and operators to achieve 
and maintain the maximum feasible security. 
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• The full authorities, capabilities and resources of the government, including law 
enforcement, regulation, foreign intelligence and defense preparedness shall be 
available, as appropriate, to ensure that critical infrastructure protection is 
achieved and maintained. 
• Care must be taken to respect privacy rights. Consumers and operators must have 
confidence that information will be handled accurately, confidentially and 
reliably. 
• The Federal Government shall, through its research, development and 
procurement, encourage the introduction of increasingly capable methods of 
infrastructure protection. 
• The Federal Government shall serve as a model to the private sector on how 
infrastructure assurance is best achieved and shall, to the extent feasible, distribute 
the results of its endeavors. 
• We must focus on preventative measures as well as threat and crisis management. 
To that end, private sector owners and operators should be encouraged to provide 
maximum feasible security for the infrastructures they control and to provide the 
government necessary information to assist them in that task. In order to engage 
the private sector fully, it is preferred that participation by owners and operators in 
a national infrastructure protection system be voluntary. 
• Close cooperation and coordination with state and local governments and first 
responders is essential for a robust and flexible infrastructure protection program. 
All critical infrastructure protection plans and actions shall take into consideration 
the needs, activities and responsibilities of state and local governments and first 
responders. 
VI. Structure and Organization 
The Federal Government will be organized for the purposes of this endeavor around four 
components (elaborated in Annex A). 
1. Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison: For each infrastructure sector that 
could be a target for significant cyber or physical attacks, there will be a 
single U.S. Government department which will serve as the lead agency 
for liaison. Each Lead Agency will designate one individual of Assistant 
Secretary rank or higher to be the Sector Liaison Official for that area and 
to cooperate with the private sector representatives (Sector Coordinators) 
in addressing problems related to critical infrastructure protection and, in 
particular, in recommending components of the National Infrastructure 
Assurance Plan.  Together,  the Lead Agency and the private sector 
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counterparts will develop and implement a Vulnerability Awareness and 
Education Program for their sector. 
2. Lead Agencies for Special Functions: There are, in addition, certain 
functions related to critical infrastructure protection that must be chiefly 
performed by the Federal Government (national defense, foreign affairs, 
intelligence, law enforcement). For each of those special functions, there 
shall be a Lead Agency which will be responsible for coordinating all of 
the activities of the United States Government in that area. Each lead 
agency will appoint a senior officer of Assistant Secretary rank or higher 
to serve as the Functional Coordinator for that function for the Federal 
Government. 
3. Interagency Coordination: The Sector Liaison Officials and Functional 
Coordinators of the Lead Agencies, as well as representatives from other 
relevant departments and agencies, including the National Economic 
Council, will meet to coordinate the implementation of this directive under 
the auspices of a Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), 
chaired by the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection 
and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will be appointed by 
and report to the President through the Assistant to the President for 
National Security Affairs, who shall assure appropriate coordination with 
the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs. Agency 
representatives to the CICG should be at a senior policy level (Assistant 
Secretary or higher). Where appropriate, the CICG will be assisted by 
extant policy structures, such as the Security Policy Board, Security Policy 
Forum and the National Security and Telecommunications and 
Information System Security Committee. 
4. National Infrastructure Assurance Council: On the recommendation of 
the Lead Agencies, the National Economic Council and the National 
Coordinator, the President will appoint a panel of major infrastructure 
providers and state and local government officials to serve as the National 
Infrastructure Assurance Council. The President will appoint the 
Chairman. The National Coordinator will serve as the Council's Executive 
Director. The National Infrastructure Assurance Council will meet 
periodically to enhance the partnership of the public and private sectors in 
protecting our critical infrastructures and will provide reports to the 
President as appropriate. Senior Federal Government officials will 
participate in the meetings of the National Infrastructure Assurance 
Council as appropriate. 
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VII. Protecting Federal Government Critical Infrastructures 
Every department and agency of the Federal Government shall be responsible for 
protecting its own critical infrastructure, especially its cyber-based systems. Every 
department and agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) shall be responsible for 
information assurance. Every department and agency shall appoint a Chief Infrastructure 
Assurance Officer (CIAO) who shall be responsible for the protection of all of the other 
aspects ofthat department's critical infrastructure. The CIO may be double-hatted as the 
CIAO at the discretion of the individual department. These officials shall establish 
procedures for obtaining expedient and valid authorizations to allow vulnerability 
assessments to be performed on government computer and physical systems. The 
Department of Justice shall establish legal guidelines for providing for such 
authorizations. 
No later than 180 days from issuance of this directive, every department and agency shall 
develop a plan for protecting its own critical infrastructure, including but not limited to its 
cyber-based systems. The National Coordinator shall be responsible for coordinating 
analyses required by the departments and agencies of inter-governmental dependencies 
and the mitigation of those dependencies. The Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group 
(CICG) shall sponsor an expert review process for those plans. No later than two years 
from today, those plans shall have been implemented and shall be updated every two 
years. In meeting this schedule, the Federal Government shall present a model to the 
private sector on how best to protect critical infrastructure. 
VIII. Tasks 
Within 180 days, the Principals Committee should submit to the President a schedule for 
completion of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan with milestones for 
accomplishing the following subordinate and related tasks. 
1. Vulnerability Analyses: For each sector of the economy and each sector 
of the government that might be a target of infrastructure attack intended 
to significantly damage the United States, there shall be an initial 
vulnerability assessment, followed by periodic updates. As appropriate, 
these assessments shall also include the determination of the minimum 
essential infrastructure in each sector. 
2. Remedial Plan: Based upon the vulnerability assessment, there shall be 
a recommended remedial plan. The plan shall identify timelines for 
implementation, responsibilities and funding. 
3. Warning: A national center to warn of significant infrastructure attacks 
will be established immediately (see Annex A). As soon thereafter as 
possible, we will put in place an enhanced system for detecting and 
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analyzing such attacks, with maximum possible participation of the private 
sector. 
4. Response: A system for responding to a significant infrastructure attack 
while it is underway, with the goal of isolating and minimizing damage. 
5. Reconstitution: For varying levels of successful infrastructure attacks, 
we shall have a system to reconstitute minimum required capabilities 
rapidly. 
6. Education and Awareness: There shall be Vulnerability Awareness and 
Education Programs within both the government and the private sector to 
sensitize people regarding the importance of security and to train them in 
security standards, particularly regarding cyber systems. 
7. Research and Development: Federally-sponsored research and 
development in support of infrastructure protection shall be coordinated, 
be subject to multi-year planning, take into account private sector research, 
and be adequately funded to minimize our vulnerabilities on a rapid but 
achievable timetable. 
8. Intelligence: The Intelligence Community shall develop and implement 
a plan for enhancing collection and analysis of the foreign threat to our 
national infrastructure, to include but not be limited to the foreign 
cyber/information warfare threat. 
9. International Cooperation: There shall be a plan to expand cooperation 
on critical infrastructure protection with like-minded and friendly nations, 
international organizations and multinational corporations. 
10. Legislative and Budgetary Requirements: There shall be an evaluation 
of the executive branch's legislative authorities and budgetary priorities 
regarding critical infrastructure, and ameliorative recommendations shall 
be made to the President as necessary. The evaluations and 
recommendations, if any, shall be coordinated with the Director of OMB. 
The CICG shall also review and schedule the taskings listed in Annex B. 
IX. Implementation 
In addition to the 180-day report, the National Coordinator, working with the National 
Economic Council, shall provide an annual report on the implementation of this directive 
to the President and the heads of departments and agencies, through the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs. The report should include an updated threat 
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assessment, a status report on achieving the milestones identified for the National Plan 
and additional policy, legislative and budgetary recommendations. The evaluations and 
recommendations, if any, shall be coordinated with the Director of OMB. In addition, 
following the establishment of an initial operating capability in the year 2000, the 
National Coordinator shall conduct a zero-based review. 
Annex A: Structure and Organization 
Lead Agencies: Clear accountability within the U.S. Government must be designated for 
















for Sector Liaison: 
Information and communications 
Banking and finance 
Water supply 
Aviation 





Emergency law enforcement services 
Emergency fire service 
Continuity of government services 
Public health services, including prevention, surveillance, laboratory 
services and personal health services 
Electric power 
Oil and gas production and storage 
for Special Functions: 
Law enforcement and internal security 
Foreign intelligence 
National defense 
In addition, OSTP shall be responsible for coordinating research and development 
agendas and programs for the government through the National Science and Technology 
Council.  Furthermore,  while  Commerce  is  the  lead  agency  for  information  and 
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communication, the Department of Defense will retain its Executive Agent 
responsibilities for the National Communications System and support of the President's 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee. 
National Coordinator: The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection 
and Counter-Terrorism shall be responsible for coordinating the implementation of this 
directive. The National Coordinator will report to the President through the Assistant to 
the President for National Security Affairs. The National Coordinator will also participate 
as a full member of Deputies or Principals Committee meetings when they meet to 
consider infrastructure issues. Although the National Coordinator will not direct 
Departments and Agencies, he or she will ensure interagency coordination for policy 
development and implementation, and will review crisis activities concerning 
infrastructure events with significant foreign involvement. The National Coordinator will 
provide advice, in the context of the established annual budget process, regarding agency 
budgets for critical infrastructure protection. The National Coordinator will chair the 
Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), reporting to the Deputies Committee 
(or, at the call of its chair, the Principals Committee). The Sector Liaison Officials and 
Special Function Coordinators shall attend the CICG's meetings. Departments and 
agencies shall each appoint to the CICG a senior official (Assistant Secretary level or 
higher) who will regularly attend its meetings. The National Security Advisor shall 
appoint a Senior Director for Infrastructure Protection on the NSC staff. 
A National Plan Coordination (NPC) staff will be contributed on a non-reimbursable 
basis by the departments and agencies, consistent with law. The NPC staff will integrate 
the various sector plans into a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan and coordinate 
analyses of the U.S. Government's own dependencies on critical infrastructures. The 
NPC staff will also help coordinate a national education and awareness program, and 
legislative and public affairs. 
The Defense Department shall continue to serve as Executive Agent for the Commission 
Transition Office, which will form the basis of the NPC, during the remainder of FY98. 
Beginning in FY99, the NPC shall be an office of the Commerce Department. The Office 
of Personnel Management shall provide the necessary assistance in facilitating the NPC's 
operations. The NPC will terminate at the end of FY01, unless extended by Presidential 
directive. 
Warning and Information Centers 
As part of a national warning and information sharing system, the President immediately 
authorizes the FBI to expand its current organization to a full scale National Infrastructure 
Protection Center (NIPC). This organization shall serve as a national critical 
infrastructure threat assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement 
investigation and response entity. During the initial period of six to twelve months, the 
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President also directs the National Coordinator and the Sector Liaison Officials, working 
together with the Sector Coordinators, the Special Function Coordinators and 
representatives from the National Economic Council, as appropriate, to consult with 
owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to encourage the creation of a private 
sector sharing and analysis center, as described below. 
National Infrastructure Protection Center fNTPC): The NIPC will include FBI, USSS, and 
other investigators experienced in computer crimes and infrastructure protection, as well 
as representatives detailed from the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community 
and Lead Agencies. It will be linked electronically to the rest of the Federal Government, 
including other warning and operations centers, as well as any private sector sharing and 
analysis centers. Its mission will include providing timely warnings of intentional threats, 
comprehensive analyses and law enforcement investigation and response. 
All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the NIPC and provide such 
assistance, information and advice that the NIPC may request, to the extent permitted by 
law. All executive departments shall also share with the NIPC information about threats 
and warning of attacks and about actual attacks on critical government and private sector 
infrastructures, to the extent permitted by law. The NTPC will include elements 
responsible for warning, analysis, computer investigation, coordinating emergency 
response, training, outreach and development and application of technical tools. In 
addition, it will establish its own relations directly with others in the private sector and 
with any information sharing and analysis entity that the private sector may create, such 
as the Information Sharing and Analysis Center described below. 
The NIPC, in conjunction with the information originating agency, will sanitize law 
enforcement and intelligence information for inclusion into analyses and reports that it 
will provide, in appropriate form, to relevant federal, state and local agencies; the relevant 
owners and operators of critical infrastructures; and to any private sector information 
sharing and analysis entity. Before disseminating national security or other information 
that originated from the intelligence community, the NTPC will coordinate fully with the 
intelligence community through existing procedures. Whether as sanitized or unsanitized 
reports, the NIPC will issue attack warnings or alerts to increases in threat condition to 
any private sector information sharing and analysis entity and to the owners and 
operators. These warnings may also include guidance regarding additional protection 
measures to be taken by owners and operators. Except in extreme emergencies, the NIPC 
shall coordinate with the National Coordinator before issuing public warnings of 
imminent attacks by international terrorists, foreign states or other malevolent foreign 
powers. 
The NTPC will provide a national focal point for gathering information on threats to the 
infrastructures. Additionally, the NTPC will provide the principal means of facilitating 
and coordinating the Federal Government's response to an incident, mitigating attacks, 
investigating threats and monitoring reconstitution efforts. Depending on the nature and 
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level of a foreign threat/attack, protocols established between special function agencies 
(DOJ/DOD/CIA), and the ultimate decision of the President, the NIPC may be placed in a 
direct support role to either DOD or the Intelligence Community. 
Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC): The National Coordinator, working 
with Sector Coordinators, Sector Liaison Officials and the National Economic Council, 
shall consult with owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to strongly 
encourage the creation of a private sector information sharing and analysis center. The 
actual design and functions of the center and its relation to the NIPC will be determined 
by the private sector, in consultation with and with assistance from the Federal 
Government. Within 180 days of this directive, the National Coordinator, with the 
assistance of the CICG including the National Economic Council, shall identify possible 
methods of providing federal assistance to facilitate the startup of an IS AC. 
Such a center could serve as the mechanism for gathering, analyzing, appropriately 
sanitizing and disseminating private sector information to both industry and the NIPC. 
The center could also gather, analyze and disseminate information from the NIPC for 
further distribution to the private sector. While crucial to a successful government- 
industry partnership, this mechanism for sharing important information about 
vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and anomalies is not to interfere with direct information 
exchanges between companies and the government. As ultimately designed by private 
sector representatives, the IS AC may emulate particular aspects of such institutions as the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that have proved highly effective, particularly 
its extensive interchanges with the private and non-federal sectors. 
Under such a model, the ISAC would possess a large degree of technical focus and 
expertise and non-regulatory and non-law enforcement missions. It would establish 
baseline statistics and patterns on the various infrastructures, become a clearinghouse for 
information within and among the various sectors, and provide a library for historical data 
to be used by the private sector and, as deemed appropriate by the ISAC, by the 
government. Critical to the success of such an institution would be its timeliness, 
accessibility, coordination, flexibility, utility and acceptability. 
Annex B: Additional Taskings 
Studies 
The National Coordinator shall commission studies on the following subjects: 
•    Liability issues arising from participation by private sector companies in the 
information sharing process. 
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• Existing legal impediments to information sharing, with an eye to proposals to 
remove these impediments, including through the drafting of model codes in 
cooperation with the American Legal Institute. 
• The necessity of document and information classification and the impact of such 
classification on useful dissemination, as well as the methods and information 
systems by which threat and vulnerability information can be shared securely 
while avoiding disclosure or unacceptable risk of disclosure to those who will 
misuse it. 
• The improved protection, including secure dissemination and information 
handling systems, of industry trade secrets and other confidential business data, 
law enforcement information and evidentiary material, classified national security 
information, unclassified material disclosing vulnerabilities of privately owned 
infrastructures and apparently innocuous information that, in the aggregate, it is 
unwise to disclose. 
• The implications of sharing information with foreign entities where such sharing 
is deemed necessary to the security of United States infrastructures. 
• The potential benefit to security standards of mandating, subsidizing, or otherwise 
assisting in the provision of insurance for selected critical infrastructure providers 
and requiring insurance tie-ins for foreign critical infrastructure providers hoping 
to do business with the United States. 
Public Outreach 
In order to foster a climate of enhanced public sensitivity to the problem of infrastructure 
protection, the following actions shall be taken: 
• The White House, under the oversight of the National Coordinator, together with 
the relevant Cabinet agencies shall consider a series of conferences: (1) that will 
bring together national leaders in the public and private sectors to propose 
programs to increase the commitment to information security; (2) that convoke 
academic leaders from engineering, computer science, business and law schools to 
review the status of education in information security and will identify changes in 
the curricula and resources necessary to meet the national demand for 
professionals in this field; (3) on the issues around computer ethics as these relate 
to the K through 12 and general university populations. 
• The National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering 
shall consider a round table bringing together federal, state and local officials with 
industry and academic leaders to develop national strategies for enhancing 
infrastructure security. 
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• The intelligence community and law enforcement shall expand existing programs 
for briefing infrastructure owners and operators and senior government officials. 
• The National Coordinator shall (1) establish a program for infrastructure 
assurance simulations involving senior public and private officials, the reports of 
which might be distributed as part of an awareness campaign; and (2) in 
coordination with the private sector, launch a continuing national awareness 
campaign, emphasizing improving infrastructure security. 
Internal Federal Government Actions 
In order for the Federal Government to improve its infrastructure security, these 
immediate steps shall be taken: 
• The Department of Commerce, the General Services Administration, and the 
Department of Defense shall assist federal agencies in the implementation of best 
practices for information assurance within their individual agencies. 
• The National Coordinator shall coordinate a review of existing federal, state and 
local bodies charged with information assurance tasks, and provide 
recommendations on how these institutions can cooperate most effectively. 
• All federal agencies shall make clear designations regarding who may authorize 
access to their computer systems. 
• The Intelligence Community shall elevate and formalize the priority for enhanced 
collection and analysis of information on the foreign cyber/information warfare 
threat to our critical infrastructure. 
•. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service and other appropriate 
agencies shall: (1) vigorously recruit undergraduate and graduate students with the 
relevant computer-related technical skills for full-time employment as well as for 
part-time work with regional computer crime squads; and (2) facilitate the hiring 
and retention of qualified personnel for technical analysis and investigation 
involving cyber attacks. 
• The Department of Transportation, in consultation with the Department of 
Defense, shall undertake a thorough evaluation of the vulnerability of the national 
transportation infrastructure that relies on the Global Positioning System. This 
evaluation shall include sponsoring an independent, integrated assessment of risks 
to civilian users of GPS-based systems, with a view to basing decisions on the 
ultimate architecture of the modernized NAS on these evaluations. 
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• The Federal Aviation Administration shall develop and implement a 
comprehensive National Airspace System Security Program to protect the 
modernized NAS from information-based and other disruptions and attacks. 
• GSA shall identify large procurements (such as the new Federal 
Telecommunications System, FTS 2000) related to infrastructure assurance, study 
whether the procurement process reflects the importance of infrastructure 
protection and propose, if necessary, revisions to the overall procurement process 
to do so. 
• OMB shall direct federal agencies to include assigned infrastructure assurance 
functions within their Government Performance and Results Act strategic 
planning and performance measurement framework. 
• The NSA, in accordance with its National Manager responsibilities in NSD-42, 
shall provide assessments encompassing examinations of U.S. Government 
systems to interception and exploitation; disseminate threat and vulnerability 
information; establish standards; conduct research and development; and conduct 
issue security product evaluations. Assisting the Private Sector In order to assist 
the private sector in achieving and maintaining infrastructure security: 
• The National Coordinator and the National Infrastructure Assurance Council shall 
propose and develop ways to encourage private industry to perform periodic risk 
assessments of critical processes, including information and telecommunications 
systems. 
• The Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense shall work 
together, in coordination with the private sector, to offer their expertise to private 
owners and operators of critical infrastructure to develop security-related best 
practice standards. 
• The Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury shall sponsor a 
comprehensive study compiling demographics of computer crime, comparing 
state approaches to computer crime and developing ways of deterring and 
responding to computer crime by juveniles. 
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